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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines theories of policy change by applying them to the 
specific problem of understanding a striking and apparently contradictory 
shift in Paris Transport policy in the early 1970s. The existing literature, 
which applies ecological and marxist theories of policy development to urban 
policy in France is reviewed, and several recent theorisations of pluralist 
policy making, and state centred theories of policy development are 
introduced. Previous work on urban policy and transport issues is criticised 
for an over reliance on functional explanations and contextual evidence. The 
introduction concludes by comparing state centred approachs to explaining 
policy change and draws together a number of hypotheses about the specific 
case of Parisian urban policy making from the models developed in Britain 
and the USA for applying pluralist, intergovernmental relations and policy 
networks models to policy analysis.
The main body of the thesis is then divided into three parts. Part 1 
sketches out the historical backcloth to the regional plan adopted in the 
late 1960s, and identifies the forces generating social conflict around 
regional development, and a fiscal crisis within the transport services 
themselves. In this context the remarkable continuity of policy dilemmas and 
the power and influence of professions contrast with the political and 
administrative instability of the Paris region over the last two hundred 
years. Part 2 analyses the rapid changes in professional thinking on 
regional development, and transport programmes in particular and shows how 
this technical re-appraisal of objectives and management undermined the 
Regional Plan. The argument analyses changes in ideology among key engineers
and managers in the context of the explosion of public discontent about 
transport services in the region which occurred in 1970. The collapse of 
public and professional confidence in the Regional Plan’s solutions led 
directly: to new strategic priorities favouring public transport over road 
construction; to new management with greater autonomy from Government in the 
public transport companies; to the adoption of new planning techniques; to 
formal consumer participation in transport planning and most importantly to 
reduced fares for consumers and increased taxes for employers. The 
remarkable fact of a Conservative Government undertaking so clear and 
perceptible a redistribution away from capital to labour points to the 
significance of the policy change which took place. Part 3 switches 
attention from strategy to policy implementation. Two contrasting projects 
are described in detail from conception to operation, revealing the variety 
of local political processes which emerged from strategic policy change, and 
illustrating the increased capacity of consumer organisations to secure 
changes in public services.The extension of the M&ro to Asnieres- 
Gennevilliers demonstrates that municipal politics had re-emerged, in 
alliance with consumerism and community politics, to create a new 
decentralised local policy making arena more consistent with the provincial 
conservatism of Giscard and the pluralist socialism of Mitterrand in the 
late 1970s. However, the continuing role of national political forces in 
regional development emerges strongly from a consideration of the 
construction of the central section of the RER.
The thesis concludes that while pluralist explanations, especially the 
’broker’ state model have much to offer in understanding the political 
processes in the period concerned, they are unable to cope with the 
overdetermination of outcomes. Empirically, it is not possible to
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distinguish between a ’broker’ state and more state centred models of policy 
change. This proves particularly difficult in the disaggregated and rapidly 
changing policy process which emerged in the latter part of the period in 
question. Theories of ’professionalised policy networks’ are judged to have 
greatest explanatory power in this case. However, the static nature of 
policy networks approaches presents difficulties when analysing policy 
fields which are characterised by high levels of competition, policy stress 
and rapid changes in professional thinking and inter-agency relationships.
The study therefore concludes with some reflections on the dynamics of 
policy networks and suggests ways in which the approach might be refined for 





The origin of this thesis is a curious political paradox. Why did a 
Conservative Government with a massive parliamentary majority, committed to 
policies of fiscal rigour and commercial efficiency in public services, 
preside over a significant increase in the public subsidy of Paris 
transport? Equally why did it choose to raise the necessary revenue by 
taxing employers? Finally, why should it adopt a planning and management 
system for public transport which eroded the Government’s ability to control 
the deployment of public funds and gave its opponents an unprecedented role 
in policy development?
Such major shifts in policy and policy making systems are rare. When 
they occur they can illuminate the forces which shape public policy and 
public service organisation particularly clearly. Understanding the 
interaction between consumers and producers of public services at times of 
stress and change will tell us something about the essential components of 
effective public services, and of policy making in modem professionalised 
Government services. Conflict about either the quantity or quality of public 
services takes up the larger part of the political agenda in many liberal 
democratic societies. Increasingly arguments about quality weigh more 
heavily than those concerning quantity, and the disputes described at the 
centre of this thesis were the first steps in France away from "progress 
through quantity" to "happiness through quality" in the public sector.
9
Transport services in a major city proved a particularly appropriate 
case study for these kinds of issues. Transport is a primary collective good 
which requires large amounts of revenue funding day to day, but also needs 
long term planning and huge capital investment. It is technically extremely 
complex, involving highly skilled design, engineering and management. 
Transport policy is an important consideration in most other public policy 
decisions. The value of land, the supply of labour, access to markets, 
access to public welfare services, the quality of the environment and the 
value of time itself, are all affected by the ease with which people can get 
from one place to another. It is not surprising, therefore, that transport 
policy in France spanned four national ministries, regional, district and 
communal councils and involved several specialist institutes, professional 
associations, private companies and a welter of pressure groups. Since the 
purpose of a transport system is to facilitate movement around as large a 
network of interconnecting services as possible, questions about boundaries 
assume even greater significance than in most public policy fields.
Transport policy was under great strain during the sixties and 
seventies. Economic changes brought with them demands for greater 
specialisation of land use. Construction, retailing, financial services and 
mass production manufacturing all demanded new large sites with good access 
to markets and labour. The leap of scale from small shop to hypermarket, 
from city centre workshop to purpose built factories in new towns, from 
small brokers’ offices to tower blocks for multinational banks meant 
wholesale changes in the demands on the transport systems in a major 
international city like Paris. Population growth brought with it new towns, 
huge new housing estates and sheer numbers of potential travellers which the 
road network and public transport infrastructure were simply not designed to
accommodate. Making Paris an economic success and a civilised place to live 
depended in part on getting transport right. For twenty years after the 
second world war all eyes turned to the USA: the private car would be the 
saviour. This thesis looks at how the planners unlearned that myth in the 
midst of the resulting nightmare of social unrest, escalating financial 
problems and painful professional doubt. The measures taken in response 
brought about rapid change in policy and in the systems by which policy was 
determined.
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the support and 
assistance which many people have given me. In the course of field research 
I was greatly assisted by the librarians and staff of the Regional 
Prefecture, the Bibliottiecque Administrative at the Hotel de Ville, the 
Institut d’Urbanisme at Universite de Paris XII and the Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques all in Paris and at the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science in London and the University Library in Cambridge. Many planners, 
engineers and research staff at the RATP, the Regional Prefecture, the 
Syndicat des Transports Parisiens, the APUR, the Mairies of Clichy and Paris 
and several consumer organisations and transport campaigns gave their time 
and knowledge generously. I am indebted to my supervisors Patrick Dunleavy 
and Howard Machin for their patient guidance throughout and for many 
pertinent and constructive criticisms.
This work could not have been carried out without the financial 
assistance of the Social Science Research Council. The Protestant Church of 
France, the London School of Economics and Cambridgeshire County Council 
have also given valuable financial contributions. The physical effort of 
producing the text has been greatly helped by access to wordprocessing and
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reprographic facilities at Cambridgeshire County Council.
Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for their consistent 
encouragement, interest and benevolent skepticism. My warmest thanks go to 
Julie Statham for her constant indulgence, sensible criticisms and 
invaluable support throughout. The final product is, of course, entirely my 
own responsibility.
Introduction : Origins of Policy Change
CHAPTER 1 : ORIGINS OF POLICY CHANGE
Broadly there are two approaches to explaining policy development: 
those founded on external structural imperatives of an ecological or 
societal nature and those founded on an analysis of the beliefs and 
behaviour of key individual actors who make up the state or decision making 
groups in society, for example politicians, or non-political elites of some 
kind - often professions. This introduction will compare these approaches, 
illustrating how they have been applied to urban policy change, particularly 
in the Paris region, and will argue that explanations based on the purposive 
actions of elites within the state offer the most defensible framework for 
analysing policy change. It concludes with a series of hypotheses about the 
role of policy networks which provide the theoretical framework for the 
succeeding evidence on transport policy development in the Paris Region.
1.1 External explanations of policy change 
Ecological/Economic Imperatives
A large body of theory has attempted to explain the evolution of urban 
and regional planning policy in terms of ecological or economic imperatives, 
which place irresistible pressures on public authorities to change rules, 
and private interests to adjust their behaviour. Such explanations fall 
broadly into two camps: explanations founded on the spatial constraints and 
opportunities in a given area (1), for example central place and locational 
theories (2), and explanations rooted in an analysis of the development of
13
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the modem industrial economy, for example analyses of the growth of 
multinational business, large scale manufacturing processes and the changing 
organisation of economic activity (3).
The starting point of ecological explanations is a set of assumptions 
about the relationship between man and the environment. These are that space 
is the object of competition between people or groups, that the nature of 
the competition is regulated by interdependency between people or groups, 
that the costs of distance generate a universal tendency towards 
concentration of symbiotic activities and that there is a natural tendency 
to equilibrium in the size and organisation of settlements. From these basic 
assumptions theories about the nature of change and distribution of 
opportunities in cities have been deduced. It is common to all of these that 
city growth, and the resulting pressure on the organisation and management 
of public services is an automatic process of competition and selection.
Early ecological theorists (4) identified natural areas of space or 
habitation as the object of their attention: basins, peninsulas, ghettos, 
ribbons along key lines of communication, travel time zones. Within these 
they identified population density as the distinguishing feature of urban 
society and the factor which transformed human relations, behaviour and 
organisation. Density, they argued, created the capacity to make partial 
commitments to activities and relationships and created the opportunity to 
apply the principles of economic maximisation to social activity and 
location. It is this capacity which creates an urban culture. The existence 
of specifically urban areas creates specifically urban social, political and 
economic issues.
14
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The second generation of ecological theorists concentrated on empirical 
analysis of urban areas and the pattern of social, economic and political 
activity which occurred in them. Hawley (5) introduced the concept of a ’key 
function’ arguing that the dominant social activity within a society, the 
type of differentiation of social groups and the interdependence of social 
groups would be closely associated with one another. By empirical 
investigation he described how business, which was the key activity in north 
american cities in the 1950s, dominated the development of the urban form by 
controlling decisions about the differentiation of space at a political 
level, dominated the physical use of space in the central areas by ensuring 
its ownership and use of central sites and dominated the relation of space 
and time in cities by organising the cycle of activity to suit business 
purposes.
There are close parallels between this approach to studying cities and 
functional sociology (6). Its explanations are founded on an analysis of how 
society adapts to external pressures which uses a series of transhistorical 
norms which are givens within any specific society. Individual values and 
motivation are of no relevance to explanation, it is a morphology of natural 
adaptation. The norms themselves militate against substantial changes in 
human organisation, and the notion of a tendency to equilibrium introduces 
the idea of some natural ’balance’ in the environment. Such arguments 
underpin much professional planning and public policy (7), for their deep 
conservatism suggests inevitable and unchallengeable qualities in the 
solutions offered.
An ecological theoretical view supported the formal planning activity 
of the District de la Region Parisienne, especially the Schema Directeur of
15
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1965 (8). The task facing public authorities and their private or social 
partners in the concertation (9) represented by the planning system, was to 
adapt the internal organisation of the Paris Region to external, autonomous 
and inevitable pressures. Formal planning was confined by natural areas, its 
scope extended only to the Paris Region, a space defined administratively 
and geologically, but with no basis in economic or social organisation. 
Pressure for change came from three directions: population growth, 
technological change and international competition; all three were beyond 
the scope of planning and public policy. The plan made clear that the 
problems were specifically urban ones, and policy makers were anxious to 
present the issues and solutions as unique to a conurbation at the centre of
a new urban society in which traditional social patterns, behaviour and
organisation had been transformed. In 1968 Maurice Doublet (10) summed up 
the policy questions facing the review of the Schema Directeur as "Paris 
must choose between respect for the past and preparation for the future"
(11). Later he spelt out the role of the planner as "Not to stop or slow 
down growth but to re-organise and co-ordinate it" (12). This official 
culture of adaptation was echoed in the highest political authorities, in a 
celebrated quote President Pompidou expressed his view that "adapting towns 
for cars is the task for the seventies" (13). In 1970 the Commissariat 
G&n&ral du Plan published Les Villes - La Society Urbaine (14) in which is 
set out the specifically ecological theory which informed the work of the
Commission des Villes in drawing up the sixth plan:
"the basis of urban society lies in the grouping of a
collectivity of a certain size and density, which
implies a more or less rigorous division of activities 
and functions and makes necessary exchanges between the 
sub groups endowed with a status which is proper to
them: to be differentiated is to be linked" (15)
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Hawley’s innovation of the ’key function’ not only enabled more 
quantitative approaches to urban ecology to be developed but also introduced 
a specifically economic imperative into the functional logic of the theory.
From a general theory of inter-dependence and competition for space it is 
possible to generate a more testable and historically specific explanation 
of urban policy based on changes in the scale and organisation of business. 
The key function of modem societies is industry, and the optimal economic 
location of industrial activity will determine the changing use of space.
During the early phase of industrial development, the location of industry 
was largely determined by natural factors, access to power, access to raw 
materials, access to natural routes of communication. Technological change, 
in transport and communication have made the organisation of industry and of 
markets the primary determinants of location of activity.
In cities, still defined as natural areas, these changes are manifested 
in the relocation of manufacturing activity on new sites outside the city 
which allow integrated mass production and the emergence of a new sector of 
employment and land use concerned exclusively with management, direction, 
marketing and trade. It is these four aspects of the industrial economy 
which are based in cities, and which require, functionally, close proximity 
to one another in a central business district. Urban planning policy, in 
this context, is adapting the city to new economic imperatives, in order to 
maintain overall economic efficiency, and competitiveness. Economic 
maximisation by firms seeking new locations for their management and trading 
functions, will produce fewer larger cities with denser central business 
districts connected to one another through international transport and
17
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communications. The overall context to the changing demands of firms is an 
international one associated with the growth of multi-national firms and the 
creation of larger european markets after France joined the European 
Economic Community in 1956.
The competitiveness of the Paris region as a location for international
business headquarters and the associated financial and service activities
was certainly of paramount importance in the plans for the Paris region
drawn in the 1960s (16). The phenomenon of ’tertiarisation’: the emergence
of the service sector as the dominant source of employment in the Paris
region has been the subject of volumes of turgid analysis and explanation
(17). J. Gajer (18) exemplifies this approach: "the urbanisation of the
Paris Region has responded to three imperatives: demographic growth,
housing the population and property speculation". Gajer argues that the RER,
as a transport development, was essential to releasing land and improving
access to labour when the concentric zones (19) which had been the basis of
previous land use plans became untenable. Gajer concludes:
"If, at first, the state and the large private companies 
responded to the needs of industrialisation, and gave 
priority to goods transport, they had, later on, to take 
on the issue of getting people to and from work. Urban 
transport routes were determined by this simple economic 
imperative" (20)
1.2 Urban Social Movements
Where ecological explanations derive from a universal tendency to 
equilibrium in ,social organisation, based on a posited relationship between 
people and the environment, marxist explanations of urban policy derive from
18
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a basic assumption of social conflict leading to a revolutionary change in 
social organisation. The various marxist analyses of urban society (21) can 
be gathered together under the banner of urban social movements. As in the 
ecological perspective it is important at the outset to establish what 
constitutes the specifically spatial or urban dimension of marxist theory.
The most thoroughgoing theorisation of the urban within a marxist framework 
is the work of Castells. Starting from a structuralist epistemology which 
denies the validity of explanations based on individual human action, or 
subject centred explanations (22) Castells attempts an analysis of the 
’urban structure’ which will provide a ’scientific’ urban object as opposed 
to the ideological statements hitherto accepted as urban sociology.
Castells, in his search for a real social form which corresponds to a 
genuine spatial form (these being the only two categories of social 
phenomena which warrant scientific investigation within the structuralist 
perspective) alights on units of ’collective consumption’. Consumption is 
defined as the process of reproducing labour power, it is collective where 
it involves organisation and management (implicitly) by public/political 
institutions.
It is doubtful if it would be possible to identify collective 
consumption units in the way Castells does if he were genuinely adopting a 
rigorous structuralist approach (23). Nevertheless he has identified a new 
field of empirical study and social conflict which it was important to 
analyse within marxist view of social change: protest over non-production 
issues in cities. Castells and his followers (24) in the empirical 
examination of collective consumption retain the structuralist categories 
for the analysis of the total system, of which spatial units of collective
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consumption form a part. The urban system has, therefore, economic, 
political and ideological levels. The economic level is broken down into the 
traditional categories of production, consumption and exchange. The urban 
system refers directly to the consumption element, in that its main function 
is to reproduce labour power through the organisation of housing, transport, 
leisure etc. In the longer term it also ensures the regeneration of the 
workforce through health services, education, childcare, social services and 
so on. Castells argues (rather similarly to Wirth) that advanced capitalism 
is increasing the concentration of collective consumption in more densely 
populated cities and that this requires greater management and hence a 
larger role for the state. As consumption becomes more collectivised it 
becomes more politicised and the capacity for a crisis in which production, 
dominated by exchange values, fails to produce the resources for collective 
consumption becomes greater. In this way political action over collective 
consumption can have revolutionary potential. Given the increasing 
dependence of the bourgeoisie, especially the new petit bourgeoisie (25), on 
collectively provided services, such political action offers scope to build 
cross class alliances. Urban social movements are alliances which carry the 
embryo of an alternative order within them, they have the capacity to effect 
substantial shifts in the balance of power within capitalist societies.
The greater part of the empirical studies, and political analyses of 
the transport users movement and their impact on urban policy in Paris in 
the 1970s, has been written in an attempt to apply Castells’ theory to a 
case which, on the surface, offers a quintessential example of an urban 
social movement. In the process, all the authors depart, as Castells himself 
has, from the strict theoretical framework set out in (1972) La Question
20
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Urbaine. The most important examples are Cherki E. and Mehl D. (1979) Les 
Nouveaux Embarras de Paris and Lojkine J. (1973) La Politique Urbaine dans 
la Region Parisienne. There are also numerous reports commissioned by the 
Ministry of Transport and Urban Affairs in the mid to late 1970s under the 
auspices of the Action Thematique Programme - Socio-economie des Transports 
which describe urban politics and transport protest in a marxist framework 
derived from Castells’ theory of Urban Social Movements.
Empirically, the major tasks undertaken by these studies are their 
efforts to document the social composition of transport protest groups, the 
nature of their demands, the impact of these demands on the state and on 
large businesses and role of transport and urban protest in the creation of 
a new left politics in France. They seek to demonstrate that the groups 
constituted a new form of cross class alliance, that the demands were 
’transitional’ in the sense that they sought a substantial shift in power 
and resources which threatened the social domination of large businesses in 
cities and in the urbanised society, that these demands had a measurable 
and lasting effect on state policy and that the groups were the foundation 
of a new style of communist and socialist politics which embraced 
consumption issues as well as more traditional industrial issues.
There is a substantial body of evidence that the transport users 
movements were representative of a wide range of social groups, though 
Cherki and Mehl conclude "working class people were almost non-existent in 
local committees (which were) largely made up of middle class people and 
students" (26). Nevertheless a wide range of travellers, organised as 
travellers rather than as workers or residents or students, participated in
21
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meetings, events and demonstrations in 1970. It can also be effectively 
argued that the transport users groups were part of a shift in left politics 
towards consumption issues, though it is clear from the literature and from 
the press that it was the political parties, especially the Communist Party, 
which took the initiative. Rather than responding to spontaneous local 
action, the Communist Party positively set out to create an organisation to 
address consumption issues on a cross class basis in 1970. The Socialist 
Party and the Union of the Left adopted the attitudes, rhetoric and policies 
of the users’ groups in their urban programmes in 1974.
It is less obvious that the demands articulated by the users’ groups 
were ’transitional’ or indeed had any impact at all on state policy. No 
amount of documenting the expressed wishes and practical actions of 
transport protest committees, and showing how these entered the vocabulary 
of opposition politics can solve the basic theoretical weakness that the 
Urban Social Movements explanation fails to offer any transmission system 
between external pressure and the purposive actions of the ’relatively 
autonomous state’. Two kinds of transmission context are developed in these 
accounts: first that the state’s role in regulating competition between 
developers and monopolies leads it to adopt certain apparently anti-monopoly 
policies (27), second that the legitimacy of the social order is 
sufficiently threatened in some struggles against urban social movements 
that concessions are necessary sacrifices (28). Lojkine argues that "it is 
the level and the nature of the contradictions between the dominant class 
and the dominated class, as between the fractions or individual agents of 
the dominant class, which determine in the last instance the form and 
content of state intervention"(29). He describes the transport users
22
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movement as "a social movement in favour of public transport interpreted by 
state power as a direct menace to the hegemony of the ruling class"(30).
However, these are only contexts and the external explanations, based 
on social (class?) conflict about the organisation of consumption, the 
quality and price of transport services, the division of activity between 
zones in the city, about the vision of city life itself, can only be 
functionally related to outcomes. Just as ecological accounts are 
descriptions of adaptation to natural tendencies and circumstances, so urban 
social movements are descriptions of outcomes associated with, but not 
explainable by, social conflict. Neither structural imperative is an 
intentioned cause of policy change.
There are other weaknesses in functional explanations of policy change. 
It is possible for policy makers to be perverse. Functional policy changes 
do not always take place even when they are recognised to be functional by 
policy makers. More arcane and flexible variants of the legitimation or 
social equilibrium explanations might accommodate this problem with some 
assertion of long run patterns of social conflict, or internal malfunctions 
of dominant groups which will ultimately correct themselves. It is 
difficult, nonetheless to provide a defensible functional explanation of the 
present British Government policy toward public transport investment in 
central London. Its own studies of the situation suggest that substantial 
investment in new infrastructure, through public intervention is required.
The dominant interests within business and the City argue that such 
investment is essential. The effectiveness of private enterprise, urban 
renewal and other public services in London will be substantially impaired
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by failure to improve the public transport infrastructure. The Government 
minister responsible himself admits that the case for public investment in 
new infrastructure is overwhelming, yet the policy he espouses is not to 
undertake significant new public investment.
Functional explanations offer no basis for understanding the relative 
priority attached to different dimensions of functional outcomes, or the 
different responses to different structural imperatives acting on the state 
with equal force. To take the example of the Regional Express Metro (RER) 
in the Paris region. Government policy sought to achieve balanced, 
distributed development across the region by establishing a new network of 
high speed transport links, this would alleviate population and transport 
pressures in the existing unbalanced system. Why then, was the outcome to
construct one section of the RER which positively accentuated the imbalance
and transport pressures in the region, when the imperatives acting on policy 
would have suggested that higher priority should be accorded to other 
sections of the overall network. The answer must lie in Lojkine’s small 
chink - "interpreted by State Power as ..." . How does such interpretation 
take place and what impact does it have on policy choice?
In addition to the common failing of functionality, each type of 
external explanation suffers from a particular drawback in the case of Paris 
transport. The ecological explanation can offer no rationale for deducing
changes in fiscal policy, its basis in the spatial specificity of cities and
the activities which are pursued within them does not extend to financial 
relationships between different social groups and the state. Yet the 
centrepoint of the policy change on public transport was the redistribution
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of costs between social groups and the imposition of new taxes on the
’dominant activity’ or ’key function’. Ecological theory can inform us as 
to the pressures to make investments, or develop new services, it cannot 
offer an explanation of how it is determined who will pay for them.
There is a difficulty of multiple causation in the case of the Urban 
Social Movements approach. Paris was a ferment of social conflict in the 
period 1968 to 1976 (31). A multiplicity of groups were active on a wide 
range of social issues ranging from environmental protection, to housing, to 
sexual politics, to military service to mention only a few. It is not 
possible to disentangle effective protest from ineffective protest, 
threatening from innocuous opposition to Government policy. Moreover,
research on internal policy discussions within the Government reveals that a
great deal of conflict was around issues which had been determined in favour 
of the opposition, but policy change had not been actioned or made public 
for some reason. This was true, for example over the RER, which was the 
focus of great protest in 1970, although the Government had decided 
privately in 1969 that it would be built along the route that transport 
users were demanding (32).
In summary, neither ecological nor modem marxist accounts of policy 
change address the crucial area of the mechanism by which structural 
imperatives lead to changes in state intervention or behaviour. Both types 
of explanation are purely functional and each has specific weaknesses when 
applied in the case of transport policy in the Paris region in the relevant 
period. It follows, therefore, that this study will be framed within 
internal, state centred explanations of policy change.
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1.2. Pluralist explanations
The explanations considered so far have been explicitly society 
centred, locating the sources of changes in public policy completely outside 
the governmental apparatus itself. Pluralist accounts provide a bridge 
between this kind of approach and the explicitly state centred accounts 
considered in section 3 below. A recent survey distinguishes three basic 
variants of the pluralist approach, all of which are consistent with the 
theory’s fundamental premiss of the state’s neutrality vis-a-vis competing 
social interests, but which differ in the ways in which this neutrality is 
specified (33).
In the ’weathervane’ model (34), the governmental system is pictured as 
a cypher which responds inertly to the balance of competing social and 
political forces acting upon it. The state is represented as neutral because 
the governmental system has no particular political commitments of its own. 
Public policies, in this view, will faithfully reproduce inequalities of 
political influence and resources, such as votes, argument, control of 
economic power which exist in society as a whole. An underlying pessimism 
about the polity is offset, however, by the characteristic pluralist 
convictions that democratic societies provide relatively open and permeable 
structures for political mobilisation; that the development of market 
economies creates a high degree of fragmentation of spheres of influence 
between multiple, complex social interests; that ’countervailing powers’ are 
often created producing a balancing effect in response to the emergence of 
large scale or broad gauge power centres; and that no single interest or
26
Introduction : Origins of Policy Change
coalition of interests will be able to dominate more than a few policy areas 
at once, or a single policy area in perpetuity.
In the Parisian case the competing political pressures stemmed from 
conflicts about access to places of work, about the price of different modes 
of transport, about development of new centres of employment, retailing and 
leisure, about the value of the existing environment and architectural 
heritage of the City, and about the place of Paris within France, the 
European Community and the international economy. Within these broad 
strategic issues, a whole gamut of specific interests achieved high 
political salience at particular times or in specific localities. For 
example, trade unions began to articulate members demands for higher quality 
public services, and better transport to and from work, in addition to more 
traditional claims for better wages and conditions. Groups of civil 
engineers, and the construction companies who retained them pressed for 
investment in new systems of transport, new types of roads, opportunities to 
experiment with traffic controls and engineering techniques. The balance 
between these altered as the international economy fluctuated, people’s 
perceptions of the value of cars, the environment and their employment 
altered, as the relative efficiency of different transport modes shifted 
according to congestion, city design, economic development and so on. Some 
groups of people made explicit efforts to mobilise political opinion in 
their favour. Car manufacturers promulgated a fashion for driving and for 
personal independence, road builders advertised the technical superiority of 
the new roads and claimed improved travelling conditions, political parties 
and campaigns representing poor neighbourhoods, public transport users and 
environmentalists gathered in demonstrations to demand more and cheaper
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public transport. The relative weight of pressure was reflected in votes, 
but also in intellectual and social fashions, in professional practice and 
press comment.
In the ’equalising’ force variant (35), the political system is 
pictured instead as intervening to redress imbalances in social and economic 
allocations. The fact that all citizens, even the most disadvantaged in 
terms of income, resources, life situations have a vote is seen as skewing 
the political system towards the amelioration of injustices and the 
protection of social interests which might otherwise go unregarded.
Politicians motivation for promoting such equalising interventions may range 
from altruism or socialist ideology at one end of the spectrum, through a 
concern to maximise system legitimacy or social efficiency, to purely self 
interested calculations of vote losses if ameliorative action is not taken.
But the end result of a complex of such processes is to bring the 
governmental system down on the side of equalising up social interests, vis- 
a-vis the situation which would otherwise apply in a pure market society.
Pictured in this light the evolution of Paris transport policy in the 
1968-1972 period becomes less surprising and apparently paradoxical. The 
policies were framed in an atmosphere of uncertainty following the events of 
May 1968 which had generated a crisis of confidence among political leaders 
at all levels in the country. It may also be the case that the re-appraisal 
of social values which took place among many groups of citizens, and by 
individual opinion formers, in the country lead to a particular sensitivity 
to providing defensible, high quality public services, with the consequence 
that evidence from research and experts to the effect that previous policies
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had had undesirable effects would lead to a questioning of previous 
decisions and a willingness to pursue alternatives.
There was particular political concern about the power of protest 
movements which could have caused an amplified anticipated reaction in this 
instance. Politicians who were concerned to maintain social efficiency or 
the fragile legitimacy of the governmental system might be anxious to avoid 
major social upheavals, or the circulation of political arguments which 
weakened the attachment of key citizens, especially the comparatively 
affluent service sector employees, to the system’s institutions and the 
solutions they proposed. In other words, the transport users movement did 
not force concessions from a state concerned to protect monopoly interests 
as the marxist account above would hypothesis, rather the state so feared 
the political impact of discontent from a group of citizens with non­
economic powers that they were prepared to adopt policies which equalised 
the balance on interest in their favour.
The equalising state might also have an impact on the style of solution 
the state sought to transport problems. The orthodoxy of the 1960s, that 
road construction, allied to increasing car ownership would expand travel 
opportunities and choices most rapidly was openly challenged by citizens 
whose travel conditions were deteriorating in the late 1960s. The road based 
solution could very easily have been undermined in professional and 
political circles by a growing awareness that it generated injustices which 
were leading to political tensions and social conflict. This might also go 
some way to explaining the decision to adopt a distinctly redistributive 
funding device: a payroll tax on businesses. In such an account of policy
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change the role of businesspeople will merit close scrutiny. Their interests 
had dominated urban policy up to 1968 and yet businesspeople met the 
financial costs of policy changes by accepting new taxation. Intuitively 
this seems to be against their interests, one would hypothesise that most 
people would prefer not to pay new taxes if they could persuade politicians 
to raise funds in another way, or to reduce expenditure so that new tax 
revenues were not needed. What sort of anticipated reaction to conflict over 
transport policy made politicians willing to act against the interests of 
business, and why were businesspeople prepared to accept such actions? These 
issues will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 4 below.
The third ’broker’ variant of the pluralist position (36 recognises 
that the state or governmental system itself has strong interests in the 
resolution of policy problems in particular ways. The state may be ’neutral’ 
in respect of competing social interests, but bureaucrats and politicians 
are not disinterested in their behaviour when the governmental system has a 
clear stake in an issue. Bureaucrats will, essentially, defend the interests 
of their agency or part of the governmental apparatus, safeguarding its 
survival, maintaining its current position and influence, promoting the 
growth of its budget and broadening the scope of its activities. Politicians 
will want to promote policies as vehicles for their own careers and 
electoral success, or because they have become socialised into an 
organisationally committed role during their incumbency in office or in 
their role as legislator of political representative. How bureaucrats and 
politicians respond to emerging policy problems and available policy choices 
will be conditioned most critically by the administrative and political 
stakes they have in the issues’ resolution, as well as by their assessment
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of the balance of political forces acting upon government.
The broker model suggests a much more balanced judgement of the 
importance of external social and internal political/administrative factors 
in shaping the development of Parisian transport policy. While the pressures 
acting upon the governmental system are seen in much the same light as in 
previous pluralist variants, this account places much more stress upon the 
motives, interests and behaviour of actors inside the governmental system 
itself and directly involved in handling transport issues. The principal 
actors concerned with governmental intervention in transport policy in the 
Paris region comprise representatives of several administrative Corps, 
research planning and policy advice staff, local elected politicians and 
other groups co-opted into the central planning systems within the framework 
of concertation. The most significant group by far are the Corps des Fonts 
et Chaussees, a professional body of civil engineers concerned with the 
greater part of urban and regional planning, public infrastructure 
construction and management and the development of both road based and 
public transport policies. Unlike their counterparts in Britain, the Corps 
des Ponts et Chaussees are strongly interested and established in public 
transport and road construction; they have a correspondingly wider planning 
role, and many debates about policy options are internal to the profession. 
The Corps dominates the central Ministries of Transport and Public 
Infrastructure, the local planning agencies for infrastructure, the 
management of public transport companies and the main consultancies in 
private transport enterprise. Within the ambit of the Ponts et Chaussees, 
smaller professional groupings, specifically the Corps de Construction and 
the Ingenieurs des Travaux Publics de VEtat, exert more practical influence
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on policy implementation. The major competitor to the Ponts et Chaussees for 
local influence and central control of public policy, within the 
governmental apparatus are Prefects, who have a co-ordinating responsibility 
for all government services in the Departement including planning, policing, 
economic development and land use controls. The Prefects oversee local 
political activity and are accountable to the Minister of the Interior.
Financial influence rests with the Ministry of Finance, specifically with 
the bureaucrats who administer development funds and public loan funds; 
their interests are articulated by the Corps de Comptes and the local 
Tresorieurs Payeurs Geheraux. Expertise in planning and research in urban 
questions was collected in the Institut d’Amtfhagement et d’Urbanisme de la 
Region Parisienne, and the Atelier Public d’ Urbanisme of the Mairie de 
Paris. Some consumer and worker representatives, alongside some 
businesspeople participated in Planning Commissions drawing up the Regional 
Plan felt obliged to defend of the solutions proposed in the National Plans.
Among politicians local Maires and certain central Government Ministers 
had substantial investment in particular resolutions of transport policy 
issues. The Maires of inner suburbs, or of major provincial cities were the 
key local political actors, while the importance attached to urban planning 
by leading Gaullists lead to a close identification of the President and the 
Prime Minister with current transport and urban development policies. In 
addition some ’backbench’ right wing politicians held trusted positions in 
the tamed regional institutions and were clearly associated with their 
programmes.
Moving beyond traditional pluralist assumptions, there is a large body
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of work examining the nature of administrative practice and intra- 
govemmental politics (37). The greater part of this literature is concerned 
with two kinds of issue: the relationship between the organisation of state 
agencies and the quality or style of service they offer the public and 
secondly the ability of public officials to frustrate, modify or distort the 
expressed wishes of political leaders. Explanations of policy change have 
been based on a synthesis of elements of both literatures reformulated 
either as a theory of ’intergovernmental relations’ or as a theory of 
’policy networks’. Both approaches stress the important role played by 
public officials in policy development, and the significance of informal 
contacts within the government system. Equally neither approach adopts 
strict boundaries between ’centre’ and ’periphery’. In each account a 
functionally defined ’centre’ plays a central role in setting rules, 
structuring debate and determining the style and level of involvement of 
various actors. However the centre cannot be territorially or 
administratively defined, and as a corollary, neither can the ’periphery’.
This body of theory posits a specific autonomy of the actors which make 
up the networks (the state)(38) from the political will of a democratic 
society. The state is able to act according to its own wishes and 
priorities, although its behaviour will differ depending on the degree of 
consensus between political preferences and state officials’ intentions.
Where the state’s intentions and political preferences co-incide there will 
be a strongly political policy making system for example controlling the 
import of heroin into the country. Where public political preferences are 
strongly divided or indifferent, professionalised policy making, based on 
technical norms will predominate for example security policy in Northern
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Ireland. Where the public’s political preferences are strongly at odds with 
the state’s intentions the state will frame issues or decision making 
processes so as to frustrate political preferences for example the issue of 
capital punishment for murdering police officers. Each of the examples 
illustrate that the state is not a unified body of officials, there are sub 
networks within the bureaucracy which, for example, strongly disagree with 
current law on capital punishment or controlled drugs, but the outcome of 
inter-network competition is the current set of policies.
1.3. Intergovernmental relations theory
Originally developed by writers analysing the agencies which managed 
federal welfare, education and energy programmes in the United States (39) 
which they characterised as professional bureaucratic complexes, 
intergovernmental relations theory has its parallels in French political 
sociology (40). These professional bureaucratic complexes are not the 
caricature technocracy so frequently ascribed to French public life under de 
Gaulle and Pompidou by their polemical critics (41), but more subtle 
networks in which local politicians, for example provincial Maires, and 
professional experts collaborate in solving problems to political and 
administrative advantage.
The result of this political-bureaucratic collaboration is a network of 
relationships which serve to undermine the independence of any particular 
governmental organisation, to frustrate strictly rational policy making and 
to encourage the development of professionalised policy systems. It also 
offers an explanation of the apparent contradiction of a strong
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centralisation of policy content, alongside an evident decentralisation of 
policy implementation and management. The policy networks can be territorial 
or issue based, but tend, in line with the professionalisation inherent in 
the model to be issue based. J-C Thoenig in L’Ere des Technocrates - le cas 
des Ponts et Chaussfes has made a detailed account of the role of the Corps 
des Ponts et Chaussees in creating a professional bureaucratic complex of 
transport and planning policy making in France in the 1960s. Thoenig 
concentrates on describing the internal struggles within the Corps over 
redefining its world view and adopting a new set of values and ambitions 
centred on urban renewal and regional planning underpinned by a range of new 
techniques for interpreting problems and defining solutions. Essential to 
Thoenig’s theory of technocracy is the interdependency and competition 
between the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees and other professional and 
political groups within the administrative system. French administration in 
the 1960s operated a set of rules, and a system of exchange between 
professions and politicians to which the world view of the Corps des Ponts 
et Chaussees was almost perfectly adapted, and the leadership of the Corps 
deployed their resources of technique and personnel effectively to achieve 
domination over transport policy development. The centre determined rules of 
exchange and interaction, and set agendas, which promoted the power of the 
Ponts et Chaussees and the strategy adopted by the Corps vis-a-vis other 
networks enabled them to depoliticise policy issues, to accommodate losing 
organisations, to promote the centre’s authority and right to govern (which 
was essential to the Gaullist credo) and to generate a consensus on the 
underlying values which made up the Corp’s world view.
There are certain obvious difficulties when applying Thoenig’s approach
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to a situation of rapid policy change. All the essential characteristics 
suggest stable, permanent relationships making slow incremental adjustment 
the normal evolutionary process. This problem reflects the underlying 
weaknesses of the intergovernmental relations approach: it has to narrow and 
specific a view of resources and strategies, tending to accept internal 
values of one profession as valid across the whole government system, it has 
a weak account of the role of the ’centre’ and pays little attention to 
variations between policy areas (42). In the context of French public policy 
in the late 60s and early 70s, its greatest weakness is its inability to 
assimilate the impact of the 1968 Events and the emergence of a political 
arena outside established local and national political structures.
It would be necessary, therefore, to adapt Thoenig’s analysis to 
produce a defensible intergovernmental relations account of the policy 
changes in the early 1970s in Paris transport. Specifically, a model of 
interaction between the professional bureaucratic complex and the protest 
movements is essential to an explanation of an unpredictable policy change.
It can be hypothesised that collaboration between representative local 
politicians (notables) and accepted professional expertise (the Ponts et 
Chaussees) was weakened by gradually diminishing political legitimacy of 
gerrymandered regional institutions (43) and the associated increasing power 
of expertise in policy making. This might result in more private, secretive 
and hence politically vulnerable solutions being adopted, as the 
professional advice of one group became institutionalised in Government and 
the bureaucracy. Rapid policy change might then take place when the 
professional bureaucratic complex perceived a serious threat to its 
influence from a change either in political priorities or because of the
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emergence of an alternative professional bureaucratic complex which would 
enable the centre to bypass them in finding an acceptable solution to a 
problem.
1.4. Policy networks
A broader, less political, explanation of policy making which 
integrates professional practice, expert opinion and government priorities 
is the concept of a Policy Network (44). The essence of the concept is that 
it does not prescribe a particular set of relationships or style of 
interaction between actors, nor does it define a specific group of actors. 
Policy networks are complexes of organisations dependent upon one anothers’ 
resources and distinguished from one other by the distinctions within the 
overall structure of resources recognised by the ’centre’ or generated by 
external pressures. Rhodes (45) argues that networks can be described using 
five dimensions: the ’constellation of interests’, that is who participates 
and what their common features are; the balance of membership in terms of 
providers, users, public and private interests; the degree of ’vertical 
interdependence’, that is the extent to which people within the network are 
dependent on one another; the degree of ’horizontal interdependence’, in 
other words the extent to which the network is dependent on other networks 
and finally on the overall distribution of resources in terms of who 
controls what and how the relative value of resources is defined and changes 
over time.
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Rhodes’ work, and the majority of the sources (46) on which he draws in 
defining a range of policy networks, focuses on Britain and on British 
institutions, especially the local government system and major public 
services such as energy supply and the National Health Service (47). 
Notwithstanding the anglocentrism of the policy networks literature, it is 
possible, as with the pluralist and intergovernmental relations models 
developed in the United States, to develop models of policy networks which 
are applicable to transport policy development in France. It is arguable 
that several variants of policy networks could have exercised dominant 
influence in policy making in the Paris region between 1968 and 1976. Rhodes 
identifies five variants all of which have features which are empirically 
testable in a study of transport policy making: policy communities, issue 
networks, professionalised networks, intergovernmental networks and producer 
networks.
A stable policy community would comprise a continuous, highly 
restrictive membership, based on providing direct services to users and 
comparatively independent of other policy communities. Thoenig’s description 
of the Ponts et Chaussees could offer a starting point for building a model 
of a policy community in which other permanent members of a constellation of 
transport interests, or of Parisian interests, retained close control of key 
resources for drawing up a defensible regional plan on the basis of their 
direct control of the regional transport infrastructure. Sfez (48) argues in 
his account of the development of the RER that the key actors were the 
managers of transport services that appeared likely to fail in the face of 
demands imposed by urban renewal programmes, and that it was their 
deployment of public anxiety that broke the log jam of approval for new rail
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systems in the city of Paris. Gajer (49) also argues that a close community 
of professional engineers, architects and builders exercised a continuous 
influence on policy development on the basis of their capacity to deliver 
new uses of space, and new travel options. The more polemical critiques of 
urban planning policy suggest a closed, secretive community of key actors 
responsible for hatching elaborate plans and foisting them on an unwilling 
populace (50). This group was closed, independent, linked local management 
of development with access to the top of the political system and was 
unconcerned with other public policy issues. As with the intergovernmental 
relations approach, there is a difficulty on the matter of stability. The 
interesting feature of Paris transport policy in the period was its 
volatility and this is problematic to a policy community model which 
stresses the insularity and independence of policy. In addition, there is 
strong evidence that the public finance policy networks had a strong 
influence on policy decisions and a significant interest in policy 
development (51). Again, therefore, a policy community explanation would be 
grounded in a hypothesis about perceived, or actual, risks of being bypassed 
by some higher authority seeking an urgent solution outside established 
policy frameworks. More plausibly, it can be argued that the stability of 
transport policy since 1972 is founded on the emergence of a policy 
community following the turbulence of the previous decade.
To be defensible, a policy community explanation would require a 
precise account of the boundaries of the constellation, the restrictions on 
membership. Stability alone suggests Rhodes’ second variant, the ’issue 
network’ which is an atomistic collection of interests, comparatively 
independent of one another, whose primary goal is stability and continuity.
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The focus of such a network would be broader than the issue of Paris 
transport and might be linked to wider environmental concerns. It is 
certainly true that a wide defensive network, concerned with the 
preservation of historic sites and open space in the Paris region emerged in 
the 1970s (52), and that this had no special professional or service 
delivery base. At the risk of repetition, this model too suffers from a poor
capacity to explain volatility and rapid shifts in policy, and it is this
feature which will be most valuable when addressing public transport policy 
in the early 1970s.
Cherki and Mehl (53) argue that the result of the political crisis in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s (which they analyse in marxist terms as an 
Urban Social Movement - see above) was an intergovernmental network, in 
which local representative organisations, specifically municipal councils,
Maires and associations of Maires played a central role in the determination 
of policy priorities. These actors provided the transmission system through 
which a varied and extensive constellation of local and ’non-centre’
interests influenced decisions on resources and priorities in urban renewal
and transport. Ribeill and May (54) explain this as a municipalisation of 
urban protest, whilst Cherki and Mehl (55) present a model of constrained 
pluralism, in which essentially pluralist local politics interact, through 
the network, with central government priorities in public finance and 
regional development. These arguments have clear parallels with the dual 
state model which Saunders (56) has used to analyse collective consumption 
in Britain. Without the network dimension, they suffer from the same 
essential weaknesses as the dual state approach; a basic empirical confusion 
about which activities perform which functions, and an unresolvable tension
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between functional definitions of policy fields and a non functional 
explanation of agents’ actions (57). It will be possible to measure the 
extent to which an intergovernmental network operated in transport policy, 
and its importance in policy making, by directly addressing the role of 
municipalities and Maires in policy development. These questions are 
examined in Chapter 5.
The ascendent role of the providers, the RATP and the SNCF, in the 
transport planning system post 1972 (58) provides some evidence for a 
producer network, of the kind which has been used to analyse nationalised 
industries, and areas of public policy where private interests have a 
substantial role. However, several characteristics ascribed to producer 
networks (59) are difficult to identify in the case of Paris transport. The 
RATP and SNCF were essentially dependent on one another, the effectiveness 
and profitability of transport operations depends greatly on the facility 
with which people can move between services, and this was greatly improved 
by new infrastructure and ticketing systems in the 1970s. There is little 
evidence, of a non-functional nature, to suggest that economic interests 
predominated in policy decisions and the membership of the network was 
absolutely stable. New producer interests have emerged since the 1986 
privatisations of parts of bus network, but in the 1970s it is more 
plausible to see the RATP and SNCF Suburban division as professionalised 
public services than private businesses.
The fact that the Corps play such a leading role in French public 
administration immediately suggests a professionalised network. Theonig’s 
account of the Ponts et Chaussees would seem to confirm that one class of
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participant - the professional engineer - was pre-eminent in policy making 
and that the centre, in the shape of the Ministry and its various divisions, 
was highly dependent on professional advice. Rhodes argues that a truly 
professionalised network is independent of other networks. He cites studies 
of water engineers, medical consultants and architects as evidence for this. 
Thoenig, however, describes the significance of interaction with other 
networks and Corps in explaining the behaviour and status of the Ponts et 
Chaussees. It is possible that this apparently higher level of 
interdependence does not militate against a professionalised network 
explanation, if it can be shown that the professional opinion of civil 
engineers exercised an ideological domination over policy making, extending 
into the activities of other networks and other interests within the 
professionalised transport policy network. This would, however, be a 
substantial adaptation of Thoenig’s view of the role of the Ponts et 
Chaussees which stresses their key positional role, and high level of 
authority, rather than their ideological dominance. On the other hand, 
ideological dominance is better adapted to explaining volatility in policy, 
since the options available and their respective merits tend to follow 
professional fashions based on practice rather than stable political 
interdependencies.
1.5. Summary
This overview has distinguished two fundamental approaches. While not 
denying the contextual importance of structural imperatives, of either 
environmental or economic origin, it has stressed that the primary basis for 
explaining policy change must be an account of the way in which actors
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within the ’state’ changed their behaviour, opinions and priorities.
Structuralist and functionalist accounts of policy change have, therefore, 
been rejected in favour of explanations based on either political mediation 
or on the sociology of administration and public services. Comtemporary 
accounts of policy development, political argument and professional thinking 
have been placed either within a broad framework of pluralist political 
analysis, or a general discussion of the role of policy networks. In both 
cases it has been necessary to detach these accounts from a specific 
normative or polemical purpose, and to make cross national comparisons of 
the applicability of arguments formulated outside France.
The state centred frameworks for analysing policy have provided a basis 
from which several hypotheses have been generated which may illuminate the 
case of Paris transport between 1968 and 1976. The ability to explain 
episodic volatility and rapid shifts in policy, and subsequent stability, 
will be a key test of these various approaches.
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CHAPTER 2 - The Evolution of Transport Policy M aking in Paris
There has been publicly organised transport of one kind or another 
trundling over or under the streets of Paris since 1661 (60). Despite the 
immense changes which the city, the surrounding countryside and the 
political life of its people, have undergone since then some strong common 
threads run through the history of transport policy. They set the stage for 
the policy changes which are the focus of this study.
Of course, the shape of Paris has been transformed. There are new 
bridges across the Seine, new routes into and across the city, a massive 
sprawl of suburbs and several totally new settlements in the city’s 
hinterland. Tower blocks reach high above the city and railway lines plough 
deep below the river bed. Great swathes have been cut through the old 
districts to bring commuters into the city centre on new roads and 
railways. The economic life of the city is based upon international trade, 
Government and public administration, finance and modem industrial 
manufacturing. Many old trades have long since disappeared, and the 
importance of the river as the principal trading route in France has 
declined(61). Paris remains the seat of Government and the administrative 
structures set in place in the 1660s are recognisable today. The Government 
which oversees them is the product of two empires and five republics and 
symbolises a further effort to establish stable effective democratic 
republicanism. The powers and responsibilities of Government have extended 
into many spheres of life. One of the themes of this resume will be the way
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that Governments have developed new approaches to the organisation of public 
services.
Three major continuities are evident in the history of urban planning 
and transport policy. The travel patterns which exist today emerged early in 
the processes of urbanisation and have been consistently reinforced by 
economic pressures and public policy. The intervention of the state, while 
using different means in different periods, has always been aimed at 
securing a balance of public utility and private costs which will not 
disturb either public order or the city’s principal financial and industrial 
interests. The profession which dominates policy development and service 
management has remained in control throughout the period, skillfully 
extending its role and developing new techniques which preserve its 
influence (62).
Against the backcloth of these continuities there have been shifts in 
the scope and role of transport planning. In the twentieth century a 
regional dimension to state intervention has emerged, characterised by 
fierce disputes between existing levels of public administration and 
disputes between professional groups within public service. The Fifth 
Republic has seen the creation of a new level of administration in the 
region and the creation of new Departements (63). Alongside these 
administrative re-organisations, public transport has come to play a more 
important role in the overall design for regional development: partly as a 
result of dominant professional thinking and partly through new approaches 
to coping with population growth and the international post war economy.
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The following sections draw out these five themes looking first at 
continuities and then at major changes.
2.1 : Continuity in travel patterns
The travel patterns evident in Paris today can be traced back over 
three hundred years. The great changes in planning, architecture, economic 
life and technology have all served to re-inforce a set of traffic flows 
which are determined partly through geography, but as much through the 
steady re-inforcement of established behaviour by public policy and private 
development. The first omnibuses in 1661 established the basic criss-cross 
pattern of city centre travel, crossing at Place du Chatelet, as does the 
present day tunnel(64). Likewise the buses were sanctioned by central 
Government although they offered what was basically a local service (65).
The experiment foundered against criticism of its impact on class 
distinctions - the buses made travel too easy for the poorer classes - and 
was shortlived. (66).
The old, densely populated quartiers of Paris, crucible of the 
revolutionary mobs, were impenetrable to public transport and routes grew 
up along the major routes leading into the central religious, business and 
Government buildings and, of course, to and from major river crossings. The 
street pattern was the main target of Haussmann’s reconstruction of central 
Paris - he created the diagonal and circular boulevards which are the basic 
map of Paris today (67). His aim was not to improve transport but to combat 
poor public hygiene by cutting great swathes through the slums and opening
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up huge areas of central Paris for redevelopment and new uses. Major 
improvements to drainage and sanitation were two of the greatest benefits of 
this radical and traumatic programme. Whole quartiers (68) disappeared as 
the city’s debts mounted and the developers profits increased. However, 
public health did improve and public order was easier to maintain (69).
More significantly for this study, the fabric of economic activity was 
changed by the reconstruction and set into a pattern which would endure for 
over a century as employment moved westward and residential areas grew up in 
the east (70). The single greatest travel demand has always been for access 
to places of work in the west. The new streets added to the congestion in 
central areas of the city by increasing the specialisation of land uses and 
by ignoring the worst blockages in Les Hailes (71) and in the Marais (72).
New public transport links to the west of the city enabled more people to 
arrive more swiftly at the principal interchanges and most popular 
destinations.
Congestion in the late nineteenth century was compounded by four 
factors: the growth in population, the archaic routing of regulated public 
transport, the great international exhibitions and the obstructions placed 
before railway construction in Paris. As the population grew it became more 
segregated. Public health measures had moved many industrial activities away 
from their traditional locations and areas of work became increasingly 
segregated from areas where people lived. As commuting increased the central 
residential districts developed concentrations of the very rich who could 
afford decent property in the city and the very poor who could not afford to 
escape the slums. The routes followed by buses and trams were regulated by a
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monopoly agreement for fifty years granted to the Compagnie General des 
Omnibuses (73) by Haussmann. These routes were not renegotiated to reflect 
changes in population distribution and as a result travel became more and 
more difficult and the financial situation of the CGO deteriorated. Efforts 
to revise the agreed routes were entangled in rows about railway 
construction and all sides became increasingly frustrated by the apparent 
impossibility of adjusting the network to meet new demands (see below for a 
fuller description of the arguments over railway development). The 
International Exhibitions (74) brought huge numbers of visitors to the city 
and created, in the longer term, new attractions for visitors (75). In 1889 
the transport system proved quite unable to support the demand for travel 
between exhibit sites (76) and this greatly improved the case being advanced 
for a new underground railway. The major provincial railway operators wanted 
to link their Paris termini (77). Such a change would greatly benefit 
through travellers, international travel and the profits of the provincial 
companies but at the expense of Parisians whose environment would be damaged 
in order to provide a service which was not for local needs. For twenty 
years the Municipal Council succeeded in blocking the rail companies 
proposals and in 1895 seized the opportunity to build the Metro instead
(78). While the Metro was the single largest addition to Paris transport 
capacity ever, it too reinforced established travel patterns by serving the 
same routes as the grand boulevards. Indeed it had been constructed 
immediately below or above the grands boulevards precisely to avoid the 
tricky and potentially divisive issue of whether people who had tunnels dug 
beneath their homes were entitled to any kind of compensation.
By 1914 the city had constructed 120 kilometers of Metro at a cost of
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620mF. The number of passengers had grown from 16m in 1900 to 254m in 1909
(79). Like Haussmann’s boulevards, the Metro just got more people to 
popular bottlenecks more quickly. It enhanced the attractions of commuting, 
further deepening the segregation of activities in the city. This problem is 
exemplified by the decision to make the Gare St. Lazare the focus of the 
first network. St. Lazare was already the major entry point for commuters 
working in the west of the city; as early as 1869 St. Lazare carried 13m of 
Paris’ 20m annual train arrivals and departures and five sixths of these 
were to suburban destinations (80).
The uncontrolled suburban growth of the inter-war years shows the 
symbiotic relationship between the railway system and urban development.
The mutual advantage to builders and railway companies accentuated the 
circle of transport-generated developments which in turn added to stresses 
in the transport system itself. The rapid growth of housing in the 
hinterland of the city, swallowing old villages and towns closely followed 
the routes of the provincial railways. Swift access to the city was a 
primary consideration in the selection of building plots (81). Public 
intervention to control the development of the district was paralysed by 
conflict between the central Government and the Departement de la Seine and 
by court rulings which weakened local planning powers established by 
legislation in 1919 (82).
Despite its radical/socialist politics (83) the Departement was 
supported by many local industrialists in its efforts to regulate 
development to ensure an even balance of industrial and residential 
investment and an equitable distribution of employment. Industry would
50
Part 1 : Policy History
benefit from such policies by their tendency to increase access to local 
labour markets and through the public support they offered to housing, 
education, welfare and leisure programmes which hitherto many firms had run 
for themselves in what were effectively company towns (84). The central 
Government was more closely associated with the banking and financial 
interests which viewed such initiatives with suspicion and anticipated 
inflationary pressures and restrictions on free movement of capital as a 
consequence. Throughout the twenties and thirties central Government, in co­
operation with the now right wing municipal council (85), frustrated the 
ambitions of the General Council of the Departement de la Seine by 
establishing special commissions to oversee planning and redevelopment in 
the Paris area and by vetoing capital funding which the Departement needed 
to carry out its policies (86). The origins of the competing professional 
networks, based respectively on the Ponts et Chausstfes and the Cour de 
Comptes can be seen clearly in the debates in the inter-war years.
The consequence was that only small developments could be achieved and 
that those tended to be the ones which least challenged the status quo. The 
Metro was extended to a number of peripheral communes, extending the pool of 
labour available to businesses located at the centre of the network and 
improving access to the grands boulevards. New towns were built close to the 
main rail routes to the north (at La Courneuve) and the south (at 
Rungis)(Sl). The Ligne de Sceaux was taken over by the Departement, mainly 
because its limited length made it an unattractive prospect for the 
ambitious provincial rail manager; it failed to go beyond the Paris basin.
On the roads the trams were replaced with motorbuses as the motor lobby grew 
in influence. The Departement accepted without hesitation the arguments put
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forward by Renault and the Societe des Carburants (88). A more important 
aspect of the road lobby was the growing pre-eminence of roads as a means of 
promoting private car travel. Regional plans drawn up in the 1930s extended 
the routes set down by Haussmann into a multi spoked wheel of autoroutes 
emanating from the quartier de I’Optra. Only one road was completed in the 
pre-war years and the first three lane highway in France opened in Paris in 
1941.
Unlike many cities Paris was scarcely damaged in the second world war 
and while its buses disappeared for combat duties, public transport was 
maintained by the Metro. After the initial period of recovery which was 
devoted to re-establishing the bus, Mtftro and rail distribution systems, 
roads began to play an increasing role in transport plans. However the roads 
were designed to support the existing travel pattern by moving through 
traffic away to ring roads, thereby speeding up local travel. In the late 
fifties and early sixties road building programmes increased the imbalance 
of the district. Manufacturing started to move to greenfield sites and the 
major firms relocated their offices to new complexes in the western suburbs 
(89).
Figure 2.1 : Relocation of M ajor F irm s’ HQs.
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These alterations to the physical structure of the region reflected 
changing economic pressures resulting from France’s entry into the European 
Economic Community in 1956 and from the emergence of massive multi-national 
firms based outside France. The Paris offices of provincial industries 
became international headquarters directing business strategy, marketing 
products, raising capital and lobbying central Government. Private banks 
became the linchpin of the international corporate sector in Paris and the 
city’s western financial business district assumed the same functions as 
London, Rotterdam or Brussels. The IAURP observed in its resume of Regional 
Planning:
"ninety per cent of bank head offices are in the Paris 
Region, together with seventy per cent of insurance 
company head offices. Three hundred and eighty eight of 
France’s top five hundred companies and all the state’s 
central administrative bodies have their head office in 
the Paris Region" (90)
Despite the opportunities presented by such a massive wave of 
development demand, these changes in economic structure again reinforced the 
existing travel patterns. New transport services supplied these western 
centres of employment with ready access from the south and east but did very 
little to improve transport around the suburbs themselves. The Schema 
Directeur (see below for a full examination of the Regional Plan) relied on 
private travel by road to overcome the increasing rigidity of the travel 
opportunities imposed by the now vicious circle of transport 
infrastructure-led development. Car ownership was increasing very swiftly in 
the 1950s and 1960s and unprecedented funds were committed to road 
construction but the road programme identified in the plan was as utopian as 
the dream of universal access to private cars. Only 24% of women had
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drivers’ licenses in 1968 and only a minority of them had access to 
continual use of a vehicle (91). Most people remained dependent, at least 
indirectly, on the public transport infrastructure which determined work 
opportunities and travel times. The growing dislocation between a fixed 
travel pattern and new uses for land in the region led to greater and 
greater distances (in time) between work and home for many people (92). Such 
pressures were beneath the wave of protest which engulfed the Government in 
1970 and were the basis for major changes in professional thinking and 
planning priorities in the early seventies.
2.2 : The regulatory framework
Throughout its history public transport in Paris has been organised and 
managed by Government sanctioned monopolies. The scope of monopoly power and 
the machinery of regulation have changed as Governments have developed new 
means of intervening in the economy but the basic elements of the process 
have remained the same. This section describes the evolution of state 
regulation and examines the durability of the public monopoly as a system of 
management.
The first omnibuses were not really a commercial venture, more an 
experiment aimed at changing the way people travelled and at extending the 
possibility of travelling across the city to more people. As we have seen 
the second motive proved the project’s downfall (93). The buses were 
organised by a private firm which had been granted a licence by the crown.
Indeed a royal decree was required to establish any new form of trade.
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Although buses disappeared for a century and a half thereafter, they were 
licensed and controlled in exactly the same manner when they returned in 
1828. The Compagnie General de Omnibuses was granted licenses to operate 
twelve routes in Paris. Other bus companies established competing services 
but not along the same routes. The principle of designating a route, 
comprising termini and set stopping places was built into the system very 
early on. This may seem obvious, but recent research (94) suggests that 
freely hailed buses are much more efficient and therefore the desire for 
regulations to control the impact of public transport on streets and open 
space has impaired efficiency for most of the system’s history.
In 1855 responsibility for licensing was taken on by the Dipartement 
(95) and the Prefect, Haussmann, agreed a new set of routes with the CGO 
which was granted a monopoly on them for thirty years. In 1860 the period of 
monopoly was increased to fifty years (96). Competition between different 
bus companies had been eliminated within the city but quickly re-emerged in 
the form of trams. In 1855 the city council agreed monopoly controls with 
two firms for tram routes around the city. The area was divided by the river 
with Tramways Nord operating to the north and Tramways Sud to the south. The 
separation of licensing authorities meant that it was no one’s 
responsibility to check that buses and trams complemented one another. In 
the city centre buses and trams frequently plied the same routes, generally 
along the grands boulevards obstructing one another and vying for 
passengers. Secondly the tram network extended into the suburbs in an 
incremental and unplanned way as operators pared off slices of profitable 
bus business. These difficulties were exacerbated by the unruliness of the 
confederations of small operators who made up the two large tram companies
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and who frequently altered their timetables or link ups without following 
agreed licence procedures (97).
The underlying cause of the disruption was the greater efficiency of 
trams. More money could be made running a tram than a bus. The monopoly 
agreements obstructed rational market behaviour. The tram companies wanted 
faster expansion and greater flexibility than the regulations allowed. The 
CGO which had enjoyed protection before the emergence of trams now wished to 
escape the straitjacket of its fifty year monopoly and diversify its 
activities by linking buses and trams into complementary routes.
Renegotiation of the agreements was in the interests of all parties but was 
blocked by the city and the prefecture because of a related but separate 
dispute about railway building. The CGO made several attempts to loosen the 
bonds in the 1880s, all unsuccessful. In 1883 it prevailed on sympathetic 
municipal councillors to propose a reorganisation of trams involving 
substantial fare increases (98). The council responded, however, by 
demanding that the CGO create twelve new routes in order to retain its 
existing monopolies and refused to recommend any change in the organisation 
of tram services. The CGO refused and a five year stand off ensued until in 
1888 (99) when the CGO, in desperation at mounting losses, unilaterally 
altered its timetables. In 1889 the public transport for visitors to the 
Great Exhibition proved embarrassingly inadequate (100) and the Government 
demanded changes in bus timetables, routes and the re-organisation of the 
tram operators into two new, more disciplined, federations: the Compagnie 
General de Tramways de Paris et du Departement de la Seine and the 
Compagnie General Parisien des Tramways which complemented the CGO.
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The rail companies were anxious to link their Paris termini, but the 
city council succeeded in persuading the Government that such a development 
was undesirable and that alternative systems should be explored for the 
city. The impending debacle of a second Great Exhibition pushed the 
Government into accepting the case for a Mtftro (101). The new service was 
licensed by the city council and the arrangements for its construction and 
management were endorsed by Parliament. The confusion of planning 
responsibilities increased with the city responsible for the Metro and its 
buses and the Departement de la Seine responsible for licensing buses, trams 
and railways in its territory.
This confusing arrangement persisted until 1921 when the Departement 
assumed lead responsibility for public transport (102). All the bus and tram 
operations were merged into a single monopoly firm: the Societf des 
Transports en Commun de la Region Parisienne. The two Mftro companies were 
merged at the same time to form the Compagnie du Metropolitain. Suburban 
railways continued to be managed, and largely neglected, by the provincial 
railway companies. The Departement made efforts to transfer suburban lines 
to the Compagnie du Metropolitain but only succeeded in the case of the 
Ligne de Sceaux, which was neither a branch line nor a mainline service and 
hence held few rewards for the company or the ambitious rail manager. This 
situation persisted after the creation of the Syndicat National des Chemins 
de Fer (SNCF) in 1937, since the nationalised company preserved the 
rivalries and prejudices of the former operators.
These efforts by the Departement de la Seine were the beginning of a 
significant change in the style of public monopolies and the nature of their
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relationship to Government. The elimination of inter-modal competition, 
together with the virtual disappearance of trams in the inter-war years, 
removed the commercial pressures on the companies. They themselves began to 
put together more comprehensive policies and plans for the transport system 
and engineers from the Compagnie du Metropolitain were at the forefront of 
the Departemenh work on regional planning. The companies also increased 
their in-house engineering and maintenance services. Their professional 
employees were members of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees which included 
key staff in the ministry and the prefecture. While the monopoly agreement 
with a private operator still technically governed relationships between 
state and transport company, in practice the companies were absorbed into 
the public sector.
Vichy created a new regulatory body as an intermediary between the 
companies and the ministry. The Office Regional des Transports Parisien 
(ORTP) supervised the overall organisation, planning and funding of public 
transport in the Paris area. The intermediary grew in usefulness as the 
level of subsidy and degree of commandeering increased during the war. In 
1948 the Government merged the remaining transport operators into the Regie 
Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP)(103) and it is this public 
corporation which manages public transport in the city today. Some elements 
of regulated private enterprise remain on the periphery of the main 
operation as it contracts out some suburban routes to private bus operators.
Rail services remained under SNCF management. All Metro services, the Ligne 
de Sceaux and the overwhelming majority of buses are run by the RATP. The 
ORTP (later the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens or STP) was retained as a 
regulatory body, not least to provide a forum for several ministries,
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departements and major municipal councils to contribute to the priorities of 
the RATP whilst not being formally represented on the board which is 
appointed by the Minister of Transport.
With the advent of effective public ownership of the largest transport 
monopoly the techniques of intervention have changed. Whereas previously 
influence had been exerted by limiting the scope of the operation, the 
choice of operator and the level of profit, in the post war era the main 
powers have been appointments to the board and most important of all, the 
level of Government investment and revenue support. Determination of 
investment programmes was built into the national planning machinery 
established in the early 1950s by Monnet (104). Revenue support is an annual 
budget item for the Ministry of Transport acting on the advice of the STP. 
Clearly the main determinant of revenue required is the level of fares. It 
is also possible for the Government to earmark investment funds for 
particular projects and the overwhelming majority of funds allocated in the 
post war period have been towards the cost of the new Reseau Express 
Regional (RER) system.
The impact of Government intervention was apparent by the sixties. The 
funds allocated for public transport investment were separately identified 
in plans and the level of fares was a direct consequence of decisions by the 
ministry of finance. What then was the point of a separate organisation - 
why not run the system directly from the Ministry of Transport? This 
question was high in the minds of civil engineers who avoided employment 
with so lowly an enterprise if they possibly could (105). The value seems to 
lie in retaining a specialism, in separating day-to-day management from
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strategy and budgeting and in providing purpose for a regional forum: the 
Syndicat des Transports Parisiens (106). The RATP also offered a sheltered 
and inconspicuous comer in which to work up potentially controversial 
projects like the RER.
The public monopoly survived because it offered politicians making 
difficult decisions a degree of distance from the consequences and because 
there is still a clearly commercial aspect to running a public transport 
system. The useful distance steadily reduced over the 150 years before 1970 
and was scarcely distinguishable when the crisis broke. The later part of 
this thesis will look at how relationships changed during and after the 
transport crisis of the early seventies and at the emergence of a new 
approach to public sector management in the RATP in the mid seventies.
2.3 : Sustained professional power - the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees
The Corps des Ponts et Chaussees (107) predate Napoleonic times, but 
like the other public service Corps their strength derives from the 
institutions, administrative law and ethic of public service developed 
during the first empire. As the name suggests they are the state’s civil 
engineers and they originate from the absolute necessity of good 
communications to maintain a strong economy and defendable borders. 
Nowadays, of course, there is much more to communications than roads and 
bridges. The Corps has adapted its organisation, deployment and skills to 
encompass each technological advance, economic doctrine or political reform 
with remarkable facility. It has evolved from a pillar of conservative rural
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France to become the driving force behind urban and regional planning in the 
great conurbations of the late twentieth century. En route Paris and its 
region have presented particular opportunities and challenges to the Corps, 
both physically and politically and these are the focus of this section
The first great challenge in Paris was railways. The Haussmann 
reconstruction work was largely undertaken by the Prefecture and local 
staff but the Ministry’s engineering advisors were at the heart of the 
debate about rail proposals in the 1870s. For the most part the Ministry 
staff backed their rural and railway company colleagues and 
enthusiastically supported wide gauge railways along the lines of London’s 
Metropolitan Line (108). Slowly however, events began to soften their 
opposition to the City’s proposals for a narrow gauge underground tram 
system. First, the Corps was particularly distressed by the inability of 
transport systems to cope with the traffic at the great exhibitions since 
this reflected poorly on them in international professional circles, more so 
than other professions or producers at the exhibitions. Secondly after 
almost twenty years of lobbying, the prospect of breaking down the city’s 
opposition to wide gauge railways and getting a measure through parliament 
to permit them was becoming too remote to be sustained. Thirdly there was 
very little other civil engineering work around because the city was 
paralysed by a debt crisis occasioned by repayments on the loans for work 
carried out during the great Haussmann reconstructions and after the 
Commune (109). Engineers relied heavily on commissions from contracts 
undertaken and the funds which would supply these seemed likely to dry up in 
the absence of a prestige project like the Metro.
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The profile of the Corps de Ponts et Chaussees increased in the early
twenties when the STCRP was set up and the Departement de la Seine began to
look seriously at regional planning. The senior planning posts in the STCRP
were held by members of the Corps (110), as were the top jobs in the
Compagnie du Metropolitain (111). In collaboration with colleagues in the
Ministry of Transport they helped to keep ambitious development proposals
alive while the President and the Ministry of Finance attempted to scotch
local initiatives. M. E. Jayot, Director of the STCRP, drafted the first
regional transport plan in a special report commissioned by the Departement
in 1932 (112). Two of his colleagues, Ruhlmann and Langevin, later
implemented a number of the projects he proposed in the 1950s (113), and
carried some of the schemes right through into the 1965 Schema Directeur.
Jayot’s plan epitomised the skill with which the profession negotiated its
way through the minefield of conflicting interests in regional planning. It
proposed extending the M itro , removing trams from the city but enhancing
their role in the suburbs, building express railways to outer suburbs and
setting up high technology services for the new airports. Gajer says of it:
"The Plan Jayot is a compromise between the main
recommendations of the Conseil Supirieur des Chemins de
Fer, the elected assemblies of the region and the main 
private companies. As such it remains ambiguous" (114)
To resolve this ambiguity Jayot recommended that a priority order of
investments be drawn up by all parties involved. This was never formally
done but one emerged as certain Metro lines were extended and some suburban
rail routes were electrified.
In fact Paris was a minor sideshow for the Corps in the thirties. In 
provincial France their status and responsibilities were growing apace. They
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took control of nearly all categories of public works including hospitals,
schools, airports, sewers and drains as well as their traditional metier of
road building (115). Their work was at the centre of the programmes
sponsored by almost every major ministry, all the prefectures and most
communes. Only a few large urban communes retained their own specialist
services (116). In the course of their work local engineers formed close
relationships with prefects, maires, local financiers and politicians,
becoming key figures in the public life of rural communities and earning
rich rewards from commissions on public projects. In 1941 they reached the
climax of their imperialism when they took over control of local road
maintenance from the communes and were therefore responsible for every level
of communication. J.C. Thoenig aptly summarises:
"The absorption of local services marked (the Corp’s) 
apogee and assured its territorial network almost total 
control of civil engineering" (117)
This influence was founded on the incrementalism and clientelism of 
Third Republic politics and soon came under threat after the liberation. The 
most apparent threat was the first liberation Government’s decision to 
abolish commissions (118). This shattered the basis of much local bargaining 
and the Corps lost control of substantial railway investment programmes in 
the post war reconstruction. The Corps succeeded in getting commissions 
restored when the Government coalition changed in 1947 but they were still 
pegged to a fixed proportion of salary. Gradually the Corps managed to get 
commissions increased at least for the most senior engineers and the rules 
were formally changed in 1953 to allow a higher maximum commission (119). 
However the rules about proportion of salary remained and thus the 
differentials within the profession widened leading to disaffection among
63
Part 1 : Policy History
lower ranking staff.
A stealthier, but more dangerous threat, emanated from the changes 
envisaged by senior ministers for the management of key state agencies and 
public development programmes. The new group of Enarques - graduates of the 
Ecole National d’Administration (120) rivalled the Ponts et Chaussees in two 
senses; they sought appointment to the senior posts in national and 
provincial administration which were traditionally the territory of the 
older Corps and secondly they promoted a style of Government and decision 
making which undermined the approach so successfully pursued by the Ponts et 
Chaussees in the Third Republic. Overall the climate was deteriorating for 
the conservative rural engineers. France was becoming an urban country 
faster than its european neighbours (121). The tax base was shifting to the 
cities (122) and so were the problems which caught public attention.
Politicians’ eyes turned to overcrowded slums, high crime rates, shanty 
towns and chaotic transport networks neglecting the depopulating 
agricultural areas. France was establishing an urban culture for itself in 
the 1950s around the motor car, the high rise block and the nuclear family.
The quaint comfort of the Third Republic was out of fashion.
Some far sighted members of the Ponts et Chaussees argued that changes 
were essential to counter these pressures on their power base, but the 
inertia of contented success resisted calls for new skills to be taught at 
the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees (123) and for a new image to rival the 
vanguard of ENA and national planning. Workloads started to decline in the 
well staffed Services Departementales and younger, more ambitious engineers 
grew restive as promotion prospects dwindled. Decolonisation was the straw
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that broke the camel’s back. Several thousand engineers returned from 
postings overseas in the mid fifties and simply could not be accommodated 
within the existing, now rigid, organisation of the Ponts et Chaussees.
By the late fifties an alternative view of the profession’s role 
emphasising town planning, traffic modelling and a scientific approach had 
emerged among the younger staff who had been trained in the USA or had read 
widely in the American planning literature. They gained leadership of the 
profession in 1963 when Georges Pebereau secured the presidency of the 
Corps. He was the first Ingenieur Ordinaire (124) to gain the top office 
and, symbolically, his greatest professional achievement was the Bagnolet 
interchange on the Boulevard Periphdrique around Paris. He ensured that new 
courses in economics, mathematical techniques, traffic forecasting and urban 
planning were introduced at the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees. He secured 
approval for plans to widen the membership of the Corps into private firms, 
non-statutory agencies and research institutes. Managerial, research and 
planning posts became the profession’s key targets in the reorganisation of 
urban planning bodies undertaken by the new Gaullist regime.
The massive changes to planning law, and the agencies which oversaw 
urban planning policy, undertaken by the Gaullists (125) in the mid sixties 
had a profound effect on the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees and presented them 
with their greatest opportunity to seal the transformation sought by 
Pebereau and his colleagues. The pilot for these reforms was the new support 
services set up for the District de Paris which employed recent graduates 
trained in the latest forecasting and planning techniques developed in the 
major US schools of urban planning. Crucially they espoused the ambitious
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and modernising creed which accorded with Pompidou’s and de Gaulle’s vision 
of a glittering twentieth century city. In 1967 the Loi d’ Orientation 
Fonciere placed the new agencies at the centre of all planning decisions by 
prefectures and introduced approaches to development on a scale not 
previously imagined. The reorganisation of the Ministries of Housing,
Transport and Local Development into a single Ministry of Equipement, which 
was divided into local Directions Departementales d’Equipement (DDEs) 
brought the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees’ old rural remit into an urban 
setting.
At first there was doubt that the Corps had the capacity to seize 
control of the new DDEs and become a town planning profession in the more 
comprehensive style required. Indeed many local staff resisted diluting the 
specialism which they felt to be their expertise and rationale. Other Corps, 
notably the Corps des Ingenieurs des Travaux Publics d'Etat resisted coming 
under the direct managerial control of members of the Ponts et Chaussees.
The Ponts et Chaussees had to cede some ground, and many junior posts, to 
the Travaux Publics d’Etat making arrangements for easier promotion from the 
lower Corps to the Ponts et Chaussees. Nevertheless, by 1967 seventy two of 
the ninety five Departemental directorships were held by members of the 
Ponts et Chaussees (126). The central research and planning agencies which 
had the Government’s close attention were also staffed by members of the 
Corps. By the late sixties the urban and regional planning system in France 
was an extension of the civil engineering profession and the most important 
decisions on public and private developments depended on the vision it had 
created for senior politicians and the recommendations its members made to 
local administrations.
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2.4 : Administrative reform
The Paris urban area has consistently outgrown the administrative
convenience of successive Governments, and each effort to rationalise the
organisation of Government in the city and its environs has conspicuously
failed. From the start Paris has been different: originally ruled by Kings,
its revolutionary fervour lost it the rights of a commune and it became a
running anomaly troubling the neat minds of rational administrators. Since
the mid nineteenth century Paris has had its own unique municipal council,
whose relationship to both the surrounding Departement de la Seine and with
national ministries remained hazy. Except for a brief period in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century when the municipal council
was a leading force for reform it has made little serious impact on town
planning and transport policy. The construction of the Metro crowned the
achievements of municipal radicalism and created the political will in the
General Council of the Departement de la Seine to tackle district wide
issues. As Cottereau says:
"The initiative of the Metro contained the germ of a 
whole historical process involving social movements and 
the introduction of modem urban planning" (127)
Haussmann had maintained control of a massive redevelopment programme 
by strictly adhering to set design principles and rules about priorities, 
contracts and costs (128). Regardless almost of opposition and economic 
conditions the Baron had moved step by step towards his design of a new city 
of Paris. From this effective, but rigid and alienating process, emerged the 
flexibility and pragmatism of municipal socialism. This was not the
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trenchant orthodoxy of the Commune but a liberal practicality concerned to 
promote public health, safe streets, good housing and profitable employment.
It did not pit architects against commerce or bureaucrats against builders 
but drew on all interests to develop a popular and consensual image of the 
future for a growing metropolis. This process was greatly assisted by the 
change in quality of city councillor and city official in the late 
nineteenth century. Although many members retained several public offices 
the city council ceased to be purely an alternative chamber for Parisian 
parliamentarians to chalk up debating points (129). By the early twentieth 
century the council had become a national focus for radical urbanism 
encompassing the municipal housing movement, campaigns for pollution control 
and parks protection, eugenics enthusiasts and a host of other causes.
Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City ideals were keenly supported in these circles 
(130).
Even then, however, the unchecked urbanisation of the unplanned 
periphery of Paris was undoing what was essentially a bourgeois philosophy 
of urban life (131). As Paris itself became cleaner, safer and healthier its 
suburbs sank deeper into degradation and the radical bourgeois basis of 
enlightened urbanism paled before the massive scale of industrial 
development and the new political forces it brought to the fore. Organised 
Labour, and the Socialist/Communist municipalities and General Council of 
the Departement de la Seine which they supported became the key movers in 
urban affairs in the inter war years. As the focus of debate shifted from 
public health towards land use, development control and economic planning 
the central Government ceased indulging local ambitions and ideas. In the 
twenties and thirties the central Government acted directly to frustrate the
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plans of the Departement and some Socialist communes, and was aided in this 
by the municipal council in Paris.
In the early twenties the Departement of the Seine adopted a 
development strategy based on strict land-use controls and direct public 
development of new towns (132). Both dimensions were blocked: the land use 
controls were declared advisory by the courts and the planning powers were 
returned to central Government acting through the Prefect; and the Ministry 
of Finance refused to grant loan sanctions for the new town projects. The 
inability of the council to control private development weakened the impact 
of the efforts it made to structure new investment along key transport links 
and resulted in the highest rates of urban growth in the history of the 
region (133). The legitimacy of the Departement’s plans was continually 
undermined by central Government intervention in planning (134). The most 
important intervention was a "Commission on the Future of the Paris Region" 
established by the President of the Republic in 1929; a specialist quango 
comprising representatives of central ministries and local councils 
nominated in such a way as to ensure that the central Government could gain 
a favourable report. The Commission’s brief was to draw up a regional plan. 
The result was the Plan "Prost" (135) published in 1936, but not approved as 
a basis for action until 1939 and never implemented during the Third 
Republic.
The power and legitimacy of local authorities was further undermined 
during Vichy when control of development and planning was handed over to a 
Government appointed commission: the Comite d’Amenagement Regional 
Parisien(CARP). The officers supporting its work were also drawn together
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into a new organisation; the Service d!Amenagement Regional 
Parisien(SARP)(136). The Liberation Government retained both bodies to 
oversee reconstruction and prevented the General Council of the Departement 
resuming its former leading role in planning. In 1948 the Government 
explicitly forbade the General Council funding the refurbishment and 
electrification of an SNCF railway into Paris (137). Throughout the Fourth 
Republic overall planning was dominated by the national plans and the SARP 
while local authorities sought room to act on their own initiative on an ad 
hoc basis. Formal relationships between centre and periphery remained 
unchanged.
The first Government of the Fifth Republic set about creating a 
regional administration capable of building the international city which the 
Gaullists dreamed of. Any fundamental change to the role and 
responsibilities of the communes or the departements was deemed impossible 
since the rights established in the first republic were so deeply 
entrenched. The Debre Government, therefore, took two measures aimed at 
improving co-ordination between local authorities: a permissive power 
enabling communes to create syndicates for several purposes rather than 
single joint service agreements (138) and secondly a directive forcing all 
local authorities in Paris to seek central Government endorsement of land 
use plans and development decisions. The Senate vetoed the directive, ruling 
it to be a change in tutelage and the Government, therefore, sought less 
clumsy means to assert control of Paris Regional Government.
The favoured solution was to create another unique institution; the 
District de la Region Parisienne. In common with the Presidential Commission
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in the thirties the District's Conseil Administratif was drawn from members 
of local authorities and nominees of central Government ministries. Its 
responsibilities and management capacity went far further though. The 
Conseil Administratif was serviced by a new senior civil servant called the 
Delegue General au District de la Region Parisienne. The Delegue had 
equivalent rank to a Secretary of State and reported directly to the 
President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. The Delegue also chaired 
the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens. M. Paul Delouvrier, formerly General 
de Gaulle’s personal representative in Algeria, accepted the post of Delegue 
General on condition that he had the same discretion that Haussmann had 
enjoyed in the Second Empire (139). In 1963 the Conseil Administratif was 
complemented by a Conseil Consultatif Economique et Social which co-opted 
representatives of industry and commerce to comment directly on policy for 
the Paris Region. The Conseil Administratif was supported in urban affairs 
by a specialist research and planning institute: the Institut d’Amenagement 
et de rUrbanisme de la Region Parisienne. By 1963 the Governments of de 
Gaulle, Debre and Pompidou had explicitly recreated the dominance of 
Parisian affairs that Haussmann had enjoyed. The instruments of this control 
were more sophisticated, wider in scope and better integrated into the 
machinery of central Government than ever before.
2.5 : The Schema Directeur
The Schfma Directeur was an effort to make a decisive break with the 
planning of the past hundred years and to establish a regional system which 
was balanced, economically competitive and able to absorb unprecedented 
rates of development and population growth. This section looks briefly at
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the place of transport infrastructure in the history of regional planning 
before going on to analyse the first Schema Directeur published in 1965.
All urban and regional planning is directed at altering the balance of 
pressures generated by uncontrolled economic and demographic trends to 
secure more or better distributed social goods. Within this general aim 
different priorities can obviously be adopted both as to ends and as to 
means: some public health measures reduce the level of employment, whilst 
others reduce the quality of the environment. Equally, to reduce the time 
spent travelling one might either promote new transport links or 
alternatively try to locate new employment closer to major residential 
areas. As the Government’s role in transport policy evolved from regulator 
to manager so the transport infrastructure assumed a more significant 
position in urban planning. This trend was reinforced by the civil 
engineering, and particularly road building, backgrounds of the people who 
prepared the new town plans in France in the sixties.
Streets were central to Haussmann’s plans for Paris, but not because 
they improved the circulation of traffic. If those had been the aims, the 
reconstruction failed as it left the worst blackspots untouched. The main 
purpose of the new streets was to restructure the space in which people 
lived; to get rid of the dense courtyards, alleys and labyrinths of old 
Paris. It is true that the new streets made it easier for the militia to get 
around, but mostly they brought light, air and sewers to the stinking, 
darker corners of poor Paris. Accidentally, the simplistic notion that light 
and sanitation would defeat TB and cholera proved correct. The ideas that TB 
lurked and cholera hovered in dark alleys were scientifically dubious, but 
sunlight killed TB bacteria and clean water was the best defence against
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gastric illness. Incidence of both diseases diminished rapidly in the late 
nineteenth century (140).
The municipal council’s plans too, centred on the places people lived, 
and the desirability of improving the physical condition of property and 
relieving overcrowding. The municipal housing programmes of the 1890s and 
1900s made no provision for where people worked, though they took into 
account the amount people earned by charging low rents. Much of the new 
housing replaced old mixed city neighbourhoods where people shared their 
streets with workshops and warehouses. The lower density of housing 
contributed to suburbanisation (141) and increased the importance of 
travelling to work, but again this was a by-product of the main purpose.
The Departement's plans in the inter war years accentuated this trend
in two respects: stronger public health regulations increased the
segregation of activities removing many hazardous, noisy or polluting
industries from residential areas and secondly, new residential areas were
deliberately located on the routes of suburban railways, strung along in
ribbons permitting maximum access to rail services (142). The company towns
which had surrounded major centres of employment became a thing of the past
as the public infrastructure provided housing, leisure, transport, health
s
and welfare in one location and a Metro or railway or new road along which 
people could travel to and from their daily work. Planners took transport 
infrastructure explicitly into account when making decisions about new land 
uses or when preparing scenarios for the future shape of the region. Roads, 
as transport links, became the flexible web which strained and bent to hold 
together the economic and demographic pressures generated by rapid growth.
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By 1936 autoroutes had become the panacea, the means by which a centralised 
city based structure for the region could be sustained. The Plan "Prost" 
revolved around a spoked wheel of autoroute class roads. This pattern was 
retained and refined in the plans produced in the fifties, culminating in 
the Plan d  Amenagement et d’ Organisation General (PADOG)(143) approved in 
1960. This added new technologies of public transport to the road system, 
notably high speed rail links for the airports. Transport was not the top 
priority for planners in the fifties however; the shanty towns, slums and 
overcrowding made housing the focal point, and system built redevelopment of 
the slum areas drew most funds (144).
The first priority of the Institut d  Amenagement et d’Urbansime de la 
Region Parisienne was to draw up a new regional plan to give the Gaullist 
administration a vision of the new Paris. The resulting Schema Directeur was 
the first decisive break from planning based on a single focus of the 
central business area of the city. The plan sets three primary objectives; 
improved living standards, enhanced economic performance and better 
preservation of the environment. These goals are set by international 
standards; the plan aims to make Paris the wealthiest, most important city 
in Europe, a capital for the European Community. The Schema Directeur did 
not aim to restrain growth, but accepted dramatic increases in population 
and economic activity as desirable and aimed to direct them towards the 
betterment of the country’s standing in the world. To make room for Paris’ 
international role the region needed to be planned to accommodate domestic 
pressures. These two processes were distinct, though sometimes the same 
infrastructure proposals contributed to both aims. Domestic development was 
to be focussed on two "axes of growth" - one to the north of the city and
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one to the south and both following the river from east to west. Each axis 
would include four new towns which would be self supporting communities with 
their own employment, social services, retailing, health and welfare and 
leisure facilities, distinct from the city of Paris. The new settlements 
would be linked to one another and to the city centre by a new regional 
transport infrastructure comprising 260km of express railways and 960km of 
autoroutes(see figure).
Figure 2.2 : The Schema Directeur 1965
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The new railways and roads would also serve two international airports and 
the new development at La Defense which included a new national exhibition 
centre; the Centre National d’Industrie et Technique (CNIT). The central 
theme of the plan is movement across and around a region between poles of 
activity which are segregated by open space but not by purpose or activity.
The Schema Directeur is particularly interesting for what it leaves 
out. First of all it ignores the rest of France; its vision extends to the 
edge of the Paris Basin and then lifts to London, Brussels and New York 
conveniently missing the grimy industry and extensive agriculture in 
between. Secondly no-one ever worked out how much it would cost. Three rail 
tunnels under the city centre, 960km of autoroutes, some of them through 
built up areas, an international airport and eight new towns do not come 
cheap. The whole plan was certainly beyond the capacity of the country’s 
resources, yet the plan offered no guidance on priorities. This is more 
significant when one starts exploring the interdependency of many proposals; 
can one really build a new airport without a rail link to Paris? Who would 
buy an office complex with no roads to the places its employees lived for 
any reason other than speculative investment of the kind the plan sought to 
discourage? Which of any two projects would be, in the long run, better 
value for money? The end result is a random shopping list, not a plan.
/
The preparation of the Schema Directeur is a revealing insight into the 
arrogance and imperiousness of Gaullist political practice. The first draft 
of the plan was prepared by a special team in the IAURP and was issued by 
the Delegue General to over a thousand organisations for comment. Many
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offered serious and intelligent critiques, not least the professional 
associations whose members would be building the roads, railways and new 
towns. Nevertheless, the final document scarcely differed from the original 
draft and was adopted unamended by the Conseil Administratif and the 
central Government (145). The rest of this study will be concerned with the 
managers and politicians’ efforts to make some realistic programme of action 
out of a grand, inspiring but ill-organised vision.
The transport infrastructure, travel patterns, political pressures and 
administrative arrangements which created the Schema Directeur and were, 
therefore, in part the continuation of long established trends in Parisian 
planning. The leaders of key professions and holders of public offices 
sought to break free from some of these patterns and build upon the changes 
already achieved in the organisation of Government and techniques of 
regional planning. The Gaullists had set up a powerful administrative 
machine, the Fonts et Chaussees was a dynamic group of highly trained public 
servants anxious to extend their role, the state and major industrial and 
commercial ventures were united in their aim to establish Paris as a centre 
of European business and rapid economic growth offered the means to do this 
as well as inspiring public optimism and political stability of a kind 
unknown for decades. Into this promising scene stalked public protest, 
policy reversal and political upset. Why and how did so swift a change in 
fortunes transpire?
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PART 2 - NEW STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS
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CHAPTER 3 : Strategic Policy Changes 1969 - 1973
The Schema Directeur certainly offered a vision of what Paris might 
look like at the end of the century, but it would be quite wrong to see it 
as a strategic policy. The crucial questions of strategy revolve around who 
will be responsible for what and who will pay how much. These real issues 
were addressed by politicians, professionals and consumers in the early 
seventies and the outcome of the process was a substantial change in 
managerial responsibilities and financial burdens. Of course, questions 
about money, professional power and political accountability are always 
inextricably linked and any division will be artificial, but for ease of 
explanation and presentation this chapter will concentrate on questions of 
political and professional responsibility, and in particular at the 
emergence of a consumer voice as an important participant in the policy 
making process. The next chapter will look at the economic aspects of shifts 
in strategy and relate these to the changing balance of political and 
professional influence.
In order to decide priorities within the programmes envisaged by the 
SchSma Directeur it was necessary to establish systems for routinely 
controlling transport investment, overseeing the operations of public 
transport operators, ensuring some coherence between the activities of 
several agencies involved in transport planning and traffic management and 
reviewing opportunities for developments not previously identified.
Institutions with these formal responsibilities already existed, most
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obviously the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens and the Institut 
d! Amenagement et de VUrbanisme de la Region Parisienne, but neither of them 
offered a decision making forum capable of crossing the boundaries inherent 
in the structure of local Government and the various professions’ spheres of 
interest. The inability of established processes to generate solutions to 
the financial and political problems emerging in transport policy in the 
Paris region raised three fundamental issues: how should local 
administration of transport policy and operations be organised, what were 
the legitimate spheres of interest and control of the various public sector 
professions involved in transport policy and thirdly what sort of 
relationship should exist between the producers and consumers of transport 
services?
3.1 : Government interference in regional planning
In the ten years of the Fifth Republic before 1968 the Gaullist 
Governments had taken several significant initiatives aimed at changing the 
direction of urban planning in the Paris Region. They had created a regional 
tier of Government - the District de la Region Parisienne headed up by a 
Regional Prefect. The Departement de la Seine had been broken up and 
replaced by a completely new set of suburban Departements (146). Transport 
co-ordination for the whole region was allocated to an interministerial, 
inter-agency body - the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens. The Institut 
d’Am&mgement et de VUrbanisme de la Region Parisienne(IAURP) gathered 
regional planning expertise and experience in a single institute. Finally 
the Conseil Consultatif Economique et Social provided a forum for eliciting 
the views of the region’s most important business interests. The local
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reorganisation was mirrored across the country by the new Ministere de 
VEquipement and the local Directions Departementales d’Equipment (147). The 
leading managers in these new institutions had seized the initiative from 
the older less formal urban policy making system with a combination of a 
new vision of the purpose of regional planning and a new set of techniques 
by which to achieve these aims. The ethos was one of rational multi-agency 
planning and this informed the system adopted to control transport policy 
and investment in the late sixties and early seventies. However the ambition 
of the new breed of regional planners occupying high offices in the 
District, the STP and the IAURP was not matched by professional legitimacy. 
Amongst local politicians and the general public the new cost/benefit and 
traffic management systems were insufficiently accepted to provide the new 
institutions with consistent public confidence. Neither could the District 
claim any direct electoral legitimacy as the gerrymandering of its 
membership to suit the Government’s purpose was too transparent to anyone 
who watched the percentages polled by parties in contests for Mairies and 
Conseils Generaux (148). The authority of the regional institutions and of 
the policies they developed came from central Government, specifically from 
the President and the Prime Minister who were closely associated with the 
vision they espoused and approach they adopted. The involvement of the 
highest offices in the Government was not merely symbolic; the doubts about 
the technical basis of recommendations emanating from the regional planning 
system meant that conflicts between professions or projects were arbitrated 
at national level in interministerial committees convened by the President 
or Prime Minister. Electoral challenges which would undermine the District's 
claim to representativeness were looming in the form of the 1971 municipal 
elections. The inauguration of the new regional councils throughout the
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rest of France would further highlight the anomalies of local Government in 
and around the capital (149).
Nor was the existing system capable of grappling with the immediate 
local transport issues which remained firmly within their remit. The Paris 
municipal council was generally sympathetic to the Government as sufficient 
centrist members normally voted with the Gaullists and Republicains 
Independents. This arrangement broke down, however, when the Prefect 
proposed the introduction of parking charges throughout the city centre in 
February 1970. During the 1969 Presidential election the centrist members 
had broken into four groups each supporting a different candidate and the 
largest of these, led by Frederic-Dupont voted against the parking charges 
in alliance with the Communists and Socialists (150).
The arrival of new planning philosophies and institutions did not 
eliminate the need for older established forms of brokerage and the Syndicat 
des Transports Parisiens and Regional Prefecture became bargaining tables 
for the national ministries most closely involved in regional development.
The language altered to suit the new ideologies but the underlying aims of 
professions and localities stayed the same. Overall policy co-ordination was 
also undermined by the creation of the new Ministere de V Equipement whose 
local services, the DDEs, were powerful specialist establishments with a 
more defensible claim to expertise in the practicalities of urban and 
regional development. The people who headed the DDEs were skilled 
manipulators of the older political structures which were threatened by the 
Gaullist reforms and constituted an important counterweight to the Regional 
Prefect’s efforts to claim an overreaching responsibility for local
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administration.
There were then three issues within the debate about how local 
administration should be organised; the desirability of overall co­
ordination by a single agent of regional development, the legitimacy of the 
rational planning techniques underlying the Schema Directeur and the 
autonomy of local institutions from national political control.
3.2 : Regional co-ordination struggles with professional specialisation
The Schema Directeur was revised in 1969( 151) to take account of 
reduced population forecasts, lower than anticipated rates of economic 
growth and as part of a first attempt to set an order of priorities for 
development. The highest priorities were the Reseau Express Regional and an 
extension of Metro line no. 5 to Orly Airport. These priorities were not set 
by the commission revising the plan but by an ad hoc group of ministers (see 
below in Chapter 6 for a full account of this process in the context of the 
decision to build the central section of the RER). In presenting the new 
Schema Directeur to the public (152) Maurice Doublet, Regional Prefect, 
argued that the absence of a clear plan for transport development was a 
direct result of the multiplicity of institutions and services involved in 
transport policy and that a new administrative structure should be 
established. Specifically he advocated a directly elected regional council 
with responsibility for transport planning, for the day to day supervision 
of the RATP and SNCF suburban services, for the budget which subsidised 
public transport and for the direct management of designated principal
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transport links within all companies systems. Doublet clearly envisaged a 
substantial shift in power away from the transport companies towards 
regional administrators and politicians. He wanted to increase massively the 
importance of the STP which oversaw almost 80% of the District's annual 
expenditure and yet had no control over the national ministries and 
transport companies represented on its board. Orselli sums up the STP as 
follows:
"At first sight it is an institution of enormous significance 
administratively and financially. In reality one must realise 
that the STP represents little more than an administrative 
channel ... in practice its decisions are prepared in advance in 
informal interministerial conferences in which each representative 
disposes of a kind of veto." (153)
Doublet allied this demand for a different administrative structure to 
one for additional resources with which to attack the problems. The failure 
to secure support for additional charges for parking or for increased fares 
made raising local revenues almost impossible. Doublet looked to the 
national Government to extend special borrowing rights to the District, 
which was not a normal commune or region, in order to free it to make swift 
increases in investments in roads and public transport (154). The Ministry 
of Finance had always refused additional funds, and continued to do so 
despite a positive recommendation by the relevant sub committee of the 
allocation board of the Fonds de Developpement Economique et Social (155). 
The regional co-ordination systems in place were, therefore, unable to 
secure the necessary resources to back their preferred programmes because of 
opposition from the Ministry of Finance to any disruption of traditional 
interdepartmental bargaining arrangements.
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Other senior officials involved in regional development echoed
Doublet’s demands. At the Colloque de Tours in March 1970 (156) M. Gabriel
Palliez, President of the Commission des Villes of the Sixth Plan and an
Inspecteur des Finances proposed a complete reorganisation of responsibility
for public transport and traffic management. He suggested:
"A single authority at the level of each conurbation responsible 
for all traffic and transport matters"(157)
Palliez also proposed that the specific grants for service subsidies and
investments disbursed by national ministries should be replaced by a block
grant system to these new multi-purpose local institutions. The most
important feature of the new bodies would be their ability to address all
the relevant issues in a single agenda and budgetary process. It was, he
underlined:
"essential that all the different powers involve themselves fully 
in the deliberations of the body and feel themselves bound by the 
policies agreed - this applies especially to the central 
State"(158)
Alongside these efforts by the Prefects and Ministers to 
institutionalise co-ordination and break down irrational budgetary 
distinctions, the transport companies and the new Directions Departementales 
d’Equipment were working to bolster the role of specialist services in 
transport policy. They focussed on developing new techniques of planning, 
priority setting and project appraisal, and on fostering a new management 
style at the RATP and in the Suburban division of the SNCF. In 1970 the RATP 
strengthened its Research and Strategic Planning (159) services and reformed 
the management structure to give greater weight to central policy divisions 
which these services supported. At the same time they introduced a new 
financial planning system based on Rationalisation des Choix Budgetaires
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which was the French equivalent of the American Programme Planning Budgeting 
System pioneered in the Pentagon (160).
The basic principle of these approaches is childishly simple, but 
revolutionary in large scale incrementalist bureaucracies. Instead of 
allocating just additional funds over and above the historical base budgets 
of each function of the organisation, the RCB or PPBS system examines all 
activities against a priority scale and simultaneously allocates new funds 
and redistributes base budgets. RCB, therefore, attempts to build up a 
programme based budget in each and every annual budget. The effect of 
adopting this approach was to move the RATP out of a sleepy backwater into 
the fast stream of public administration in France, for they became a pilot 
for an approach which the President and senior ministers wished to see 
widely adopted. The adoption of a radical new approach helped the RATP to 
forge links with the key policy advisors in other institutions, notably the 
Service Regional d’ Equipement and the IAURP and to gain allies on the STP 
and other interministerial commissions. As the RATP itself said:
"RCB provided a means of establishing a common language between
technicians and decision makers and a common scale of measurement
for both groups" (161)
The RATP management actively sought a new image for their product and spent 
significant sums in 1970 promoting public transport. The overall effect of a 
better public image and a growing reputation for sophisticated planning and 
management was a marked improvement in the number and quality of recruits to 
the construction, planning and financial branches of the organisation, and 
an enhanced ability to take on a major role in the development of new public 
transport services.
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Like the RATP, the SNCF suburban services had always been a low
prestige retreat for the unambitious railway manager. They were neglected, 
run of the mill services which the company had been happy to divest in the
past (162). The prospect of regional control of the suburban services
stirred fears in the senior SNCF management however. They may not have cared
to run the service much themselves, but to lose control of a significant
proportion of the traffic into the Paris termini threatened control of 
national and international timetables, and would reduce the overall size of 
the network in their control very significantly (163). Moreover, another 
group of managers might look more favourably on the suburban service and 
could argue, from outside, for increased resources and improved support 
services. Finally, commuters provided a ready source of income and were the 
most captive market available to the company. In 1971, therefore, the SNCF
set up a Suburban Division with one manager responsible for suburban
services into and out of Paris (164).
The DDEs were settling down after the conflicts surrounding their 
creation in 1968 (165) and were now producing land use plans for the 
communes within their areas, as required by the new law of 1967. Not 
surprisingly the land use plans closely resembled the road plans which the 
majority of senior staff in the DDEs were more accustomed to preparing 
(166). Clearly the DDEs were both a specialist service accountable to the 
Ministere de V Equipement and a nascent inter-departmental land use planning 
and urban development body. The Ministry saw them as the latter and sought 
to widen their professional base and to reduce their dependence on road 
construction. Specialisation was, therefore, a defence against the regional 
prefecture, and against their own masters for the staff in the DDEs.
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3.3 : The legitimacy of the Schema Directeur
The Schima Directeur was an experts’ plan, not a popular political 
strategy. It had been drawn up secretly and had been accepted, on a 
superficial basis, by all the authorities which were consulted about its 
contents. Its impact was based not on a widespread belief that it offered 
the means to a better society, but on fear of the consequences of stagnating 
in past approaches. The themes of unparalleled population increases, the 
challenge to the economy from international trends and the need to respond 
to the prospect of spiralling congestion and chaos were endlessly repeated 
as the plan’s rationale. Equally important was the belief that the plan was 
a significant departure from past practice. Never mind that its vision of 
the Paris region bore a striking similarity to those drawn up in the 1920s, 
the Schema Directeur was part of the brave new world in which rational 
planning, scientific investigation and a common ideology of progress 
produced universally accepted solutions to the problems of competing in the 
world.
In the same way that the institutions of planning excluded the 
pluralism of local politics and sought to mask the rivalries of different 
elements within the administrative system, so the ideology of the Schema 
Directeur denied the necessity of detailed negotiation over the precise path 
of progress, the exact division of spoils or detailed breakdown of costs. 
There was in the late sixties no rival plan, no statement of an alternative 
view, though public life reverberated with the rejection of urbanised, 
industrialised lifestyles. Nowhere can one say "here is the impact of the
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May 1968 events on urban planning" yet the doubt and insecurity which 
followed the demonstrations and general strike ate away at the foundations 
of the Gaullist ideal of modem urban living.
On the surface, the keenest supporters of autoroutes, high rise blocks, 
concrete and glass extravaganzas of private offices and public utilities had 
every reason for confidence. President Pompidou was evangelical in his 
support for redevelopment and especially for private motor cars - "the task 
of the seventies is to better adapt the town to the car" he said (167). His 
supporters had been elected in droves in the 1968 Parliamentary elections 
and in the Presidential election itself the Left had failed to mount a 
serious challenge with the Communist candidate achieving 23% of the poll and 
the Socialist Candidate a miserable 5%. Yet the echoes of 1968 still haunted 
them, and the frequent clashes between rival groups and the police on the 
streets of Paris, the growing squatters’ movement, the new community 
politics emerging around a vague, naive rejection of an international urban 
culture re-inforced the fear that the stability so quickly restored after 
May 1968 might be illusory. The mystique of the events of May 1968 was not 
confined to the gauchiste groups who yearned to re-enact them, as R. W. 
Johnson puts it:
"The events of 1968 had been so sudden and shaking, and yet so 
causeless that it was feared they could return as quickly, rather 
as the plague had paid recurrent fearsome visits to medieval 
cities"(168)
The air of uncertainty had more practical effect among local politicians and 
administrators anxious to find more secure bases for action than the general 
ideology of the Schema Directeur, and more defensible schemes than the 
grandiose but unproven projects which filled the pages of the Cahiers de
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VIAURP. Several issues were capable of splintering the superficial 
unanimity surrounding the proposals in the Government’s programme. Among 
these were car parking, road construction through historic quarters of the 
city, road construction through ancient parkland on the outskirts of the 
city, the level of fares, the reliability of buses and trains, above all the 
cost in time and discomfort entailed by living in a new town and working in 
a new office complex. Because the systems underpinning the Schema Directeur 
could offer no positive reassurance to concerned groups on any of these 
issues, and because the established political processes for seeking favour 
and reassurance from Government were bypassed by the priority setting 
methods of the District and the interministerial committees it was difficult 
to divide and rule opposition to developments. A global plan invited global 
opposition.
The aspect of the Schema Directeur which was most directly challenged
was its dependence on new transport links, especially roads. The plan had
been drawn up using forecasts of future car ownership and travel demand
based on models prepared in the United States. By 1970 these models were
openly questioned by the leading researchers and practitioners in civil
engineering (169). The Colloque de Tours was the start of an alternative
approach to transport policy within regional development, lead by the
Minister of Transport himself. Opening the conference he said " the larger
towns have more need of Fulgence Bienvenue than of Baron Haussmann" (170).
He went on to say:
"the natural development of individual means of transport leads to 
the asphyxiation of city functions and imposes ceaseless road 
investment burdens which are beyond our financial means. ... 
moreover the free movement of private cars presupposes the 
existence of public transport in sufficient quantity and of
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satisfactory quality" (171)
In his address to the meeting, the Director of Land Transport from the
Ministry, the most senior civil servant in transport policy drew the
following conclusion:
"it seems evident that individual car ownership, even if it is 
matched by a sufficient development of roads will not resolve the 
growing transport needs of town dwellers in a satisfactory way."
(172)
The greatest unmet needs in towns, he argued, were those of commuters and 
they could only be addressed by tackling four key issues: how to organise 
new systems of transport in a way that was more efficient than buses but 
cheaper than light railways; how to improve traffic management; how to 
create physically separated routes for public transport vehicles and how to 
measure and increase public transport productivity.
While the contributions from the Ministry established a climate of 
reform, the intellectual basis for tackling the new agenda was set out by 
Michel Frybourg of the newly created Institut de Recherches de Transport 
(IRT). He suggested that the proper basis for judging relative priorities in 
public investment programmes would comprise a traditional cost benefit 
analysis, indicators of wider social impacts and a clear representation of 
the value of different aspects of schemes to politicians. He defended this 
extension of the older purely technical basis for assessing value by arguing 
that:
"taking account of the social criteria as distinct from the 
economic effects it gives greater consideration to the competing 
claims of the different social groups affected by the proposal 
and, therefore, ensures better application of the democratic 
principle of equality of opportunity irrespective of relative 
incomes or geographical locations"(173)
Frybourg dubbed this approach "multicriteria analysis" and as will be
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described in detail below in Chapter 4 this became the basis of the RATP’s 
planning system in the mid ’70s and was keenly debated in professional 
circles throughout the period of rapid growth in public transport 
investment. Frybourg went on to introduce the concept which did most to 
advance the cause of public transport, and which became a key element in the 
ideology of consumerism that is "transport captivity".
"Captives" are travellers who are denied a choice of transport modes
for essential journeys. The most captive transport users were people who
relied on one means of public transport for their journey to work but this
section of the population would also include many women, many young people,
a significant proportion of disabled people and most old people. Frybourg
estimated that such people constituted at least a third of the population.
Moreover, Frybourg argued, captives subsidise other travellers by bearing a
disproportionate amount of the total social cost of transport. This cross
subsidisation was at the root of the most pressing problems, not least
traffic congestion and the huge costs of wasted fuel, pollution and idle
time. Furthermore, the existing approaches to transport planning exacerbated
the wasteful allocation of resources by failing to measure the true costs of
various transport options. He, therefore, proposed:
"a system of pricing the use of cars at marginal cost as the best 
means of optimising the use of roads and financing the necessary 
infrastructure" (174)
Such a policy would require non market forces to impose the true prices but 
would:
"imply a discernible improvement in the quality of public 
transport so as to offer a viable alternative to car drivers"
(175)
Essentially, Frybourg’s case was that the ideological attachment to car
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driving, and the political weight which car owners therefore held, caused 
market failure in the overall transport market leading to an excessive 
expenditure of total resources on private travel. The planning systems used, 
for example, in the Schema Directeur re-inforced the problem by regarding 
traffic flows as the problem, rather than trying to promote the maximum 
travel opportunities for all people, including car owners. The main outcome 
of this process was an ever more pernicious spiral of traffic congestion 
which drew attention away from lateral solutions. Cities could only break 
out of this vicious circle by accepting a permanent and increased role for 
public transport and by adopting a policy of deliberately extending choice 
of travel modes to the largest possible number of travellers. The simplest 
way to devise a satisfactory plan was to attribute the full social cost of 
private travel to private car drivers. The unstated, but inevitable 
conclusion to such an approach is to introduce road pricing on urban roads.
Public transport operators at the conference emphasised that their 
productivity and profitability were severely constrained by road 
congestion. Michel Robin, speaking on behalf of the Union des Transporteurs 
Publics Urbains et Regionaux (UPTUR), suggested that the concept of 
productivity should be subdivided when applied to transport operators. The 
internal productivity of the firms should be measured according to 
industrial criteria, but the degree to which they could deliver their 
product to the consumer should be viewed in the context of road conditions 
which lay beyond their control. He concluded:
"the first and foremost way to make public transport competitive
is to accord it priority within traffic management systems"(176)
In a minor, but interesting contribution to the debate, Paul Josse, Vice
93
Part 2 : Policy Change
President of the STP suggested that efficient public transport services to 
city centres can only be developed if they are combined with traffic control 
policies which give them special privileges and if roadside parking is 
actively discouraged.
Simultaneously, commissions of selected experts, political nominees and 
business representatives were drawing up proposals for the Paris Region for 
inclusion in the Sixth National Plan (177). The Regional Prefect selected 
the following principal issues for the plan in an initial report in 1969: 
the increasing imbalance of development between east and west in the Paris 
Region, the depopulation of the city centre, the ageing of the region’s 
population and the rapid transfer of economic activity from manufacturing to 
services. All of these contributed, the report emphasised, to the congestion 
in the city and surrounding district and the pressure on commuter transport 
links (178). The report produced by the Planning Commission for 
consideration by the C w & t Consultatif Economique et Social (CCES) in 
September 1970 elevated the issue of commuting to a principal theme, 
alongside the changing distribution of economic activity and the ageing 
population. The challenges posed by an aging population were linked to 
commuting, for they were most acute in the central city districts which had 
been vacated by younger workers in favour of new suburban settlement from 
which they now had to travel to work. At the same time the socioeconomic 
composition of the city’s population had altered dramatically with a 16% 
decline in the number engaged in industrial or commercial occupations and a 
5% increase in managerial and professional people. The surplus of jobs over 
available workforce had increased by 8% each year between 1962 and 1968 in 
the west of the region while staying almost the same in the eastern areas.
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The commission found that the number of people working in the city of Paris
but living elsewhere had increased by over 15% between 1962 and 1968 and
that nearly 1 million people would commute into the twenty arrondissements
every day by 1975. Over the same period the RATP had experienced a decline
in traffic. The proportion of people travelling by bus had fallen 37% and
that using the Metro by 6%. The report suggested that the average proportion
of household income devoted to private transport had increased significantly
but did not quantify this. The number of people owning cars had increased
46% in the period 1962 to 1968 and traffic forecasts suggested that overall
commuter traffic would double before 1985. The Commission estimated the
additional road space required by such an increase to be of the order of
fifteen six lane autoroutes. Parking would also be a growing problem; even
assuming some modest recovery in public transport services the report
estimated that the authorities would need to build 25,000 spaces every year
just to keep up with demand. Overall the report concluded;
"the two major problems which emerge from this diagnosis concern 
on the one hand public transport and on the other the location of 
employment. Their solutions are to a considerable extent related"
(179)
The Commission felt that the powers available to the District and to 
local authorities to control development were grossly inadequate and 
proposed that developers should be forced to meet a higher proportion of the 
cost of public infrastructure both directly by including public utilities in 
plans as a condition of securing authorisation for construction, and 
indirectly through increased taxes on development land. Public authorities 
should also be granted increased rights to intervene in the property market 
and the wider powers to pre-empt properties where this was desirable for
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public infrastructure development. On the specific transport issues which 
they raised the Commission recommended much stricter controls on parking 
including charges for parking in the city centre, a programme of car park 
construction and special encouragement to private development of car parks. 
So far as public transport was concerned they supported constructing the 
central section of the RER, proposed joining Metro lines 13 and 14 and 
recommended extending the Ligne de Sceaux. The commission concluded as 
follows:
"up till now the policy for Paris transport has been geared 
towards individual means of transport to the detriment of public 
transport, the operating conditions and general standards of which 
have seriously deteriorated. A reversal of this trend is now 
unavoidable and it seems indispensable that the sixth plan should 
emphasise the attractions of such a policy reversal"(180)
Addressing the Conseil Administratif, Maurice Doublet underlined this
general point "if an effort is not made to improve public transport, we are
heading for a catastrophe" he said (181).
The car lobby began to see the writing on the wall, and in March 1970
the Chambre Syndicale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles wrote to the national
planning commission on traffic and towns dissociating themselves from the
local commission’s conclusions and urging an alternative policy:
"We contest the general orientation of the report ... (ie) that 
the solution to the difficulties encountered by public transport 
lies in the restriction of the use of private cars ... (we) repeat 
that employment/residence should be addressed and the principal 
problem is the disparity between the rush hours and the rest of 
the day. It should be recognised that the respective demands of 
public and private travel are often non-transferable ... even in 
city centre the comfort and speed of public transport count for 
little against the flexibility of the private car. We hope that 
solutions to the problem of traffic congestion are based on needs 
ie. based on the most profitable solutions. The question of 
profitability has been neglected in the report and (we) regret 
that it does not take account of the arguments advanced in favour 
of express urban autoroutes" (182)
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The final content of the national plan was determined by an Inter- 
Ministerial Committee chaired by President Pompidou in October 1970. The 
Committee adopted three basic principles: priority for public transport in 
the inner areas, priority for roads in the outer areas and better access to 
new towns and airports. Top priority was assigned to the RER, and a series 
of other projects were awarded high priority. In the city these comprised 
completing the Boulevard Peripherique, starting the Left Bank Expressway, 
modernising two unspecified Metro routes improving public transport rolling 
stock and increasing the number of escalators at junctions. The majority of 
priority schemes in the suburbs were autoroutes designed to increase access 
to the Peripherique from the west and to complete most of the outer ring 
road. Two public transport projects were specified: a new railway to the new 
town of Cergy Pontoise and extending Metro no. 8 to Creteil. These priority 
schemes accounted for half the projected investment budget available for the 
duration of the plan, and the remainder was available to be allocated by the 
Conseil Administratif of the District.
While the plan clearly devotes huge sums to major road schemes and 
continued with the road programme of the Schema Directeur, the importance 
ascribed to public transport and the commitment to a priority for public 
transport schemes in the city testify to the progress that the alternative 
approaches promoted at the Colloque de Tours had made in so short a time. 
Strategic policy increasingly favoured alternatives to autoroutes and 
private transport as Part 3 will demonstrate in detail.
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3.4 : Local politics in Paris
The degree to which Parisians should control their own affairs has 
always been problematic for French Governments. A major theme in the 
historical backcloth to the strategic policy changes was the recapture of 
almost complete control of the formal machinery of policy making by central 
appointees under the Fifth Republic. The foundations for this temporary 
victory started to slip as urban politics and local democracy became the 
touchstones of new political forces emerging after 1968. Foremost among 
these were the Groupes d’Action Municipal and the reformed Parti 
Socialiste. The Parti Communiste too was emerging from its bastions in the 
Couronne Rouge - a ring of suburban communes which had remained faithful to 
their Communist municipal councils for up to fifty years (183). As part of 
this strategy the Communist Party played a major role in organising protests 
against fare increases and transport policies in 1970 and 1971 which will be 
fully analysed below. In parallel with policy content, the centralism of 
political control was actively questioned by people within the bureaucratic 
and political establishment as they reflected on the effectiveness of 
Pompidolean policy making.
In his address to the Colloque de Tours Raymond Mondon reflected on the
weakness of past practice saying that transport policy and regulation was
such a complex area that:
"it cannot be the affair solely of a few specialists. The elected 
officials of local authorities, especially in the large towns, 
must also contribute the fruits of their experience" (184)
Palliez’s contribution to the Colloque echoed this theme, especially his
proposal that there should be elected multi-purpose authorities for all
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major urban areas. He also proposed that the specific grants paid to local 
services by the various ministries should be combined into a block grant 
paid by the Ministry of the Interior. The Regional Commissions preparing the 
National Plan had also emphasised that the key to securing control of the 
development of the Paris basin, and starting to redress the imbalance of 
development, was to extend control of infrastructure and of planning 
permissions to more local bodies with greater teeth.
Such suggestions ran counter to the growing centralisation of decision 
making as the dilemmas facing policy makers grew more acute. The major 
issues of investment priorities and of the level of fares were highly 
charged. Not only were they the object of intense political activity by 
opposition groups, but they divided the professional and local decision 
makers. Increasingly, therefore, major policy decisions, and even minor 
issues which were linked to larger matters of principle, were referred to 
inter-ministerial committees for decision by ministers or by the President 
of the Republic. It was widely recognised that the level of fares was set at 
the Elysee, not by the RATP or STP (185). The deficit which resulted from 
the fares charged failing to cover the total cost of running the RATP was 
not met solely from national budgets however. The Local Authorities in the 
area served by the RATP were obliged to pay nearly two thirds of the deficit 
in one way or another. In practice half their contribution came from the 
contribution they made to the District de la Region Parisienne and the other 
half directly from their local budgets. The Conseils Generaux of the new 
Departements resented this taxation without representation and in February 
1970 they all voted not to hand over their proportion of the funds unless 
satisfactory improvements in service were forthcoming (186). The most
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important investment decisions were also being made outside the formal 
planning and consultative forums. For example, the decision to allocate 
highest priority to the RER in the sixth plan was made by an ad hoc 
commission reporting to the Prime Minister, and members of the CCES and the 
Conseil Administratif du District were informed later of the outcomes.
Ideological factors emphasised the appearance of central control. The 
development of Paris as an international centre of trade and culture was an 
important part of the future France which Gaullists relied upon to cement 
together the contradictory strands of concertation and strong leadership 
which were their distinctive appeal to conservative voters. New urban design 
was integral to the picture of better, cleaner, more wholesome cities which 
Pompidou and his followers wished to offer the French people. In this 
context the national Government could not neglect the environment in which 
it was located and the districts in which the vast majority of its members 
and servants lived and worked. Even if ministers did not initiate proposals 
to redevelop an area of Paris, or to relocate major industrial and 
commercial activities to sites outside the city centre, they were obliged by 
their own beliefs to offer an opinion or criticism and therefore they began 
to assume ownership of more local or more simply commercial projects in 
which the central Government need not necessarily participate in any way. As 
the cohesion of local policy networks was eroded by their inability to cope 
with the challenges of large scale development, so attention came to focus 
on the rules governing their role, and the central Government agencies and 
politicians which determined the rules.
The capacity of local political institutions was further diminished by
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the forthcoming municipal elections which offered the first opportunity 
since the 1969 Presidential election to test the parties respective 
strengths. French politics, nationally, was at the beginning of the 
realignment which brought the Socialist Party of Francois Mitterrand and the 
Union pour la Democratie Franqaise (UDF) of Valery Giscard d’Estaing to the 
fore later in the 1970s, eclipsing the older formations of the UDR and the 
Communist Party which had dominated political life in the first decade of 
the Fifth Republic. The fluidity of the political blocs from which the new 
parties emerged was reflected in the multiplicity of lists presenting 
themselves in the municipal election in the Paris area. This was most 
evident on the municipal council of the city itself. In 1969 the centrist 
bloc on the Council, which normally voted with the UDR had split, ostensibly 
over the issue of Alain Poher’s candidacy for the Presidency. Poher was the 
leading centrist member of the Council and the centrist bloc at first broke 
into two groups, one loyal to Poher and the other comprising members who 
supported the Government and were led by Frederic-DuPont.
In the 1971 elections however, there were four centrist lists, those 
led by Poher and Frederic-DuPont, a new grouping led by Jean Lecanuet and an 
independent list which was allied with a community action group contesting 
the elections under the banner "Paris pour les Parisiens". All of these 
currents would eventually become part of the UDF. Within the Majorite lists 
of Government supporters there was an increased proportion of Republicains 
Independents who were followers of M. Valery Giscard d’Estaing (187). The 
1971 municipal elections were the first occasion in which the Union of the 
Left electoral pact which eventually brought the Socialists to power was 
pursued in a disciplined fashion. The new Socialist Party agreed that it
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would only make agreement about withdrawals from ballots with the Communist 
Party and the Confederations des Institutions Republicaines which was led by 
Francois Mitterrand. Some Socialists were subsequently expelled for making 
agreements with Lecanuet’s centrists (188).
Figure 3.1 : Composition of Paris Municipal Council
Majorite : 39 - Comprising 37 UDR and 2 Republicains Independents 
Opposition : 38 - Comprising 26 Communists, 9 Socialists, 2 Radicals
1 Parti Sociliste Unifie and 1 independent 
Centrists : 13 - Comprising 9 Centrists and 4 Union du Centre (189)
Despite the clamour for attention by small gauchiste and fascist 
groups who clashed frequently at poorly policed meeting throughout the 
campaign (190), the main themes of the election were about local autonomy 
and the development of the city. The Majorite campaign concentrated on their 
plans to develop the city to cope with increased population and the 
infrastructure proposals set out in the sixth plan. They emphasised that 
they saw these plans being achieved by a combination of competent 
administration at all levels and by clear understandings between national 
and local Government. The underlying message defended the status quo so far 
as local Government was concerned and this is hardly surprising given the 
scale of the reforms which the Gaullists had already sponsored since 1961.
The centrist groupings all made issues of competence and accountability 
central to their campaigns. They argued that the limitations on local power 
in force reduced the incentive to make informed and responsible choices, 
weakening the quality of local administration and bringing the political
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system into disrepute. In his election address Jean Lecanuet said that he 
believed that "given the opportunity to make unrestrained choices ... the 
electors of Paris would choose men of dynamism, wisdom, responsibility and 
power" (191). Centrist manifestos stressed an apolitical, rational approach 
to solving problems, committing themselves to look dispassionately and 
intelligently at the facts and make proposals accordingly. This approach had 
the convenient effect of avoiding the questions of detail on which the 
groups were divided or simply undecided.
The Union Democratique, which was the label under which the
Socialists, Communists and their smaller allies, were running called for
local democratic control of services, increased resources to carry out
public transport and public housing programmes in the city and campaigned
against the redevelopment of city centre districts. They made great efforts
to capture the centrist vote and called for the widest possible alliance
behind the strategy of the left. The Communist Party waxed lyrical on the
themes of democracy and pluralism:
"Finding solutions to the ever more complex problems of municipal 
Government, especially to gaining more central Government money, 
demand a wider, more direct and more continuous participation of 
the governed in the life of their city. ... In town or village, 
just as the country as a whole, a better life is inseparable from
the progress of democracy  We do not wish to dominate as the
UDR claim, ascribing to us their own designs, but rather we wish 
to create the widest possible union of workers and democrats"
(192)
The Right made substantial gains in the City of Paris in the 
elections. Five Communists, three Socialists and the PSU members were 
defeated. The left made some compensating gains with one independent 
socialist and two CIR candidates securing election. The centre retained
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thirteen seats but within them the balance shifted towards those inclined to 
support the Government. Overall the Majorite'  increased its number of seats 
by seven, and three of the new members were Republicains Independents. It 
appeared that the electors had predominantly followed parochial local 
concerns and in so far as any message about the autonomy of the council can 
be discerned it was that voters wanted more local control but not by the 
left.
In the suburbs the centrist groups were less important and the 
campaign boiled down to a straight argument between the Government’s 
supporters and the opposition, except in a few communes where local 
notables were especially influential, for example Creteil where the Maire 
was a wartime commander with de Gaulle and stood as a Gaulliste de Gauche.
The results in the suburbs were the opposite of those in the city. The Left 
made significant gains and consolidated its hold in its traditional areas.
The UDR too made some gains, continuing to pick up communes which had 
traditionally supported independent conservative administrations (193). In 
the country as a whole the left made significant gains, foreshadowing the 
1973 legislative elections in which the Union of the Left would shake the 
Gaullists hold on national as well as local political office (194).
3.5 : Professions’ spheres of influence
The extent of a professional grouping’s natural or legitimate field of 
interest and control is an issue between groups and within them. The 
emergence of new policy priorities or types of activity generates 
competition between professions which can claim some legitimate expertise or
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ownership. At the same time the development of new areas of work disturbs 
the internal balance within an established profession and threatens the 
elite group which controls accreditation and upholds standards. Both of 
these phenomena accompanied the development of regional planning in Paris,
and the resulting difficulties besetting the transport system in the
district. This section explores the rivalry between the Ponts et Chaussees 
and other public sector grouping over control of strategic policy
development and examines the impact of this on the internal organisation of
the Corps.
The onset of acute professional instability was precipitated by the 
appointment of M. Albin Chalandon as Minister of Equipement in 1969 by the 
incoming President Pompidou. Chalandon had entered politics as a successful 
businessman; he was head of a major supermarket chain in France (195), and 
he wished to bring the organisational culture of big business into the 
ministry with him. His approach to decision making, appointments and the 
internal structure of the ministry showed little tolerance of the niceties 
of professional statutes and conventions. The reform which most incensed the 
senior members of the Ponts et Chaussees was his proposal to abolish the 
convention of promotion by seniority and replace it with open competition 
for posts among applicants from several corps. Defending his proposal 
Chalandon argued that a Minister should have the power to "put the right man 
in the right place" (196) and that this would create a new spirit in the 
administration which promoted "questioning, doubt and perpetual re­
adjustment" (197) and so improved the quality of decision making. Quite 
apart from the threat to the basic rules of professional privilege embodied 
in these proposals, Chalandon underlined his determination to break the
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mould of the Ministry by appointing a Prefect, and well known critic of the
Corps des Ponts et Chaussees as his Chef du Cabinet (198). Chalandon made
clear that his aim was dramatically to increase political authority over the
day to day management of the ministry:
each civil servant considers that he owns his job. In a company 
the boss gives the orders. A minister, however, is obliged to 
persuade and convince his own managers. The result is an 
administrative totalitarianism which renders the political 
authorities quite impotent" (199)
The Ponts et Chaussees were threatened by increases in prefectoral 
control at a local level as well. Doublet was co-ordinating the preparation 
of the sixth plan in the Paris Region and was a key member of the national 
commissions which distributed the development funds which would finance 
major infrastructure proposals (200). There was therefore, a new force in 
regional planning opposed to control remaining within the Ministry of 
Equipement at the same time as they were saddled with a minister who seemed 
unlikely to take a parochial sectional view of the interests of the staff in 
the civil engineering and planning professions. The effect of this was to 
weaken the aggressive, expansionist group which had lead the Corps through 
the 1960s and assured its members of a dominant position in the local 
institutions and the new Ministry established during that period. The 
organisation’s primary need now was for defence of its longer established 
bastions and the conventions which underpinned them. More conservative 
forces asserted themselves in the elections for top professional posts and 
in 1969 M. Paul Josse became President of the Corps, backed by a range of 
more senior engineers than had held the senior posts when Pebereau was 
President (201).
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The Corp’s General Assembly in April 1970 (202) agreed major 
organisational changes to help defend its members position within public 
administration, in face of a hostile minister, and more generally in face of 
challenges from the Regional Prefects and the graduates of ENA who were 
increasingly occupying the highest civil offices. The assembly agreed to 
create a separate association to promote the interests of civil engineers 
which would be open to a wider membership than the Corps itself. In this way 
the Corps would be able to expand the number of politicians, senior public 
servants, bankers and businessmen who had an interest and an affinity for 
the profession much more quickly than by increasing the number of graduates 
of the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees and without the associated threats to 
incomes involved in increasing the number of recognised practitioners. This 
would leave the Corps with more time and resources to pursue the narrower 
role of defending members’ professional interests. The renewed conservatism 
also increased the stress placed on the power of the profession in the 
provinces and on the desirability of decentralised administration.
Faced with these protests and the prospect of major disruption to the 
work of the Ministry, Chalandon withdrew the original proposals on 
professional statutes and proposed a pilot scheme for open application and 
promotion in seven DDEs. He also replaced his Chef du Cabinet with an 
engineer who was widely respected in the profession, M. Jean Chapon (203).
He did not let up on his efforts to introduce a more businesslike approach 
within the service, however, and several major contracts for road 
construction in the provinces were placed wholly with private companies, 
taking them beyond the supervision of the local Ponts et Chaussees. As one 
local engineer described the situation;
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" the Departemental Directors, already suffering formidable 
pressures from the public sector in the urban areas, dared not 
speak out for fear of displeasing” (204)
Having experimented with the new statutes in seven Departements, the
Minister proposed to phase them in in the remaining DDEs. This reassured the
more conservative engineers that the purpose of the exercise was not just to
drive out unsympathetic staff, or that if it was it would be some time
before the Minister’s attention turned to them. The Corps was also divided
over the proposals, some younger, more ambitious engineers stuck at lower
grades welcomed the freeing up of promotion opportunities. In October 1971
the new statutes came into force with the blessing of the Ponts et Chaussees
provided that:
"this must be a real liberalisation of the administration; there 
are presently too many constraints limiting the actions of 
departemental directors. ... We are ready to play the game and 
accept the challenges but everyone must accept all the 
consequences and give the practical means to departemental 
directors to exercise the responsibility which they are expected 
to bear. ... There has never been any question of the bureaucracy, 
whatever their views or position, replacing the power of the 
Minister in policy making. Certainly when one has detailed 
knowledge of the technical issues there is a risk of one’s own 
interest as the general one, but the general interest is 
constantly redefined in a dialogue bringing together critiques 
from all sides, accommodating financial constraints, taking 
account of basic technical constraints...if judgments are 
ultimately needed then it is definitely the political authorities 
which are qualified to make them." (205)
The challenge by non-professionals and by alternative professions in 
regional planning had, therefore, been reasonably successfully parried.
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3.6 : The relationship between producers and consumers
The essence of a publicly regulated monopoly is that the relationship 
between the supplier of a service and its customers is governed by more than 
the price. The deliberate exclusion of competition necessitates regulation 
of prices and of supply systems in order to protect consumers. Regulatory 
bodies accountable to politicians had been set up to oversee the transport 
companies and to monitor the quality of service. They also made 
controversial pricing decisions based on demand for transport and the costs 
of the public transport operators. In 1970 and 1971 public confidence in 
these mechanisms declined to the extent that consumers resorted to the 
streets to put their demands for improved services and lower fares and the 
long term consequence of this dramatic breakdown in confidence was 
significant reform of the regulation and funding of public transport 
operations in the Paris Region.
The reforms in administration, and especially to the STP had left the 
national ministries, and senior national politicians with the task of 
protecting the public interest in the management of Paris transport services 
and it was they who had to grapple with the accelerating deficit of the 
RATP. The deficit had two underlying causes: buses were becoming 
unacceptably slow because of the increased congestion on the roads caused by 
increased private car ownership (206) and the Metro was becoming more 
expensive to run as the rolling stock and track aged and struggled to carry 
more passengers in busier peak hours (207). The buses were the worst of the 
two problems; they accounted for only a third of the passengers carried yet 
generated two thirds of the company’s deficit (208). Bus users were the
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least able to bear increases in fares even if they could be introduced 
solely for buses. To bring in a different fare structure on the buses would 
break up one of the cardinal operating principles of the system - that one 
ticket paid for one journey on either mode.
Figure 3.2 : RATP Operating Deficit (mF)
1959 49.6 1964 394.5
1960 50.0 1965 475.2
1961 68.0 1966 602.9
1962 149.3 1967 511.3
1963 243.1 1968 563.3
1969 760.2
1970 768.6
As the table above suggests, fares were almost doubled in 1967, but the 
effect of this fell out in less than a year. Fares were held steady between 
1960 and 1967 as part of a national counter inflation policy pursued by the 
Ministry of Finance under the direction of Valery Giscard d’Estaing. The 
accumulated deficit, and the difficulty of rectifying the position was, 
therefore, largely of the central Government’s making. They had refused to 
allow the RATP to increase prices in line with costs. However, policies 
towards public sector enterprises were changing as their deficits became an 
increasing burden on the national budget. In 1968 the Rapport Nora (209) on 
the future of public sector industry and services, commissioned by the Prime 
Minister, was published. This concluded that public sector enterprises 
should operate on a more contractual basis and be expected to break even 
unless they had explicit agreements for subsidies to particular activities.
There was no clear contract between those who subsidised the RATP and the
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managers who decided the precise pattern of services. It was not at all 
clear what the public were getting for their 700mF.
In 1969 the Ministry of Finance indicated that it had changed policy 
and expected the STP to set out a programme for reducing the deficit on the 
RATP’s existing operations (210). The Government had effectively decided 
upon significant fare increases. In February 1970 the first in a programme 
of fare increases was announced, increasing the price of a journey to 
seventy centimes. The STP signalled the Government’s intention to increase 
fares by ten per cent every six months until the deficit of the RATP was 
brought under control. It was this programme of price increases that brought 
consumers onto the streets, and into committee rooms, to oppose the 
Government’s transport priorities. The peak of discontent was in the summer 
and autumn of 1970 when the campaigning groups, organising protests by 
transport users, mounted three major regional demonstrations and peppered 
the press with statements, petitions and letters of protest at the fare 
increases and the intolerable conditions on the buses, Metro and trains. 
Transport policy was certainly the most resonant local political issue of 
the year (211).
There were two organisational foci for the campaign: the Cartel and the 
Federation des Comites d’Usagers de Transports en Commun de la Region 
Parisienne (FCU). Each represented one of the two major strands in 
opposition politics at the time; the Cartel was an initiative by the 
Communist Party and the major union confederations to create a popular 
alliance around their new strategy of the Union of the Left and the FCU was 
an alternative, local campaign organised by two far left groups, the Parti
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Socialiste Unifie (PSU) and the Trotskyist Lutte Ouvriere (LO). The Cartel 
was supported by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Confederation 
Generate du Travail (CGT) and Confederation Francaise Democratique du 
Travail (CFDT), the Convention des Institutions Republicaines (CIR) and two 
political clubs: Jeune Republique and Objectif 72. For a short time the PSU 
was affiliated to both campaigns but it quit the Cartel in June 1970 when 
the Communist Party refused to sanction local activists committees (212). In 
practice the Cartel's politics and strategy were determined by the Communist 
Party. Although the FCU was initiated and generally organised by activists 
from LO and the PSU it did gather together a number of non-aligned local 
committees with parochial concerns. These two currents of transport policy 
campaigning, one linked to national opposition politics and the other to 
local service delivery would continue long after the peak of protest 
activity in 1970.
Despite the deep antipathy between the founding organisations the two 
campaigns complemented one another well. The Cartel offered strong links 
with the resources of opposition political parties and trade unions, and 
brought the organisations representing employees into the campaign. The FCU 
provided a forum for users to articulate local grievances in their own terms 
and located the campaign firmly within an alternative view of urban and 
social development which was gaining popularity among the victims of the 
high rise housing and poorly serviced new towns. The unifying issue was that 
of fares. The slogans which mobilised a great mass of supporters were "Non a 
la hausse" (Say no to fare increases) and "Pour la carte unique de 
transports" (District wide travel passes for all) (213). The Cartel argued, 
and this policy was supported by all participants in the Campaign, that the
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cost of travelling to work should be met by employers. In fact employers did 
already pay a weighting allowance of 23F a week for transport for all 
employees in the Paris area, but this did not cover most peoples’ costs. The 
Cartel suggested that all employees in the Paris area should receive a free 
season ticket and that employers should pay a tax to meet the costs. The 
emphasis on commuting to work indicates that working men were the key 
supporters of the campaign; the free travel card scheme would not help women 
out of formal employment, students, the unemployed or pensioners.
The Cartel accepted that the existing public transport infrastructure 
could not cope with the extra demand which free commuting would generate 
(214). Its opposition to fare increases was, therefore, linked to a call for 
massive increases in investment, especially in the RER and for a new form of 
project appraisal which would favour public transport over road 
construction. It emphasised however, that it did not envisage reducing 
investment in roads, simply increasing the level of funding to public 
transport. The Cartel estimated that its programme of priority investments 
in ring roads, M/tro extensions, RER construction, rail electrification and 
general modernisation of buses would require double the funding allocated 
for the sixth plan. Again, these are traditional trade union demands. An 
important part of the CGT’s support for the campaign stemmed from the 
increased orders for rolling stock and construction equipment which such a 
programme would generate for its members in depressed industrial districts 
in northern and eastern France. However, the Union had started to adopt a 
more radical approach to workers interests, seeing them as both producers 
and consumers of public services. In 1971 the Paris District of the CGT 
produced a report on transport conditions (215) which within a familiar
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marxist critique of policy development adopted a more explicitly political 
approach to improving consumers’ rights. The CGT identified two underlying 
causes for the crisis in transport policy: the overaccumulation of capital 
which resulted in excessive and irrational investment in urban development 
and secondly the organisation of transport services according to profit 
rather than need. The CGT emphasised that the traffic congestion which beset 
car drivers was as much a product of these forces as the high cost and poor 
quality of public transport. This state of affairs was not irredeemable in 
the CGT’s estimation. The state chose to support the private monopolies 
which ran urban development and public transport against the interests of 
consumer and could act differently. The Union therefore identified four key 
demands on which the state should act: infrastructure investment should be 
increased so that everyone’s needs could be addressed, new investments 
should be publicly funded so that they were not distorted by property prices 
and money markets, employers should be taxed to pay for transport and all 
employees should receive a free travel card for journeys to work.
The Communist Party was the leading force in the transport users’ 
campaign and it had by far the most comprehensive and detailed programme of 
alternative policies (216). They were alternatives of scale however, rather 
than radically different approaches to urban planning and transport 
priorities. The Party supported the existing road programme, and proposed 
that the public transport investment programme should be accelerated so that 
new RER routes, rail electrification and Metro extensions could begin as 
soon as possible. The Communists believed that the Government’s investment 
programme was too small rather than wrongly directed. The Party strongly 
supported car production, reflecting the strength of its membership in the
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factories. For them the crisis was not the result of some so called consumer 
or industrial society, nor was it wrong for every Frenchman to enjoy 
driving his own car, the real problem was that the state had made 
insufficient provision to facilitate new styles of living. The Party’s own 
policy on fares differed slightly from the simple demands made by the 
Cartel. It favoured extending the range of concessionary fares, and 
subsidising travel to work, while maintaining a realistic full fare so that 
the services covered their day to day running costs. In other words, the 
Communist Party wanted to write off the accumulated deficit, but thereafter 
favoured keeping the RATP to a break even budget. The CGT and the Communist 
Party were conservative in organisational terms as well as in policy 
matters. They refused to sanction local committees which directly involved 
users and ran the campaign through a district wide co-ordinating committee 
(217). All the major actions were marshalled and directed by the party’s 
service d’ ordre and key positions in front organisations like the Groupe 
d’Action sur VAmelioration de la Circulation et des Transports were held by 
Party nominees (218).
Not all the groups who supported the Cartel were as conservative as the 
leading elements. Both the CFDT and the Socialist Party had a more radical 
approach to controlling cars in city centres. The effect of transport policy 
on the environment was much more important to both these groups. The CFDT 
was strongest in its critique of the impact of cars on the urban 
environment. In 1971 it too published a report on Paris Transport (219) 
which placed the blame for the deterioration in journey times and public 
transport conditions squarely on the increase in private car traffic. The 
Union proposed an alternative model of the city in which many central areas
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were reserved for pedestrians and buses, in which the normal mode of travel
was free public transport on dedicated routes, insulated from private cars,
and in which car drivers paid tolls for access to inner city districts. The
Socialist Party echoed this vision in its 1972 programme:
"Today, the citizen is all too often forced to use their own car 
for travel into town. This is presented to them as progress. In 
fact, real progress consists in giving citizens the means to buy a 
car if they wish, but not to oblige them to do so in order to get 
about ... that is the tyranny of the car. It affects people and 
the towns in which they live. The result is that quiet streets are 
destroyed, parks ruined, pavements narrowed and the overall 
quality of life is degraded" (220)
Transport strategy was part of the democratisation of city Government which
was the central plank of Socialist Party politics in the early 1970s. The
party’s objectives were summarised at the Assises de Socialisme in 1974.
First of all it aimed to replace central Government control of transport
policy with local management by accountable, participatory bodies. This
would be assisted by a range of central measures to reduce pressure on local
administration including freezing land prices, stopping any more office
development in the city centre, increasing the amount of low cost public
sector housing under construction, reducing car access to central districts
and promoting community associations in all neighbourhoods. The Assises
identified four urgently required policy changes: there must be tighter
restrictions on parking, no more car parks should be built in the city
centre, all new buildings should be obliged to supply sufficient car
parking spaces for their needs and a major programme of pedestrianisation
should be embarked upon.
The Cartel’s underlying conservatism was a great asset for it enabled 
it to appeal to the average commuter living in a new town or suburb who
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would not wish to associate with the street politics of the far left, but 
found the conditions of travel and the increased costs intolerable. These 
people were the backbone of the campaign, and the key to its success. An 
opinion poll taken for the Government in the summer of 1970 showed that 88% 
of people questioned felt that transport conditions had deteriorated, 54% 
thought that public transport had got worse, 86% approved in principle of 
restricting the use of cars, but 80% were against increased fines for 
traffic offences and 67% opposed introducing parking charges (221). The 
Cartel organised three major actions. The first in July 1970 comprised 
demonstrations of various kinds at the main rail stations and Metro 
interchanges, ranging from sit down protests to leafletting passers by.
Opposition from Government supporters, and from influential members of local 
authorities was sufficient to persuade the Government to announce that it 
would defer the forthcoming price increase pending the outcome of 
discussions on future plans. Within two months however, protest reached new 
heights when the STP announced that journeys which crossed the city boundary 
and went outside the twenty central arrondissements would cost two tickets 
instead of the normal one. This incensed commuters on two counts, first of 
all it removed the advantage of making a journey on one mode and secondly it 
meant that they would be making a much larger contribution to the much 
vaunted improvements in the service than they had previously believed. There 
was much sense to the proposed new fare structure from the RATP’s point of 
view. If Metro extensions could not be used to increase revenue per 
kilometre they would simply increase congestion on the central routes and 
reduce the profitability of the RER. At this point the campaign began to 
attract open support from members of the Majorite. Commenting on the 
decision M. Alain Grioterray, a leading Republicain Independent and
117
Part 2 : Policy Change
Rapporteur du Budget of the District de la Region Parisienne said:
"we see here another example of a measure decided and announced in 
a quite unacceptable and irresponsible way. I recently condemned 
the suggestion by some technocrats that tolls should be introduced 
on urban roads, an idea which alarms many people. Today suburban 
residents have been given a further example of such behaviour
without so much as an explanation of the objectives behind the
scheme which many people rightly oppose. My friends are already 
petitioning in protest and with good reason." (222)
The situation deteriorated further when the Government announced that the
fare increase would come into effect at the same time, on January 1st 1971
(223). The Cartel called a regional demonstration through the centre of
Paris in protest. In November 1970 30,000 people marched from Les Hailes to
Opera along the route of the proposed central section of the RER (224). This
large mobilisation of otherwise non-political citizens impressed the
organisers and the Government. The Cartel followed it up with a further day
of action in all the major transport termini in December 1970 (225). Once
again the Government retreated and postponed the proposed fare increase
mindful of the forthcoming municipal elections and anxious to develop a
strategy for transport development which would provide better justification
for further fare increases (226).
Dissatisfaction with transport policy had by now spread to the heart of
the Gaullist administration. The Conseil Administratif du District de la
Region Parisienne referred back the transport section of the draft plan in
February 1970 calling for further investment and greater priority for public
transport (227). The newly elected President of the Paris Chamber of
Commerce called for action to redress the transport crisis saying:
"If in the next few years a serious effort is not made in 
transport investment the Paris Region will endure a severe 
crisis." (228)
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In March 1971 the users campaign won. The Government announced that it 
would introduce a tax on all employers in the Paris Region to pay for 
transport investment and published revised investment programmes (for a 
detailed description of the new measures see below . The Cartel was not 
fully satisfied and called a further demonstration against any fare 
increases and for better services which, despite the campaign’s 
overwhelming success on its major points still attracted 18,000 people 
(229). In August 1971 the Government introduced a ten per cent fare increase 
and the two ticket system for suburban journeys on new routes. The Cartel 
called for a day of action, but the response was muted and in September 1971 
the Cartel formally disbanded and the constituent groups went their separate 
ways each sponsoring a transport users’ group of far greater numbers and 
importance than they could have imagined two years previously (230).
The FCU participated in the regional mobilisations, but its primary 
interest was in local users’ committees which it sponsored and supported in 
many localities. At the height of discontent in November 1970 there were 
sixty active neighbourhood transport users’ committees (231). These local 
foci for discontent complemented the regional dimension of the Cartel. Many 
of the problems were not about fares, or overall investment, but about the 
routing, organisation and timetabling of local services. The Cartel could 
not offer support to groups wishing to pursue these kinds of grievance, 
indeed routine systems for consulting about local services were woefully 
inadequate. The FCU provided a group to bring together like minded, 
aggrieved local citizens and also a means of collecting together such 
evidence into an impressive account of the travails of travelling on a daily
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basis which was published in September 1970 as the Livre Noir des Transports
Parisiens. The FCU gave greater prominence to issues surrounding the
contracting out of suburban bus services to private operators and the
inadequacy of links between suburban centres. While the operational style of
the leaders of the FCU was classically Trotskyist, based on cell
organisation, strong leadership and transitional demands, the coalition
offered a space for groups of less political or non-aligned campaigners to
air their views and ideas. The FCU was the origin of some influential
ecologist groups which were important during the implementation phase of
projects within the new plans announced in March 1971 (see part 3). The FCU
was much more middle class than the Cartel and was most active in
traditional mixed inner city communities. Following an analysis of
participation in the local committees Cherki and Mehl concluded:
"while locally the social strata affected by (transport) issues 
were usually mainly workers, or simply a mixture of social 
classes, the campaigning force was almost completely dominated by 
the salaried middle class." (232)
This reflects an important weakness of the FCU as a single issue campaign;
it sought to mobilise people according to locality as much as according to
their experience of travel, and this confused the simple messages which
generated greatest support. The Cartel laboured under no similar handicap;
it appealed to people simply as transport users, wherever they came from,
whatever they did, whatever they sought elsewhere in life. Once deprived of
the mobilising issue of fares and investment funding by the March 1971
climbdown, the FCU also suffered a demise (233). The rationale for
confederal action was weakened, as local issues became more important and
more integrated in general municipal politics. As transport politics became
more parochial the distinctions between local committees increased, and they
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ceased to be such fertile ground for the activists of LO and the PSU who 
moved elsewhere to seek recruits and supporters.
The users’ campaign had its individual leaders outside the formal 
organisations, the most important of whom was Brigitte Gros, Maire of 
Meulan, a town to the south-west of Paris and author of an influential 
account of the appalling transport facilities facing her electors entitled 
"Quatre Heures de Transport par Jour". Mme Gros was a centrist politician 
and focussed discontent on the institutional arrangements for representing 
consumers in the region. In May 1971 she called for a new regional 
authority (234). This was to become an important theme once the financial 
reforms (see below) had been put in place.
The period from 1972 to 1975 was the zenith of community politics in 
France, as local action groups multiplied around issues of housing, 
environmental protection, transport, leisure and security (235). The 
membership of these groups overlapped and particular interests coalesced or 
conflicted as decision were made incrementally about urban development. The 
age of grand plans and broad brush implementation was over and a new 
sensitivity to local concerns and consumer rights pervaded urban planning 
and public service management. The pattern set by the FCU and their 
equivalents in provincial cities was the basis for a new style of politics 
and a new agenda of issues. Questions of quality and of locality became more 
important than the great international trends and quantitative models which 
had dominated the sixties. Political debate centred more on consumption and 
distribution and less on production and productivity. The theme of the 
"cadre de vie" (quality of life) took pride of place in the decentralist
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democracy of the ascendent Socialist party and pastoral conservatism of 
Giscard.
3.7 : The Plan Global of 1972
Grand strategy might be dead, but the bureaucracy still needed a plan 
as a basis for local negotiation, management accountability and progress 
measurement. In March 1971 the Government accepted the need for a new set of 
priorities in the Paris Region and for a stable set of arrangements to 
oversee the implementation of the new policies. If employers were going to 
pay large sums into the budget then they must be satisfied that it would be 
well spent. Maurice Doublet was commissioned to produce a Plan, covering the 
three dimensions of the problem examined in this chapter namely: who should 
be responsible for policy implementation, what should they do first and how 
should users be involved in decision making? The inter - ministerial 
committee which had agreed to introduce the tax on employers also set down 
other policy guidelines for the Regional Prefect. Parking charges and fines 
for illegal parking were to be phased in throughout the city; ministers 
wished to see further examination of the possible benefits of new technology 
in public transport especially the Aerotrain project to Cergy Pontoise
(236); the Government wished to pursue actively the idea of negotiating a 
contract with the RATP and finally the Government would welcome proposals 
for a new transport authority for the region.
The first draft of the new plan, setting out guiding principles, was
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published in January 1972. The authors set out the following remit:
"The solution to the problem of transport and traffic demands a 
global and coherent policy on investment and on regulation as well 
as on public transport tariffs. ... insufficient emphasis has been 
placed on public transport and in particular on the improvement of 
the existing means of transport and the extension of Metro lines"
(237)
The report identified three aspects of planning: technical questions like 
demographic forecasts, psychological aspects including the extent of public 
involvement and understanding and judicial/political issues which concerned 
bringing together the "diverse tendencies and actors" which could implement 
an agreed plan. The Plan then set out the full measure of the problem. The 
accumulated deficit of the RATP was 1370mF. Receipts from ticket sales and 
other miscellaneous sources only covered 50% of the costs of running the 
firm. The bus network represented 30% of the operation but caused over 60% 
of the deficit. There was no coherent leadership and responsibility in 
policy making
"the STP does not dispose of the independence in decision making 
which is desirable in order to ensure ... the co-ordination of 
diverse interests and pressures. A different organisation allowing 
the state, local councils and the transport companies to better 
exercise their respective roles must be created." (238)
The principles for future plans were based on an acceptance that an
effective transport policy:
"implies a profound revision of the role of the car in urban areas 
and demands in certain circumstances priority for public 
transport." (239)
Following from this shift in the underlying principles of transport 
planning the report outlined a proposed charter for transport, as a basis 
for a new contract between consumers, public authorities and the transport 
companies. The main points were as follows: in the city centre and inner 
suburbs public transport should meet 80-90% of rush hour travel demand and
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60% of all demand at other times; each square meter of Metro or train 
carriage should be occupied by less than four standing passengers; buses 
should run at a guaranteed minimum speed of 15 kilometers per hour; 100,000 
on street parking spaces should be abolished; traffic flow should be at a 
minimum speed (unspecified); 60-80% of journeys in the outer suburbs would 
take place in cars; it should be possible to park within 200 meters of any 
destination; everyone should be within 800 meters of a transport service to 
the city centre. The short run priorities suggested in the draft plan were: 
establishing a single transport authority with greater powers to intervene 
in public and private transport management; increasing investment in 
existing systems; giving special priority to suburban roads in ZUPs; 
improving budgetary control and accounting systems; increasing the 
managerial autonomy of transport companies within the context of the 
contracts with the new authority; setting up new appraisal systems for 
future investment proposals. The report envisaged institutional reform as 
the key change and elucidated the various options in some detail.
»
One set of options was based on extending the role of the STP. This 
involved making it an institution of equal status to the District, making 
the Presidency an elected office and electing local representatives to the 
board in direct regional elections. The central Government would continue to 
be represented by nominees from interested ministries and the new body would 
be serviced by the Regional Prefect. The STP’s powers over parking and 
traffic management would have to be increased. The second set of options 
were based on changing the role of the District de la Region Parisienne. The 
first of these would be to decentralise transport policy entirely to the 
District, giving the regional prefect tutelage over the RATP and the SNCF-B
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subject to supervision by the Conseil Administratif du District. The second 
possibility was to continue the joint responsibility then in force but to 
transfer the STP’s functions to the District, the central Government would 
continue to control the companies but through a single regional authority 
rather than a specialist institution. The third possibility was to retain 
the existing arrangements but to devolve the central Government’s interests 
in the STP to the Regional Prefect, thereby creating a local joint board in 
the STP. The plan also suggested that the District should be given direct 
representation on the board of the RATP. The common feature of all the 
schemes is that they increase the scope of prefectoral control at the 
expense of either the national Government or the transport companies.
Doublet wanted to remove the possibility of the two colluding against him, 
but was indifferent as to which he had to negotiate with in a two way 
situation (240).
The final plan says absolutely nothing about institutional
arrangements for managing transport policy. A powerful combination of the
Ponts et Chaussees and the Government’s reluctance to broach further
administrative reforms on the eve of the legislative elections combined to
remove all such proposals from active consideration until the Regional
reform was extended to Paris in 1976. Robert Franc comments:
"His (Doublet’s) plan is strangely silent on one essential point; 
which body will implement this transport plan. Logically it should 
be an elected regional assembly but the Government does not wish 
to hear talk of such things. Power and responsibility, as far it 
is concerned, are things which it will never share" (241)
The priorities had changed but they became the property of the Minister of
Transport, the DDEs and the Transport Companies. No longer was regional co­
ordination by the Prefect and national involvement by President and Prime
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Ministers the right way to direct policy. Transport became a specialist 
preserve again, operating to different criteria and in a different political 
culture, but separate from the grand plans of the regional strategists.
The specific content, in transport terms, of the plan had been well 
signalled in the draft but is a remarkable shift from the Schema Directeur 
and the original sixth plan nonetheless. The priority order of services was 
set out as follows: public transport, safety and emergency services, goods 
deliveries, general traffic circulation, parking policy. The plan insisted 
that the social costs of proposed plans should be fully measured and 
compared before judgments about the relative value of possible developments 
were made. Some specific measures were included in the plan including 
parking bans on all main roads in the city, a re-organisation of the bus 
network and approval for the concept of bus lanes, a programme of Metro 
extensions and further development of the RER. There was no mention of the 
big road projects like the Left Bank Expressway and the A86 ring roads which 
had been top of the priority list in 1970. Overall strategy had shifted 
dramatically towards public transport, and responsibility for development 
was firmly in the grasp of the specialist engineers who had challenged the 
legitimacy of the Schema Directeur and the institutions which had prepared 
it.
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CHAPTER 4 : M aking Employers Pay - Economic Dimensions of Policy Change
The most striking feature of the strategic policy changes was the 
Government’s decision to tax employers in the Paris region in order to raise 
more revenue and avoid further fare increases. The central point of the 
transport users’ arguments against fare increases had been that employers 
were the main beneficiaries of commuter transport systems, and that the 
location of employment was the major cause of congestion and inefficiency 
and, therefore, that if more revenue was required employers should make an 
increased contribution. This argument went to the heart of public policy: 
the determination of the relative costs of public goods to different social 
groups. The basic rationale for public intervention and regulation in 
transport services must be that, left to its own devices, the market would 
generate irresponsible monopoly power, unnecessarily high overall costs and 
an unreasonable level of fares for the consumer. The transport users’ 
campaigns claimed that the Government was no longer protecting the consumer 
sufficiently and that the proposed programme of fare increases was an 
unreasonable subsidy of costs which should properly be borne by other 
beneficiaries. Underlying this argument is a basic issue about the boundary 
between work and leisure - does work start when the employee leaves his/her 
home or when s/he arrives at work? Who should pay the costs involved in the 
segregation of work and leisure necessitated by mass production of goods, 
services and homes?
Throughout the sixties, urban policy and transport investment
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increasingly imposed this cost on employees. As their workplaces moved away 
from the city centre, out of the old networks and generally further from the 
main new residential developments so employees had to buy cars, buy more 
expensive season tickets, get up earlier and arrive home later. Increased 
commuting time had a straightforward economic cost associated with fuel, 
parking, ticket prices and lost time; it also had an unquantified cost in 
terms of loss of contact with families, stress and diminution of community 
life. Not for nothing were new towns often described as dormitory towns.
Bridgitte Gros summed up the effect on the community of which she was Maire 
with the apt title "Quatre Heures de Transport par Jour". These people were 
the pioneers of a new culture which Gaullism and modern town planning 
espoused, but they were also its victims. They did not all own a small, 
efficient, cheap Renault or Citroen and they did not enjoy the freedom of 
traffic free new highways to their workplace. They couldn’t afford the car, 
they needed two anyway if they were going to go shopping as well, and the 
highways had not been built. Reality was an old, inefficient, uncomfortable 
railway or a slow crawl through dense traffic. There was no joy for them in 
the journey to work, the gain was all the employers.
Public policy makers went some way to accepting the employee’s view of 
things. All employees in the Paris region received a weighting allowance for 
travel (the Prime de Transports) which in 1970 was 23F per week. However, 
this amount was substantially below the costs incurred by many longer 
distance commuters (242), or people who had to change modes of public 
transport to make their journey. The unions’ demands were no longer for 
increases in the weighting allowance, but a more radical proposal that all 
employees should be provided with a card enabling them to travel to work
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free (243). This card should be paid for by the employer. The transport 
users’ campaigns recognised that free travel cards for employees would only 
benefit a particular group of transport users and they argued as well for 
concessionary fares for pensioners, students and war veterans (244). Equally 
they saw that changing the cost of existing transport would not solve long 
term problems and they called for greater public subsidy of investments in 
new services and improvements to the existing infrastructure.
Clearly the revenue and capital components of transport policy are 
different in their impacts on budgets, and in their methods of financing, 
even if closely interconnected in outcomes for consumers. The policy options 
in each area were different as well. This chapter looks first at the 
proposals adopted by the Government to generate more resources for the 
transport system as a whole and then examines the plans which determined the 
distribution of benefits from deploying these new resources. It concludes by 
arguing that the outcome was a dramatic change in the distribution of 
benefits, and equally in the system which planned future transport 
developments.
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4.1 : New resources - the versements transports
The notion of taxes on employers to increase resources had been 
achieving growing credibility in professional argument since 1969. This 
process had accelerated rapidly as the transport users’ campaign 
demonstrated the depth of opposition to fare increases. The tax could be 
justified within the prevailing ethos of "true prices" for social goods. The 
Rapport Nora (245) had established an orthodoxy that public bodies should 
cover their costs when producing traded goods and services; in other words 
subsidy should be in the form of income support rather than artificially 
cheap goods which led to high deficits in nationalised industries. The fare 
increases to which the Government was committed flowed from this approach; 
the RATP should charge a commercial rate for its services. However, a 
broader view of "true prices" suggested that this approach was an 
unjustifiable subsidy to employers, whose sole contribution remained the 
prime de transports. Genuinely true prices should, therefore, reflect the 
benefits enjoyed by employers as well as the service offered to transport 
users.
The PCF incorporated the idea of a tax on employers in its campaign on 
transport policy from the very early stages (246). They drafted legislation 
(247) which suggested a graduated tax on all firms with more than 100 
employees in the Paris region and a special tax on the profits of the large 
department stores in central Paris. As we saw in Chapter 3 above the free 
travel card was a key demand in the users’ campaign and was promoted 
strongly by both the CGT and CFDT. In their Plan d’Urgence in June 1970 the
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PCF proposed to spread the burden still further by introducing taxes on
property development and by diverting extra funds from the national road
fund. Bridgitte Gros echoed these proposals in an open letter to the
President of the Republic; she called for three essential measures:
"First, lightening the burden of fares - that is why it is crucial 
to proceed towards a fairer distribution of subsidies and why we 
propose that Comites d’ Entreprises should be able to issue free 
travel cards to employees wherever they live. Secondly we call for 
the re-imposition of an infrastructure tax on firms to pay for the 
costs of transport and thirdly we urge the Government to introduce 
an effective property tax on urban development." (248)
Sympathy for the idea of taxing property developers and new industries was
widespread as resentment against their quick profits and deleterious effect
on architecture and city life grew among the middle classes and
intelligentsia of Paris. A special tax for transport costs was also
attractive to the Ponts et Chaussees, for it would give them a guaranteed
resource for public transport analogous to the Fonds Special
d’Investissement Routiere (FSIR) for roads, and insulate them from the
budgetary discipline imposed by the Ministry of Finance. If taxes were to be
increased a regional payroll tax was an attractive option politically since
it would alienate few voters and would leave the level of taxation in the
hands of the central Government rather than some opposition controlled local
authority.
How did employers react to the proposal that they should bear a larger 
share of the burden of funding Paris transport? One might expect that 
businesses would protest vigorously against a direct increase in their 
costs, which would, arguably, reduce competitiveness and weaken the 
valuable new financial discipline being imposed on inefficient public 
utilities. In practice reaction was muted and ineffectual, there was no
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significant counter argument to the users’ demand for new taxes from any 
quarter and the decision to introduce the tax and the debate over the 
precise details of how much it would cost and how it would be collected 
revealed a broad consensus throughout the Region and across the political 
spectrum for the users’ proposals. There seem to have been four factors 
which impeded effective mobilisation of business interests; first the 
business community was divided over urban policy and taxation, secondly 
there was a long history of the government leadership of business responses 
to external pressures for change, thirdly key elements of the business 
community were integrated into public policy making and had been colonised 
by civil servants and finally fear of civil disorder and opposition 
political success inhibited political action by business leaders. In each 
case it is instructive to look briefly at the evolution of business 
participation in public policy making in order to more fully understand the 
forces which opened the way for a radical redistribution of resources.
First, business attitudes to urban planning and transport policy 
differed depending on the size of the firm, the location of its primary base 
and according the nature of the firm’s activity (249). Small employers had 
favoured general improvements in infrastructure which maximised the range of 
travel and investment opportunities and offered them a wide choice of 
locations. Medium sized firms had been the primary sponsors of the Centre 
National d’Industries et Techniques, which was the original development 
project at La Defense, in order to provide a new location for traditional 
Paris based skilled manufacturing which could provide better common 
services compared with their existing bases scattered around the city and 
inner suburbs. Large employers on the other hand had sought larger sites,
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either in greenfield locations further from the city, or through renovation 
of substantial city plots. Their interest in the transport network was for 
dedicated services to enable their employees and customers to reach their 
new headquarters in large enough numbers. Paris based companies such as the 
older established manufacturers and the national banks were looking to 
locate their whole activity on a new site, or to improve the existing 
support services for their largest centre of operations. However, many of 
the largest businesses in the region were expanding from bases abroad or in 
provincial France, and were more concerned with international communication 
than with their role in Paris and its surrounding districts.
There were clear differences in the demands made by manufacturers and 
those made by the financial sector. The former was looking for greenfield 
sites, or for smaller bases in integrated communities with ready access to 
labour and markets, and was especially supportive of the new towns (250).
The financial sector promoted the concept of the cite finaciere: a small 
close knit district dominated by financial institutions with easy 
communication and rapid direct exchange of market information (251). A 
further factor dividing businesses was that some of the leading companies in 
the region had a clear interest in road construction and private motoring: 
two major car manufacturers dominated the manufacturing sector and had 
exercised strong influence on transport policy in the past (252). In 
addition the largest newcomers were oil companies who were keen to expand 
their sales in France.
Effective business intervention, either at the level of individual 
lobbying, or through ad hoc associations to promote specific developments,
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required alliances across the different elements of the business community.
La Defense represented a compromise between the small businesses seeking 
facilities for common marketing and promotion through the CNIT and big 
multinational business prospecting for sites for French headquarters 
offices. Local businesses’ anxieties over the scale of the new development, 
and the way in which major foreign companies came to dominate its management 
and construction, were allayed by the preferential treatment given to 
landowners and displaced firms (253). These accommodations enabled the 
project at La Defense to proceed rapidly, and to secure essential public 
investment in the necessary rail infrastructure (254). However, the 
proposals for a new Commercial Centre in Les Hailes were opposed by small 
businesses (255) and this made it more difficult to secure the necessary 
political endorsements to undertake such a radical project. In the debates 
in the municipal council on the future of Les Hailes, the centrist members, 
who represented traditional small businesspeople succeeded in placing strict 
restrictions on the size and purpose of redevelopment (256).
There is some evidence that businesses were divided over the specific 
transport issues involved, as well as over the broader issues of urban 
redevelopment. The financial sector, especially banks and insurance 
companies sponsoring the concept of a cite financiere were in favour of the 
RER, of restrictions on road use and parking, and of subsidised travel for 
employees into the centre of Paris. Lojkine cites evidence from an interview 
with a leader of the Federation Francoises des Societes Assurances who 
supported parking restrictions and fare subsidies in the late 1960s (257).
He also quotes, as supporting evidence, an article in the journal Banque 
which advocates pedestrianised financial districts in major cities (258).
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The Consortium advocating a Commercial Centre in Les Hailes argued that the 
RER junction should be at Les Hailes and that this should form the centre of 
the Parisian transport system (259). It is also clear that the major 
department stores stood to gain from their direct access to the RER system 
through the Auber station, and that parking restrictions and traffic 
regulations would harm their business much less than the smaller stores in 
the same locality. A survey of shopkeepers in the vicinity of Auber in 1971 
found that 56% of them felt the new RER service would be an advantage to 
trade (260).
Small companies, and especially local manufacturers and traders, still 
based in city centre locations were opposed to the restrictions and the 
specialisation of transport services implied in the RER and the traffic 
restriction proposals. They were also opposed to the principle of 
contributing towards the deficit of transport utilities, since the immediate 
payback was difficult to identify and local taxation figured more 
prominently in their balance sheets (261). The most vocal political 
opponents of the tax (see below for a detailed account of the Political 
debate in Parliament) were the same centrists who has defended small 
businesses against the proposals for redevelopment of Les Hailes. Against 
this ideological opposition to non-commercial public services and a desire 
to be free of local tax burdens must be weighed the pragmatic point that 
over four fifths of the businesses in the Paris region did not have to pay 
the Versement Transports because they had less than 10 employees (262).
Overall therefore, business attitudes were split between a conditional 
willingness to accept higher taxation on the part of financial institutions,
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a general indifference on the part of international corporations and a weak
opposition on the part of small local industry and commerce. In these
circumstances the capacity of peak organisations to make substantive
contributions to policy development was diminished (263). The Chamber of
Commerce was disinclined to make specific recommendations without a clearer
consensus among its members. The Presidents remarks at the height of the
transport crisis emphasise the Chamber’s concern, urge increased public
funding but fail to specify any priorities for transport development though
it does suggest a preferred source of additional resources:
"if in the next few years a serious investment programme 
in transport infrastructure is not undertaken, then the 
Paris Region is in danger of reaching an insoluble
crisis - the vital financial commitments involved should
not be borne by one generation alone, the time frame for 
bearing the financial burdens will be long and loans 
should be forthcoming"(264)
The second factor weakening business participation was a culture of 
deference to Government in many policy areas. Throughout the twentieth 
century French business had attempted to secure Government assistance in 
facing major external challenges which required restructuring, re-investment 
or significant reforms in commercial practice. This was manifested in, for 
example, the protectionist reaction by many businesses to the formation of 
the European Economic Community in 1956 (265) and, in the Paris region, by 
the demand for preferential treatment for local companies when major 
developments such as La Defense (266) were planned. In this context, 
initiatives such as the Versements Transports can be seen as helpful 
interventions by the state, enabling business to find collective solutions 
to the problems of financing necessary infrastructure, which individual 
firms were unable to address either alone or through their associations.
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State organisation of funding mechanisms for transport, to the 
advantage of key businesses, was not a new phenomenon in France. The road 
building and motor industry had benefited from the FSIR, which placed a tax 
burden on all car owners in order to generate adequate funds to build and 
maintain roads. However, the major public transport operators, for example 
SNCF, had been hampered by their close association with the Government, and 
by a crippling dependence on the state for investment funds, which were 
provided almost exclusively through the national planning machinery. The 
transport utilities’ relationships with Government had been characterised by 
greater dependence than industry as a whole, and by a more specific 
bilateral arrangements for planning and managing services. The utilities 
were therefore not in a position to lobby very effectively for tax revenues 
despite the importance of new transport infrastructure for the 
profitability of urban development.
To a degree, this weakness vis a vis Government strategy was replicated 
in the regional planning system which drew up priorities for the sixth plan.
The relationship between the Government and business in the planning 
commissions reflects the willingness of businesses to defer to the expertise 
of civil servants and professional advisors. The key role of Rapporteur and 
the crucial research, report preparation and data gathering tasks were all 
undertaken by the Regional Prefects nominees. The manufacturers, especially 
the car manufacturers, whose objectives differed from the emerging 
professional consensus in support of public transport based solution were 
ineffective dissidents in the planning commissions on transport and on 
towns. Their objections to the draft proposals for inclusion in the sixth
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plan, especially the priority ascribed to the RER and Metro extensions ahead 
of the A86/7 outer ring road were politely noted, but ignored (267).
On bigger issues, for example the redevelopment of Les Hailes, the 
plans promoted by the Consortium (268) were rapidly brought within the 
public sphere, and the Regional Prefect established a commission comprising 
representatives of leading public and private sector parties with an 
interest in the development. However, other efforts by businesses to 
organise alternative planning forums, or to promote alternative plans which 
were not sympathetically viewed by the Prefect, the Minister or leading 
professionals were generally ineffective. A good example of this phenomenon 
was the fruitless efforts by the consortium Urbanisme-Amenagement- 
Transports to promote the idea of a private toll road to double the capacity 
of the Peripherique in 1973. Although the project for a second deck on the 
Peripherique, a Super-peripherique, was backed by the Chamber of Commerce, 
and had the personal sympathy of the ailing President Pompidou, the project 
was never even considered by the formal public planning bodies. The 
proposal to introduce tolls was a fundamental shift towards private 
reponsibility for the costs of motoring. The Chamber of Commerce estimated 
that tolls might raise 2.7 million Francs (1973 prices) by 1980 and that 
this would be sufficient to fund the entire programme of roads set out in 
the Schema Directeur. However, the idea was regarded as politically too 
dangerous despite the intellectual support it commanded among transport 
planners and economists (269).
Thirdly, some of the most important businesses were closely involved 
with public policy making by other routes than peak organisations. The areas
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in which business representative were most influential, for example in the 
development of Les Hailes, and in the latter stages of the development at La 
Defense, were those dominated by financial companies, especially banks. Many 
of the largest customers for new office space on the big redevelopments were 
banks (270). The same banks were frequently the financiers for the 
development companies constructing and letting the new premisses. Lojkine 
describes the period from 1967 onwards as a third phase in business 
participation in urban policy in which financial organisations became the 
leading representatives of business, following earlier periods in the 
fifties when local manufacturing played a leading part before being 
displaced by international industrial complexes in the mid 1960s. Public 
sector banks were a powerful and changing influence in the financial sector, 
and played a central role in reshaping the means by which business 
influenced decisions on urban planning and transport.
In the late 1960s the financial system in France was liberalised 
introducing greater competition between public and private banks (271). A 
proportion of the expansion of financial institutions and their office 
requirements in Paris can be attributed to banks gearing themselves up to 
take on a wider role in a more competitive market. However, the 
liberalisation of the financial market did not break the close links between 
nationalised banks and central government ministries, especially the 
Ministry of Finance. The banks’ role in financing infrastructure investment 
also ensured close involvement with urban and regional planning through the 
Regional Prefecture and the Ministry of Equipement. Therefore the primary 
demanders and financiers of new infrastructure had a direct bilateral 
relationship with key policy makers on, for example, committees of the Fonds
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de Developpement Economique et Sociale and in the Regional Prefect’s office.
Peak organisations were, therefore, isolated from the forums where these 
decisions were made, and the capacity of other sectors of business to 
influence them was correspondingly weakened.
The final factor influencing businesses’ willingness to take issue with 
the versement transports was, of course, the public protest which is the 
principal subject of this study. The vehemence of consumers’ dissatisfaction 
was communicated to businesses directly by their employees through lateness, 
absenteeism, recruitment problems and the impact of the protests on places 
of employment. The potential consequences of widespread public discontent 
were not lost on businesses who had recently made substantial concessions 
through the Grenelle agreements to restore political and economic order 
after the events of May 1968 (272). Furthermore, the RATP and other 
transport providers drew attention to the possible consequences of 
continuing unhappiness on the part of transport users (273). Employers 
themselves accepted the underlying argument that they too benefited from an 
infrastructure which provided good transport conditions for their employees.
Some could intervene directly to ensure good access for their particular 
sites, but there remained a strong general interest in effective regional 
networks, and in general public confidence in the system. Business required, 
and to an extent, welcomed, the Government’s initiative to resolve the 
funding and investment problems which beset the region’s transport system 
and thereby undermined the redevelopment programmes on which their future 
markets and profitability might depend.
By early 1971 members and supporters of the Government began to
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indicate their support for the idea of a payroll tax; in February 1971 Paul 
Delouvrier indicated that he backed the suggestion (274) and in his press 
briefing before the Interministerial Meeting of March 25th the Minister of 
Transport, Jean Chamant, made it clear that the ministry had supported the 
proposal in discussions with the President and the Prime Minister (275). At 
the Interministerial Council the Government resolved to introduce 
legislation immediately to institute a tax on all firms with more than nine 
employees in the Paris region. In legal terms the tax was on the same basis 
as the Social Security levy and was titled a "versement". The maximum rate 
was set at 2% of total salaries of employees working in the Paris Region.
The primary objective was to raise funds for infrastructure investment, and 
the second aim to promote managerial reform in the RATP. The Bill was 
introduced in Parliament in May. Article II of the Bill stated explicitly 
that:
"the employers are the primary beneficiaries of the existence of a 
large labour market, especially in Paris and in the three 
departements on its periphery, the essential feature of which is 
the fluidity facilitated by a large public transport network."
(276)
As well as the main aims, the funds generated could also be used for 
relieving the burden of public transport subsidies on the budgets of public 
authorities in the Paris region and to fund the re-organisation of Paris 
transport. The role of collecting and disbursing the funds was given to the 
STP.
The Parliamentary Commission which examined the Bill clause by clause, 
before the detailed debate in Parliament as a whole, emphasised the growing 
deficit of the RATP as the main rationale for the measure. The Commission 
found that the Government was bound to act to meet the crisis occasioned by
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the deficit and judged the bill according to its probable effectiveness in 
redressing the situation. The Commission estimated that the gross revenue 
collected would be 1170 million Francs in the first year and it praised the 
ease with which funds could be collected through the existing social 
security machinery. The Commission considered the alternatives of additional 
public expenditure from general tax revenues and of further increases in 
fares. It rejected both on the grounds that neither would relieve "the 
excessive burden on public finance at a time when investment needs to 
increase quickly" and both would "risk being a further cause of increases in 
wages and prices which would have repercussions throughout the national 
economy". It recommended that the Government should use the revenue to 
achieve some immediate short term goals including better services on 
existing systems, better productivity and reducing the level of direct 
Government subsidy. It also emphasised that the Government should programme 
a tariff policy which would help to reduce the deficit, should give two 
years guaranteed investment funding and should stop interfering in the day 
to day management of the RATP.
In the longer term the Commission argued that the tax would be most 
effective in the context of substantial institutional reforms which would 
decentralise control of Paris Transport to a regional body. Equally the tax 
was commended for the long term benefit in helping to reduce the deleterious 
effects of land use policies and development strategies which rely on high 
levels of long distance commuting. The Rapporteur from the commission 
recommended two amendments exempting firms locating in new towns and 
establishing concentric bands so that the tax was less the further from 
Paris a firm was based. Both of these were accepted by the Government.
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In the debate itself, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Transport skirted around the specific aspects of the measure and
concentrated on the wider issues of economic development in the Paris
Region and the need to improve the balance of activity across the district.
Nevertheless a right wing Prime Minister did say:
"Today, the Government proposes to you to demand of the employers 
who benefit directly from the existence of these transport 
facilities that they assume part of the cost. In this way it will 
be possible to minimise future fare increases and from this year 
on, if you adopt the principle of an employers’ contribution, not 
to raise the cost of weekly season tickets." (277)
Chaban Delmas was speaking directly to the most important part of the
transport users’ campaign and giving commuters the assurance on travel costs
they sought from the Government. More specifically he cited three
justifications for the Bill. First to relieve the state budget of an
excessive burden, straightforwardly to obviate the need for direct tax
increases on all citizens. Secondly, to "better divide the costs between
employers and employees so as to resolve the stresses placed on the RATP and
the SNCF by the current arrangements; this objective was to be achieved
"without insupportable increases in fares for the travelling population and
most especially the workers" (278). Thirdly to attack, at its roots, the
crisis which beset the Paris region as a result of unbalanced redevelopment
and uncontrolled growth. The Minister of Transport stressed the plans set
out in the Sixth Plan to improve the transport infrastructure and emphasised
the managerial reforms taking place in the RATP and SNCF. The Government had
agreed a contract with the RATP in which it would guarantee stable fares and
steady investment finance, devolve financial control and exempt the RATP
from VAT in return for a freeze on recruitment and a commitment to reduce
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employee numbers through automation. M. Chamant showed the Government’s
priorities when he said:
"In the course of this year the Government will almost certainly 
have to increase the basic fare but it does not want wage earners 
holding season tickets to suffer the consequences of this extra 
charge." (279)
The main opposition parties supported the measure and simply sought 
reassurances that the Government seriously meant to rethink its urban 
strategy. Speaking for the opposition parties M. Boulloche said; "We ask 
ourselves if you are really on the way to solving the problems of urban 
transport". He suggested that there were two models of urban development: 
the American and the European. France, he argued, simply did not have the 
space to accommodate fashionable American town planning ideas. The PCF moved 
a symbolic amendment to retitle the levy a "taxe" but this was rejected.
Serious opposition to the measure came only from a small group of
Republicains Independents who represented constituencies in the Paris
region. One of these, M. Paul Stehlin argued that the bill was:
"an expedient destined to produce revenues which would disappear 
into the cavernous operating deficits of the transport operators.
(280)"
He accepted the Government’s case for reorganising the system but believed 
that the tax was "hurriedly prepared and rushed before Parliament and should 
be opposed on three grounds". First it was contrary to the basic principles 
of French law on financial responsibility in that there was no direct link 
between the benefits gained by the employers of the region from an extended 
labour market and the inefficiency of the RATP and SNCF. Secondly the law 
placed an unjustified and arbitrary burden on one of the elements in the 
community which benefited from the transport system, namely the employers,
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and others should share in meeting the costs. Thirdly the proposal ran
counter to the Government’s declared policy of simplifying the structure of
taxation which in other spheres had been achieved by replacing specific
taxes with YAT. Overall, Stehlin argued, the tax would be a disincentive to
enterprise and would inhibit small and medium sized firms which the country
looked to win valuable export markets in the future. Overall the tax:
"will not solve the problem of the transport deficit anymore than 
an aspirin, in temporarily bringing down a fever, cures the 
disease." (281)
Other opponents of the measure took up the theme that it should only be 
approved in the context of more fundamental changes to the transport system 
which would eliminate the transport companies’ dependence on deficit 
funding. The key figures opposing the measure were M. Christian de la Malene 
and M. Pierre Bas, both of whom were centrist members of the Paris Municipal 
Council as well as Deputies for constituencies in the Paris region. In their 
view the bill was a simple transfer of debt burden from employees to 
employers and would do nothing to guarantee improved services or 
productivity by the operators. M. de la Malene spelt out bluntly what the 
bill was about:
"the object of the bill is to avoid increasing the price of weekly 
season tickets and to find from the employers the means to make up 
the difference" (282)
The Government would retain the capacity to set the service levels through
the new contracts it planned to agree with the RATP and SNCF, but was
imposing on other groups, who did not enjoy such influence, the costs of
meeting the service levels which resulted. They, therefore, posed the
arguments about accountability to financiers against the democratic
commitment to improve accountability to political control whilst freeing the
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firm from day to day interference in non-political planning and management.
The Bill passed without significant amendment, and in 1972 the new tax 
came into force. Firms in Paris paid 1.7 per cent of pay roll, whilst those 
in the inner suburbs paid 1.3 per cent of pay roll and in the outer suburbs 
1 per cent. Firms relocating to new towns were exempt. Immediately after the 
bill became law the Government announced a fare increase on basic ticket 
prices, exempting season tickets (283). The users’ groups called for 
protests but the demonstration in August 1971 was but a faint echo of the 
tumult of November 1970 (284), and could not bring to life the fears of 
1968. A satisfactory compromise on revenue funding had been achieved.
Political stability and consumer satisfaction on the issue of fares was 
maintained throughout the 1970s by a skillful distribution of the burdens of 
funding new transport initiatives and by continuing increases in the 
contribution made by employers toward the overall cost of the system.
Between 1972 and 1982 the proportion of revenue costs met by the central 
Government and by local authorities remained constant at twenty two per cent 
and ten per cent respectively. The contribution made by customers through 
fares fell from forty five per cent to thirty five per cent and that made by 
employers through the versement transports increased from seventeen per cent 
to twenty eight per cent. Despite the emphasis on commercialism the income 
from contracts and advertising fell from eight per cent of total cost to 
seven per cent (285).
146
Part 2 : Policy Change
4.2 : New management and planning systems
The new tax had important managerial consequences, in addition to the 
political benefits which inspired its swift promulgation. Public transport 
budgets in Paris now enjoyed similar status to road budgets across the whole 
country. The FSIR, which reserved road tax revenue for highway construction 
and maintenance, had safeguarded the road engineers’ budgets through many 
fiscal crises. Public transport policy in Paris now enjoyed analogous 
protection. This freed the managers of the RATP and the SNCF to think 
through more radical plans, and to devise their own programmes, based on 
realistic forecasts of future resources. The influence of politicians, 
finance ministry officials and the prefecture was correspondingly reduced.
The secure resource base of the transport enterprises combined with the new 
managerial culture to produce a new approach to transport planning, option 
appraisal and public consultation. The high level concertation of Gaullist 
planning was superseded by a local managerial strategy based on building 
alliances with local people and politicians on the basis of formula planning 
modified to meet specific local circumstances. This section will look at the 
new plans and the new project appraisal system for assessing the comparative 
value of projects included within the strategy which was adopted. Part three 
will look in depth at the policy implementation process which flowed from 
this new style of planning and management.
The Plan Global (286) set the scene for planning new investments and 
priorities but it offered no clear guidance on respective responsibilities 
of agencies, or on the relative priority of schemes listed as desirable.
Plans which put the principles adopted in 1972, and which lay beneath the
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tax reforms, needed to be drawn up. In the economic sphere the most 
important concept was that of "true prices". This notion that planning and 
management in the public sector should be based on the economic costs such 
as would be reflected in a market price which would eliminate the necessity 
for public subsidy had been the basis for a project of commercialisation of 
public enterprises in the early 1970s (287). In the case of public transport 
in Paris, this impact was combined with an extension of the range of goods 
to which true prices applied. The most obvious application of true prices is 
to sell the goods supplied by a public utility at a price which ensures a 
given return to capital. This approach makes the good which is sold direct 
to the customer the only product with a clear value which can contribute to 
the rate of return. For example, the only factor contributing to the rate of 
return on public capital invested in Renault cars is the income from selling 
the cars. By extension then, the best transport investments in Paris would 
be those which yielded greatest income from ticket sales or tolls per franc 
invested.
The difficulty with this approach, in its pure market form, is that 
most transport goods are not traded; they have an average cost, but there is 
little or no marginal cost to the consumer. This is most obviously true of 
roads where, having invested in a vehicle, maintained it and filled it with 
fuel, all routes have the same marginal cost so far as road consumption is 
concerned. If one wished to plan public and private transport 
simultaneously, or in any co-ordinated way, one has, therefore, to make 
assumptions about the value of roads since no market information is 
available. Given the high historic cost of public transport infrastructure, 
and the comparatively small contribution to overall costs made by consumers,
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market information on the value of public transport goods is equally 
imperfect. It is, however, theoretically possible to devise a price 
structure which would achieve break even point for a public transport 
enterprise and devise market based rates of return. The first draft of the 
Plan Global floated the possibility of road pricing as a solution to the 
dilemma of non-comparability of competing investment opportunities. This 
represented an effort to improve the market signals generated by transport 
users, but was politically unacceptable and the final plan made no reference 
to the idea of introducing tolls on urban roads. To this day, autoroutes 
within conurbations are toll free, despite the comparatively high tolls on 
inter-urban autoroutes in France. Road pricing was rejected because, despite 
its intellectual coherence and supporters in the professional establishment, 
it was vehemently opposed by both Pompidou and leading Communist politicians 
and could find no effective political constituency (288).
Multicriteria Planning
In the absence of clear commercial data about the true costs of 
potential investments planners sought to increase the sophistication with 
which they measured the non-market value of potential capital expenditure.
In effect they turned to the opposite side of the equation, the cost of a 
scheme was established and the true price was assessed by measuring the 
benefits of a project across a range of non-market criteria. This is 
analogous to moving from a simple cost efficiency measure to a social cost 
benefit analysis model. The significance of this change in approach is two­
fold. First the criteria used were much wider than those taken into account 
when preparing the Schema Directeur or the Plan Global. Secondly
149
Part 2 : Policy Change
responsibility for assessing the relative priority of schemes moved from ad 
hoc commissions of ministers and senior officials to the senior engineers 
and planners in the RATP who ran the cost-benefit analysis system, and 
carried out the detailed negotiations with local interests direcdy.
This approach was dubbed "multicriteria planning" (289). In essence
this was a politicised cost/benefit calculation and, therefore, incorporated
political priorities into a formally neutral planning tool; Frybourg was
stating an ideal rather than a reality when he suggested that:
"Multicriteria analysis does not offer a substitute for economic 
calculation, nor for political decision, but a supplementary 
illumination to facilitate the making of a decision." (290)
In order to see the effect of multi-criteria analysis on transport
priorities this section concentrates on the system’s application to Metro
extension proposals by the RATP in the early 1970s. The RATP adopted six
criteria: resident population and number of employees served per kilometre
of line; forecast traffic and number of stations per kilometre of line; cost
per kilometre of line; internal rate of return on a purely economic basis;
the effect of the extension on the structure of the Metro system as a whole
and the effect of the scheme on the overall urban/regional structure. The
innovative elements are clearly the criteria which attempt to link the value
of the scheme itself, as determined by the internal rate of return, to the
overall effect on the transport system and on the urban/regional structure.
The effect on the overall transport system is measured in relative terms
according to the number of interconnections with buses, trains and other
Metros on the new route and by estimating the schemes impact on the
accessibility of other parts of the network to new users. The effect on the
overall urban structure was determined by models developed by the Institut
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d’Amenagement et de I’Urbanisme de la Region Parisienne which forecast the 
impact of new transport links on traffic levels, on land prices, property 
prices, rates of development and distribution of population (291).
Having scored all the potential schemes the second phase was to 
determine comparability and preferences. This was achieved in four stages.
First a margin of error was attached to each score. Secondly two thresholds 
were established for each criterion: a threshold at which the system was 
indifferent between two schemes ie. a level of significance for differences 
between schemes’ scores and a threshold of absolute preference: a point at 
which the difference on one criteria was so great as to outweigh any other 
basis for choice. Thirdly, a pair by pair comparison of scores was carried 
out to indicate which schemes were superior one to another and whether they 
were superior on the same or different criteria. Finally a classification of 
comparable and non-comparable schemes was drawn up. Figure 4.1 is a map of 
the schemes under consideration. The scores of each of the twelve proposals 
under consideration are summarised in table 4.2. Figure 4.3 shows the order 
of preference which each individual criterion would generate and figure 4.4 
the pair by pair comparison of schemes. Figure 4.5 is a graphical 
representation of the pair by pair comparisons. The overall classification 
is set out in figures 4.6 and 4.7.
151
Part 2 : Policy Change
Figure 4.1 - Metro extensions under consideration
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Figure 4.2 - Characteristics of proposed Metro extensions (292)
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Figure 4.3 - O rders of preference generated by each criterion
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Figure 4.5 - Graphical representation of pair by pair comparison
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Figure 4.6 - Classification of schemes
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The overall result, giving highest priority to lines 7 to the north and 
13bis also to the north would have been the same had only the internal rate 
of return been used to assess relative values. The three lines of descending 
priority below these two schemes in Figure 3.7 are not comparable one with 
another- there is no basis for claiming that line 5 is superior to line 7 to 
the south, only that it is preferable to line 4. Lines 8 and 1 are ascribed 
priority solely because they are contributions to other major plans - the 
new town of Creteil and the office development at La Defense. Their value 
is, therefore, interdependent with the financing of other public sector 
investments and with the extent to which public promotion of new development 
is backed by private capital. It is questionable whether the RATP can, 
within this system, reasonably be asked to take on funding the extensions to 
these areas within its own allocation of capital. The only line which 
secures a substantially higher rating than it would on a strict internal 
rate of return is line 5 to Bobigny.
Overall it must be concluded that the addition of qualitative criteria
has had little impact beyond securing questionable bases for continuing
schemes which would not be a priority for the RATP, viz the extensions to
Creteil and La Defense. This suggests that multicriteria analysis is not the
answer to market failure its proponents hoped it would be. In a long and
complex critique of the approach Comte and Quercy conclude with the
following straightforward argument:
"We would insist that the aggregated multicriteria analysis 
presents the same fundamental inadequacy as the classical cost 
benefit analysis ... the fact that the conclusion of the study is 
presented as a unique outcome on the one hand masks inter group 
conflicts which exist and on the other hand over simplifies
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decision making" (293)
Similar arguments led Pierre Merlin to urge caution in the application of 
multicriteria analysis and to argue that it could only be seen as a 
supplement to quantitative measurement of the internal rate of return of any 
scheme (294).
Given such limitations what did the system contribute to prioritising 
the public transport plans developed in the 1970s? The most important 
contribution was that of establishing a legitimate set of options for 
investment in public transport. The process of comparative evaluation made 
all the schemes for extending the Metro real practical possibilities rather 
than pipe dreams of outside campaigners. The method of analysis demanded a 
programme within which to assess relative priorities and the establishment 
of a credible programme of improvements and developments made the Metro a 
serious contender for public funds. Secondly the evaluation provided a range 
of justifications for a variety of possible schemes so that compromises 
which secured political support from a sufficiently wide spectrum could be 
rationally defended in the national planning system. Thirdly it gave the 
RATP a defensible system for working out overall priorities meaning that it 
could make its relationships with Government more contractual. This reduced 
the necessity for direct ad hoc political initiatives to settle planning 
priorities and placed transport budget setting on a similar footing to other 
ministries. The end result was that the RATP was funded and its plans 
supported, rather than the RATP being employed to carry out the 
Government’s plans.
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4.3 : Towards contract-based planning
In the three years from 1972 to 1975 the locus of planning and 
development moved from the District lead by the Regional Prefect to the 
RATP lead by a politically-appointed Director. This reflected a shift in 
financial accountability for investment and budget management. Following the 
adoption of the Plan Global in 1972 responsibility for detailed planning and 
priority setting was quickly assumed by the Ministry of Transport. It seems 
very likely that the Prefecture was severely weakened by the inability of an 
ailing President Pompidou to maintain the administrative discipline which 
had ensured that the Ministry of Transport’s powers were always curtailed by 
inter-ministerial and special commissions which combined local and national 
interests (295).
Successive plans became known by the names of the Ministers who 
announced them. In January 1973 Roger Galley, Minister of Transport unveiled 
a new plan for developments in the bus network in the city. The reason for 
adopting buses as a priority was transparently political in the run up to 
elections in 1973; it was essential for the Government to make some clearly 
visible efforts to show that all the planning was making a real difference 
to the service. Buses were the quickest and cheapest way of achieving the 
illusion of improvements. The programme included ten dedicated bus lanes, 
new buses and a set of express cross city bus routes. The plan affirmed that 
the M hro would be extended to Chatillon and St. Denis by 1976. Additional 
funding for these projects was made available to the RATP as a loan, on the 
basis that future fare revenues would repay the cost. The opposition was 
scathing on this point: "M. Galley has merely launched an electoral
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diversion" said the Communist party (296).
Specialist budgeting and management continued its advance after the
parliamentary elections when the Prime Minister requested a report from the
new Minister of Transport M. Yves Gueny:
"I believe it necessary that all the reforms undertaken should be 
put before the interministerial commission and that it agrees 
forthwith measures which will assure better management of 
transport and clearer relations between the administration and the 
public bodies concerned. ... I request that you commission the 
Secretary of State for Transport, M. Billecoq to review all the 
relevant questions and propose the necessary steps within your 
field of responsibility in co-operation with the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and 
Tourism." (297)
M. Billecoq’s report recommended that responsibility for transport 
management should be assumed by an interministerial committee responsible to 
and convened by the Ministry of Transport. This created a forum for 
interministerial decisions at national level and abrogated the role largely 
assumed hitherto by the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens. The power of 
agenda setting had been removed from the Regional Prefect and assumed by the 
Ministry of Transport. The power to recommend budget allocations, fare 
levels and capital programmes was also in effect taken over by the national 
ministry. The Report also recommended changes to the financial arrangements 
under which the RATP and the SNCF operated. The declared objective was no 
longer overall self financing of transport operations, but simply that fare 
revenue should meet day to day operating costs; the immediate link between 
cost efficiency and investment programmes, which the doctrine of true prices 
had sought to introduce was, therefore, formally denied. Investment 
decisions were separated from revenue costs and would thereafter be met by 
direct Government subventions or loans against the revenue generated by the
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versement transports. With the influence of the corporatist lobby in 
Government at its lowest ebb as the President’s terminal illness reduced his 
participation in day to day affairs, these recommendations were adopted and 
the national Ministry of Transport assumed a role it had not held since the 
reforms of 1948.
Transport planning now revolved around the relationship between the 
Ministry of Transport and the transport companies, principally the RATP. The 
shackles of regional co-ordination were broken and the professional 
engineers in the companies became able to negotiate directly with 
sympathetic paymasters, who had at their disposal a dedicated tax revenue to 
protect the budget from the predations of the Ministry of Finances. Public 
transport in Paris had achieved a protected status equivalent to that 
previously enjoyed only by the national road programme. The new planning and 
financial allocation system reflected the professionalisation and 
specialisation of the policy area.
The main tool for determining future programmes became the RATP’s 
annual five year forward plan which provided an account of progress towards 
agreed targets and a series of projected developments (298). The main user 
groups and worker representatives were involved in planning through direct 
consultation by the RATP. It presented the report direct to the Ministry for 
decision, and published it to other agencies for information. The annual 
subvention to the RATP’s revenue account, and the release of capital 
allocations for new schemes became contingent on the Ministry’s satisfaction 
with the annual plan, as opposed to dependent on the Prefect’s 
urban/regional planning priorities or on interministerial bargaining. In
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practice the RATP did the bulk of negotiation and compromising on future
4
programmes direct with local groups who acted principally through 
established municipal political channels. The RATP still could not be 
mistaken for a private company - for a start its senior executives were all 
political appointees and it had no private capital, but its approach to 
selling its product, communicating with customers and contractors and 
organising its activities was one of a'commercial enterprise. The big 
increases in service levels were at least partly funded by loans and by 
increases in revenue from passengers. Its political success can be measured 
by the fact that while its income from passengers rose substantially, this 
amount reduced as a proportion of overall revenue. In 1977 the Government 
increased the rates of the versements transports by roughly seventy per 
cent. The RATP had gained the power to implement its own programmes.The 
RATP’s contract extended beyond the business of running the existing system, 
which had dominated its affairs for the twenty years up to 1975, and took on 
the planning and political management tasks previously carried out by the 
District and the Regional Prefect. It is this political management of the 
development of new transport links which is the subject of Part 3.
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CHAPTER 5 : Back to Municipal Politics - The extension o f Metro 13bis
What difference did these bold shifts in philosophy and secure new 
funds make to local transport planning? How did the Maires, councillors, 
engineers and managers adapt to the new priorities they were expected to 
follow? To find out, this chapter follows one project, the extension of a 
Metro line in north western Paris to examine the political and social 
questions it raised and to measure their effect on the management style and 
professional practice of the RATP’s engineers and managers. Clichy was not a 
typical commune, but part of the problem of Metro extension in inner suburbs 
was that there was no typical place, typical problem and typical solution.
How adaptable and pragmatic were the policy implementors when challenged to 
turn a rational set of priorities into a publicly acceptable service?
5.1 : What kind of area would the new line serve?
The ambiguity of the area around Clichy and its northern neighbours was 
summed up by its description in the Schema Directeur as a "zone of 
transition". The six communes which made up the area were a diverse mixture 
of waterfront bustle in the Port on the Seine, tranquil suburbs in the 
northern residential areas, newer light industry in the centre of an 
established nineteenth century community in Clichy, and crumbling decaying 
areas on the edge of the Peripherique awaiting the bulldozers and system 
construction in Zones d’Amenagement Concerte. The district straddled the
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divide between the "working city" and the "residential suburb". Overall 
there was a surplus of jobs over economically active residents. These jobs 
were concentrated in the more traditional working class occupations in the 
docks and in industry; there was little local labour available for the 
newer, growing commercial and service sectors.
The pattern of travel into and out of the area is complex. Tables 5.1 
to 5.4 illustrate the origins and destinations of in commuters and out 
commuters (299). There is no predominant direction of flow and commuting to 
and from Paris is significant in most of the communes. The main transport 
links bordered the area; it was bounded to the east and west by mainline 
railways into Paris termini (300) which served outer suburbs as well. Within 
the area the primary public transport service was the bus network operated 
by the RATP which focussed on the Metro termini at Porte d ’Ouen and Porte de 
Clichy (301). Local travel needs were more important than in other 
peripheral communes which depended on the city centre for their services.
The political characteristics of the communes reflected their 
ambiguous position in the structure of the conurbation. Situated between the 
bourgeois conservatism of north west Paris and the robust pioneering 
communism of St. Denis the political history of the communes was varied and 
idiosyncratic. Clichy itself was a Socialist commune ruled paternally by the 
M. Levillain who had been Maire since 1944, a traditionalist oblivious of 
the upheavals of the 1960s and autogestionnaire fashions of the 1970s.
Genneviiliers was part of the Communist "Couronne Rouge". Bois-Colombes and 
Asnieres were Gaullist and had recently been joined by Villeneuve-La-Garenne 
which had given up a long history of centrist independence in 1971 when it
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elected a Gaullist Municipal Council (302).
Figures 5.1 - 5.4 : Origins and Destinations of Com m uters
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The Clichy-Asnieres-Gennevilliers area was not a product of post war 
planning, and the communes in the area maintained political traditions which 
predated the Fifth Republic and the District. It was not a candidate for 
wholesale approach of the Schema Directeur. The structure and character of 
the area evolved more gently and would require greater political sensitivity 
than the radical urban planners had yet demonstrated. This chapter looks at 
the backcloth to the Metro's imminent passage across the neighbourhoods of 
the north western suburbs and goes on to examine the issues raised by the 
controversy which surrounded the project’s implementation.
5.2 : Why was there no Metro already?
Clichy was the only commune immediately bordering the PfripMrique not 
to benefit from the Metro extension programme planned in the late 1920s 
(303). The Metro line 13 had only been extended as far as Porte d’Ouen. Line 
13 started at Gare St. Lazare and ran northward along the Avenue de Clichy 
through the seventeenth arrondissement of the city to a junction called La 
Fourche (304) where it divided into line 13 which continued to Porte d’Ouen 
and line 13bis (305) which extended as far as Porte de Clichy on the edge of 
the city. The 1928 Plan Jayot proposed to extend the Metro into most inner 
suburban districts including Clichy as part of a general programme for 
eliminating the tram network which was the main service in these areas at 
the time, but increasingly came into conflict with private motor cars and 
public motor buses (306). In the west of the region the plan was, 
effectively, to extend all the existing Metro lines as far as the major
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bridges across the river Seine. Line 9 was extended to Pont de Sevres in 
1934. In 1937 extensions of line 1 to Pont de Neuilly and line 3 to Pont de 
Levallois were opened. The remaining extension to the bridge in Clichy was 
never completed. Line 13bis never went beyond Porte de Clichy and line 13 
itself was extended as far as Carrefour in St. Ouen after the war in 1952 
when some projects which had been left in abeyance at the commencement of 
hostilities were picked up again in the first plan (307). The proposed 
project was a victim of delay: by the time the scheme reached its place at 
the head of the queue the rationale for extending the Mitro had been buried 
by the growing obsession with private motoring in the 1950s and the desire 
to plough funds into road construction (308). Alongside the rest of the 
Metro system line 13bis embarked on two decades of neglect in the early 
1950s. Its particular misfortune was to have been neglected for three 
decades before that.
The Municipal council did not relent in its hopes for a Metro line and 
continued to press for the planning permission granted in 1929 to be 
exploited by the RATP (309). Prospects for reviving the scheme came from the 
unlikely source of the RER. The original plan for the RER set out in the 
1965 Schema Directeur proposed two North-South routes. In 1969 the Schema 
Directeur was revised to take account of the lower population projections 
and more modest funds available than forecast in 1965 (310). One of the main 
revisions was a suggestion that the more westerly of the two north-south 
links should be achieved by joining lines 13 and 14 of the Metro together by 
a new tunnel under the Seine running from Champs Elysee to Invalides with 
extensions to St. Denis in the north and Chatillon in the south. The RATP 
responded to this proposal by pointing out that it would be sensible to
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include the old established plan to extend line I3bis within this package 
(311). This idea did not meet with the approval of the ad hoc ministerial 
committee established in 1969 to prioritise schemes within the draft sixth 
plan. Their view was that the overall cost of 340mF was still too high and 
that extending line 5 to Orly would offer greater benefits (312).
The major policy changes of 1970/1 did not fully restore the fortunes 
of the scheme which now had a shelf life of over forty years. The Plan 
Global in 1972 proposed that there should be an experimental "Mini-Metro" in 
Clichy (313). This would be a new type of automated light railway of the 
kind which now operates in Lille and the London Docklands, but was 
unprecedented in 1972. In the event the much vaunted experimental system met 
with strong local resistance from politicians who demanded their right to a 
"proper underground service" (314). The "Mini-Metro" remained a glossy 
photo-montage in "Transports Nouvelles" (315) and the RATP sought other ways 
of economising on the project through Clichy. By now though they were 
working in the context of a major programme of M6tro extensions adopted 
within the company’s forward plan, and justified through the multicriteria 
planning techniques employed by the Bureau d’Etudes. In this context there 
were three main issues surrounding plans to extend the line: the overall 
priority of Metro extensions in the RATP’s programme; the relative priority 
of each potential Metro extension and finally the quality of service offered 
and environmental impact of the new line.
169
Part 3 : Policy Implementation
5.3 : The overall priority of Metro extensions in the RATP programme
The approach to planning which was described at the end of the 
previous chapter compared Metro extension schemes one with another - it did 
not look at the relative value of say Metro projects and dedicated bus lanes 
on the grands boulevards. The inter - ministerial committee which had set 
the priorities in the sixth plan, and later adopted the Plan Global had 
included some Metro extension schemes, to Orly, Creteil and La Defense in 
its list of specified approved schemes, but substantial funds were allocated 
to unspecified improvements in the public transport infrastructure and it 
was these which the RATP was planning to spend. In 1970 the Metro had a poor 
image. It offered a sub standard service in outdated rolling stock. It was 
infrequent, poorly managed and unreliable. Equally importantly, it was an 
inner city service, crowded with local travellers going short distances 
across and around the city. Interchanges between routes were inefficient, 
slow and confusing. The M$tro was an unattractive prospect for the longer 
distance commuter. Suburban Mtftro systems had to offer a qualitatively 
different service which could transport people quickly and predictably from 
more widely spread origins to city centre destinations. As the distance 
between stops and routes necessarily increased with a wider network, and 
travel times increased the comparison was less between Mitro and bus 
services. Increasingly the Mitro was seen as an alternative to railways or 
the RER.
The Schfma Directeur saw the RER as the main public transport system 
for the suburbs, but regarded private motoring as the most important means 
of travel outside the city centre. The critical policy change so far as
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M/tro development was concerned was, therefore, the acceptance in the 1972 
Plan Global that public transport should have priority in the inner suburbs. 
The RATP then had a choice of potential systems to improve public transport 
in the areas immediately bordering the inner city. As Jayot had recognised 
fifty years before (316), the Metro had significant advantages over other 
options for these kinds of journey. It was faster and more comfortable than 
buses, and placed fewer obstructions in the way of private car travel, 
indeed by taking drivers and buses off the roads it reduced traffic 
congestion for business users and people who had no alternative but to use 
private vehicles. Equally M/tros were cheaper, quicker to construct and more 
easily linked to the existing transport infrastructure than the RER which 
had only one established route across the city centre and was still hampered 
by the need for passengers to change modes to effect most journeys. Once the 
central sections of the RER were completed it would become a strategic 
network for the outer suburbs and for rail users; the more local, high speed 
service would be offered by the Metro.
The general idea of extending Mfaro lines won widespread support from 
localities for reasons of straightforward self interest. For a local 
politician a Metro line was far more likely to secure a quick payback than 
the drawn out process of building an experimental scheme or a major 
construction project like the RER. The Metro was popular with consumers 
since it was well established and, most importantly, a cheap form of public 
transport. These decisions were being made before the days of universal 
travel cards and the Metro was significantly cheaper per journey than the 
RER, and could take a passenger further for one ticket than the bus system. 
Neither was the Metro associated with negative images of wholesale
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redevelopment and high technology of the kind which surrounded the 
increasingly discredited schemes of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
Mitro was part of the romantic old Paris serving tradition rather than the 
grand ensembles and high rise office blocks which rose around RER stations.
On a broader national scene Metro systems were fashionable and 
received strong support from several influential provincial Maires who were 
seeking Metro systems in their own cities; the best examples were Lille,
Lyon and Marseilles all of whom were canvassing proposals with national 
ministries (317). With influential national politicians backing such 
systems, there was greater incentive for municipalities around the capital 
to associate themselves with the general case for this type of public 
transport infrastructure. Generally speaking the demand for Metro services 
to peripheral communes preserved the coalition which had so successfully 
overturned Government policy in 1970. The commuters who had no access to 
swift car travel and who depended on poor public transport services could 
all support the case for an general extension of Metro lines. Equally all 
the local groups campaigning on local transport issues could back one 
another, since if any were successful a precedent for a new public transport 
service to their kinds of area would be established. The national political 
parties who had co-ordinated the cartel had strong motives for carrying on a 
campaign for a wider network of Metro routes, and for the general model of 
service. They were chasing possible political gains in these sort of areas, 
consolidating their hold on some and encroaching on opposition territory in 
others, through their espousal of local issues and at the same time bringing 
together Parisian and provincial interests and thereby strengthening their 
already strong argument that the parties which ran local Government in the
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greater proportion of the country were fit for national office (318).
A programme of Metro extensions also had attractions for the engineers 
in the RATP, many of whom had been schooled in the design and construction 
of such systems but had never had the opportunity to practice their talents 
in France. Through its external consultancy the RATP was involved in 
constructing Mfaro systems in some third world countries (319), but no 
Metros had been built in France itself for twenty years. No self respecting 
railway engineer could really get excited about bus lanes and the RER was a 
prestige project dominated by a specialist team. The major suppliers of 
rolling stock, control equipment and ticket machinery saw great advantage in 
such a programme as well. It was clear to them that improvements in these 
areas would not be confined to the new lengths of track but would be adopted 
across the entire network as new rolling stock spread through the routes.
There was, therefore, a long term, stable and lucrative market at stake for 
them in decisions which were apparently at the margin of the existing 
infrastructure.
The effort to establish a new type of Metro was part of a wider 
initiative to change the style and quality of service offered by the RATP.
The most dramatic part of this, given the background of consumer protest 
around the issue, was a new fares structure. The zones which had been 
arbitrarily set up when the Metro first extended beyond the walls of Paris 
became the foundation of a multi-mode travel card system - the Carte 
Orange. Instead of charging people for a journey, or for the same journey 
every day for a given period, as the previous system had done, the Carte 
Orange enabled its holder to take as many journeys as they liked within a
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designated zone on all the public transport services available until the 
card expired. This system had many advantages for the RATP. It simplified 
fare collection enormously since the majority of journeys were paid for in 
advance and revenue from weekly, monthly or annual cards was easily 
predicted; this helped with cash flow management as well.
The Carte Orange overcame the problems of comparative inefficiency of 
services which only plied short routes, particularly buses. There was no 
marginal cost to the card holder in jumping on a bus to go a few streets to 
connect with a rail or Metro service. The Carte Orange unified the RATP and 
SNCF networks in a far more effective way than any amount of capital 
investment in interchanges; passengers could now plan multi-mode journeys on 
the basis of one piece of price information, the cost of a Carte Orange to 
the relevant zone. The RATP had, therefore, created a single, more flexible 
transport network, and simplified, indeed automated, much of its revenue 
collection in one simple policy change. The results were striking. Bus usage 
increased by fifty per cent, overall traffic by over twenty five per cent 
(320). Because passengers were buying a new product - the right to 
universal travel - resistance to fare increases was greatly diminished. The 
RATP increased the price of the Carte Orange by twenty per cent in each of 
the first four years it was available, while increasing the individual 
ticket price to keep up only with inflation. There was no resistance to 
these increases and sales of the card increased every year (321).
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5.4 : The relative priority of Metro extension schemes
Where the general issue of priority for the Metro programme could 
unite natural enemies, dividing the cake among potential beneficiaries could 
divide natural friends; so it proved in Clichy and in the users’ campaigns 
more generally. The outcomes of multi-criteria planning, however 
theoretically defensible, were certain to be politically contentious in at 
least two ways. First of all some groups argued that they favoured some 
areas unfairly and secondly some interested parties argued that other, more 
significant criteria had not been taken into account.
The case of Clichy illustrates two types of allegations of 
unreasonable favoritism in the setting of priorities. The local transport 
campaigning groups in Clichy argued that other areas, notably St. Cloud and 
Creteil were unreasonably favoured in the allocation of funds for Mtftro 
construction. They suggested that close political associations between the 
Maires of these communes and the Government had unduly influenced the 
decision. The Maire of St. Cloud was M. Fourcade was also Minister of 
Finance at the time which gave the accusation some circumstantial 
credibility. The Communist Senator who led the local Comite pour 
VAmelioration des Transport et de la Circulation a Clichy (CATCC) put the 
argument bluntly;
"We demand that the Metro in Clichy be constructed like that in
St. Cloud" (322)
Campaigners in Clichy also argued, naturally, that as their claim was the 
oldest it should be settled first. The Metro had been extended to Pont de 
Sevres in the direction of St. Cloud in 1937; the people in Clichy had no
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improvement in service since the 1920s.
The issue of relative priorities reveals the degree to which 
traditional local politics reasserted themselves in urban planning in the 
seventies. The Metro was an issue within the municipality and between the 
municipality and higher levels of Government. The principal reason that the 
Metro became a major local issue in Clichy was the impending retirement of 
the Maire. Within the Union of the Left, both parties wished to secure the 
succession to M. Levillain. The local PCF, through its sponsored campaigns 
and in the figure of M. Schmauss - the locality’s most senior politician - 
sought to outflank the Socialists on the municipal council by creating 
strong public pressure which would test the resolve of pragmatic Socialists 
who were minded to do a deal with the RATP on either the timing or the 
quality (see below) of the new service.
The attitude which local councillors adopted towards the Metro service 
became a key issue within the ruling group on the municipal council, and the 
council became a central actor in the policy arguments about the Metro 
service within Clichy and across the region as a whole. This changed the 
channels through which pressure was exerted to change policies or specific 
decisions. Whereas the regional bodies had made the key decisions in the 
sixties, it was the RATP and the Ministry of Transport which made the 
crucial decisions in the seventies. Local politicians no longer sought 
alliances at District or prefectoral level, but dealt directly with the 
relevant RATP managers and sought to put pressure on Ministry officials by 
raising the issue directly with the Minister. The traditional ways of doing 
this were personal and party contacts and questions to the Minister in
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Parliament (323). This development is part of a wider change taking place in 
the political culture of France at the time. The new Regional 
Administrations endorsed a provincial political culture without giving the 
central Government the means to undermine more firmly based local 
institutions. Professional groups like the Ponts et Chaus/ees had found new 
ways of maintaining power and independence within urban and regional 
development which depended directly on their traditional political skills 
rather than on an alliance with the few officials who had access to the top.
The quality of this change was well summarised by Simon Nora speaking in 
1975:
’’Our elite system was a great asset until a few years ago - this 
is in the post war decades when our politics were unstable and 
France was modernising and industrialising. The technocrats then 
were a dedicated clerge, the secular priests of progress, pulling 
France forward with autocratic zeal. But that phase is over. Today 
France is largely modernised and what is needed is something else 
- the emergence of a more open and egalitarian society where 
ordinary people can participate more” (324)
The questions being addressed demanded this kind of approach. Clichy 
was not a greenfield site on which one could plant a grand ensemble, a 
hypermarket and an RER station. The kind of pioneer spirit and grand 
thinking which supported that approach denied the heritage and community 
which was strong even in a run down suburb led by dated Socialists and 
unsophisticated Communists. Each potential route for a M&ro extension had 
its own peculiar history, its own special pleaders and its own local 
priorities. The delicate questions of priority and of implementation could 
be informed by the rationalism of multicriteria planning, and underpinned by 
a grand programme to transform the shape of the Paris region, but their day 
to day management and adjustment required a sensitivity and skill which only 
people with real stakes in the project - the consumers and the constructors
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- possessed. In Clichy the disputes surrounding the detailed implementation 
of the Metro project focussed on the quality of service and on its impact on 
the local environment.
5.5 : Quality of Service and Environmental Impact
The proposal which had lain dormant on the drawing board for so long 
had been to continue Line 13bis underground as far as Asnieres, including a 
new tunnel under the Seine in Clichy. In 1972 the RATP issued a new Sch/ma 
de Principe (325) which retained this design running underground through 
Clichy with two stations in Clichy, one in the centre and one on the bank of 
the Seine and a terminus in Asnieres Gennevilliers. This was widely 
welcomed, and as the last chapter showed, it scored highly in the priority 
setting system. The detailed plan issued in 1974 differed in two crucial 
respects; the line would run above ground from the centre of Clichy out to 
the terminus and there would be only one station in Clichy. There was no 
doubt that the reason for the changes was the RATP’s desire to reduce the 
costs of the project. Digging tunnels is very expensive, especially under 
rivers, and the number of new passengers per kilometre of tunnel steadily 
declined as the network extended. It was in the RATP’s interest to 
construct lines on the surface wherever possible. An unsystematic look at 
the Mitro systems of comparable cities suggests that overground services are 
indeed the norm in suburbs; the systems in London, New York and Chicago are 
but three examples. The RATP also argued that there were strong engineering 
grounds for constructing the new route on the surface; claiming that their 
last attempt to tunnel under the Seine in the north of the city had lead to 
a serious accident and that the new tunnel would be geologically unstable
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(326). The local council got the RATP to accept that a specially re-inforced 
tunnel was a possibility but the RATP argued that this would further 
increase the expense (327).
The real rationale for the surface construction was revealed by looking 
at the Service des Ponts et Chaussies road programme for the mid seventies. 
High on the list was a link road from the Boulevard PdriphMque to the A86 
ring road through Clichy and requiring a new road bridge across the Seine 
(328). Obviously it would help the engineers, and reduce the costs, if the 
two river crossing could be effected at the same time by constructing a new 
bridge. The decision to cross the river by bridge, rather than by tunnel, 
imposed a series of other very significant engineering constraints on the 
project. Trains do not go up and down slopes very well, meaning that it was 
desirable to have as great a proportion of the whole line at surface level 
as possible to minimise the ascent and descent from the bridge. This 
difficulty was accentuated by the proposed design of the bridge which placed 
the Metro lines above the road. The road scheme also disrupted the plans for 
a station on the river bank by proposing a change to the line of the river 
in order to eliminate two inconvenient islands and simplify the 
construction of the bridge.
Clearly there were many straightforward pragmatic reasons for adopting 
this kind of approach and in July 1974 the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens 
adopted the revised plan. They did so having sounded out the Maire first who 
had let them know that his priority was to secure a Metro service for the 
commune before his retirement and that he would accept the compromise 
involved (329). In accepting the Maire’s judgement the RATP was guilty of
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taking insufficient account of other sounds emerging from Clichy politics.
The Communist party, and in particular M. Guy Schmauss and the CATCC were
campaigning against the revised plan from as early as March 1974. The first
stage of the campaign had been to canvass opinion on the Rue du Martre down
which the now overground Mtiro was to pass. In a referendum residents were
invited to choose between the original Schema de Principe and the new
scheme. The underground option received 3765 votes and the new scheme only
14 (330). The CATCC took this result along with them when they went to lobby
the Director General of the RATP. M. Schmauss reported his conversation with
M. Giraudet as follows:
’’The Director General of the RATP replied to me in the course of 
the interview that an underground Metro in Clichy would be too 
slow, too difficult to construct and too expensive. However, I 
pointed out that the RATP’s alternative is also unacceptable 
because it will generate too many ill effects: noise in an urban 
area between 5-30 am and 1-30 am, it will destroy an established 
area and will cut the town in two. Neither will it serve the needs 
of the local people. Not constructing the station at Pont de 
Clichy will deny a service to twelve thousand people including 
those who use the Beaujon Hospital, The Alsacienne Company and the 
National School of Radio-electronics.” (331)
L’Humanit^ reported that until November 1973 the RATP had also favoured the
original underground scheme but had been forced to submit a cheaper scheme
to the inter - ministerial committee on Parisian transport in order to get
the necessary financial backing to proceed with the idea at all. Even with
the new scheme the RATP would now be forced to borrow most of the capital
cost from a new regional loan fund to be established in the 1974 budget. The
PCF, through the pages of L’Humanite, sought to widen this issue by
suggesting:
"This new operation proves that they have no intention of 
treating the suburban services properly. The overground lines, 
which are less onerous on the budget are now likely to be adopted 
systematically for all the planned suburban extensions” (332)
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Pressure was placed most directly on the Maire to change his view, both in 
order to protect the aggrieved residents of the Rue du Martre and to 
protect his party from appearing weak on a major policy conflict. In the 
event he bowed to pressure announcing that he would seek a compromise 
between the two sides saying: ”1 want the Metro here straight away, but you 
(the RATP) must reduce the environmental distress” (333). This was regarded 
as a very feeble position by M. Schmauss who increased the pressure directly 
on the RATP.
Despite the representations from local residents that they had never 
been consulted about the plans the RATP decided to proceed with work on the 
new scheme, arguing that all they had to do was consult on the principle of 
extending the Metro along the designated route. The details of 
implementation were their prerogative. In law they were quite correct; the 
political wisdom of this course was less clear. The RATP site office in 
Clichy became a focus for protestors and was continually vandalised and 
daubed with anti RATP graffiti (334). Several pieces of engineering 
equipment were damaged by protestors. Faced with a direct threat to their 
operational work the local RATP engineers took matters into their own hands 
and began local consultations in an effort to secure support for their 
efforts. They called a meeting in the site office for the leaders of the 
protest campaign in order to explain the way in which work would progress 
and the safety implications of tampering with civil engineering equipment 
(335). They also held meetings with local traders and residents groups.
These were a mixed success; the attacks on RATP property ceased but at one 
meeting in the site office tempers became so frayed that the site engineers 
had to beat a hasty retreat through the window leaving the offices occupied
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by protestors (336).
The CATCC decided that it was imperative to stop the work before it was 
so well advanced that there seemed no credible alternative. They adopted two 
separate tactics. They pressed the municipality to withdraw the co-operation 
of its own direct labour force and surveyors who were carrying out a great 
deal of the work for the RATP and who had detailed knowledge of the street 
plan, drainage, conduits etc. Simultaneously they sought a ruling from the 
Commissaire d’Enquete d’Utilite Publique (337) that the new project was 
qualitatively different from that approved at the time of the Schema de 
Principe and should be subject to a further public inquiry.
Mounting evidence of opposition was provided by an independent opinion 
survey commissioned by the Municipal Council in February 1975 which showed 
that a majority of residents preferred to have a Metro which "preserved 
completely their environment even if this delayed completion by up to three 
years", fifty eight per cent of residents were either totally or relatively 
opposed to the overground scheme. In addition fifty nine per cent supported 
the idea of having a second station to serve the area around Pont de Clichy 
(338). In this context the Maire hardened his attitude and withdrew the co­
operation of the Commune’s staff from the RATP work. Problems multiplied for 
the RATP in March 1975 when the Commissioner ruled that the new scheme did 
not have a valid Declaration d’Utilit/  Publique and that the RATP should not 
have commenced work. The Commissioner found that one station in Clichy would 
be insufficient and that the long overground section of line would cause 
unacceptable noise pollution. He advised the RATP to include a further 
station and to include noise abatement measures in their design (339).
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The Commissioner’s report was simply advice to the Minister of
Transport who could instruct the RATP to accept the Commissioner’s advice
and take the necessary measures or he could submit the plan to the Conseil
d’Etat seeking authorisation to overrule the Commissioner. Both would
involve a substantial delay, but the latter course obviated the need to
renegotiate the financial package with the Ministry of Finance and seek a
redefinition of the RATP’s capital programme in the ihter - ministerial
committee. The Minister submitted the RATP’s existing plan to the Conseil
d’Etat. In the interim the CATCC pressed its case that the only grounds for
the RATP putting forward the overground scheme was the parsimony of the
Ministry of Finance. M. Schmauss argued at length:
"The RATP project in 1969 envisaged a tunnel under the Seine 
which would cost seventy million francs more than the present 
scheme, amounting to less than a twelfth of the money wasted on 
the new abattoirs at La Villette (340) ... Do they realise that
such an investment will last more than a century ? Must our
children suffer the distress of a noisy metro, cutting their 
neighbourhood in two because in one disgraceful year it was 
decided this way? The Government seems quite misguided; it swamps 
our TV screens with exhortations to save energy but by omitting a 
station at Pont de Clichy it will lose thousands of customers who 
will carry on using their cars. In a hundred years they will spend 
on petrol at least seven times what the Government claims to be 
saving. More fundamentally they have found the money "down there" 
at the other end of line to put a new tunnel under the Seine 
linking lines 13 and 14. It is true that down there are the "beaux 
quartiers" ... Clichy is, by contrast, an ordinary working 
suburb." (341)
Here we have the major issues set out in one ramble; is the M$tro better 
value for money than road investment; should new services have to be 
constructed at a cost of serious environmental damage; why should the Metro 
be different in Clichy than in the centre of Paris? Is Clichy being badly 
treated in comparison with other communes? On this last point L’Humanite was 
in no doubt commenting:
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"This affair places in relief the dramatic backlog in investment 
in Paris Transport. There remain twelve lines to be extended. ...
To obstinately proceed with the overground extension in Clichy 
would be a grave error for the future. That is why we are hostile 
to this new project which is really just a cheap substitute. The 
residents of Clichy will be refused what has been so generously 
awarded to Saint Cloud, where the Maire, it is true, is the 
Minister of Finance" (342)
The issue of quality of service became the central one for the campaigners
for Clichy and for the RATP. The RATP needed to make its case that suburban
Metros should be judged by a different set of criteria to those which were
planned for the city centre and that these did not amount to political or
social class favoritism. The two sides cases were summed up in a
Parliamentary exchange between a local Deputy and the Minister of Transport
in June 1975. The Deputy, M. Alain Vivien asked:
"reminding the Secretary of State of the problems posed by the 
extension of Line 13bis,.. The Municipal Council in Clichy has 
carried out an opinion poll which demonstrates that the majority 
of the population of the commune wish to be served by two stations 
- at Clichy Centre and at Pont de Clichy. They demand an 
underground crossing of the Seine. However, the current project 
envisages only one station and an overground river crossing which 
will harm the local environment. This project meets with the 
hostility of local people and their elected representatives. I ask 
the Minister if he does not now judge that he must favour two 
stations in Clichy and underground construction throughout" (343)
The Minister replied summarising the RATP’s case and offering a potential
resolution of the dispute as follows:
"the creation of a second stop in Clichy would concern only a 
limited number of people, its effective service area would be 
restricted by the river and the numerous access points to the 
station at Clichy Centre. Against the advantage it would give to 
certain travellers in Clichy one must balance the increased 
travelling time entailed by an additional stop for those going 
further. In general the RATP has adopted greater distances between 
stops on suburban extensions than on existing routes in order to 
reduce journey times and to take greatest advantage of the very 
modern rolling stock which will run on these new lines. An 
underground crossing of the Seine would add considerable expense 
(around ninety million francs) and delay construction or 
compromise other similar projects. As far as the environment is 
concerned, architectural studies are in progress and in the
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specific matter of noise pollution the RATP envisage a number of 
ameliorative measures including using the most modern rolling 
stock, special care in the positioning and maintenance of the 
track, use of heavy load bearing suspension, having no points on 
the elevated sections and installing baffle screens to dampen down 
noise. Finally the RATP are pursuing, at my request, research into 
ways of further reducing inconvenience at minimal cost" (344)
It is worth looking at this summary of the Government position in some
detail. First of all the Minister has given an exceptionally full reply, he
could quite easily have said the RATP were looking into problems and would
report to him in due course. The level of detail on environmental protection
suggested that the Government were taking these matters very seriously as
befitted the image of the new President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing. It is
also clear that there is no room for compromise on the overall cost of the
scheme, except at the direct expense of other Metro extension schemes. There
is even an underlying suggestion that if the overground project were
rejected then the extension scheme would be dropped altogether in favour of
an area where the locals were more grateful and co-operative. The Government
have clearly adopted the RATP’s case that the suburbs must be treated
separately; the Minister spells out the case for longer distances between
stops on economic grounds, and in order to support outer lying communes.
There are real political conflicts around such a set of priorities. If the
prime purpose of extending the Metro is to serve communes on the outer edge
of the built up area, that is to bring commuters into the city centre from
dormitory areas; then areas on the edge of the city centre which have
complex local transport networks, and clear local labour markets and
transport needs, like Clichy, will get bypassed in favour of simpler,
politically more sympathetic areas further out. The issue for Clichy has
shifted from securing a better local transport service to protecting its
residents from the environmental degradations involved in bringing commuters
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through the area from Asnieres into the city centre. On this issue, though, 
the Government is willing to compromise.
This was the solution recommended by the Conseil d’Etat which accepted 
the revised RATP scheme on condition that it incorporated measures to reduce 
noise pollution (345). Specifically the RATP was required to install double 
glazing in all buildings within thirty metres of the Metro viaduct, to erect 
baffle screens, to use special points at junctions and most significant of 
all to reduce the elevated section to four hundred and eighty eight metres.
This necessitated an unusually steep ascent and descent from the bridge and 
also constructing a special hood for the opening from which the underground 
section of line emerged. By adopting this position the Government remained 
vulnerable to charges of favouritism. If it was all right for suburban 
Metros to run overground at higher speeds between more widely spaced 
stations why did the extension of line 10 into St. Cloud resemble nothing 
more than a conventional underground city centre service (346). The PCF’s 
argument that it was an advantage to have the Minister of Finance as Maire 
seems likely to be the underlying explanation for this mystery. Other 
evidence points to an unwillingness to help political enemies. In 1975 the 
Maire of Bobigny, a Communist stronghold and the only departemental 
administrative centre (347) not to be served by the Metro secured a written 
undertaking from the President of the Republic that an extension to Bobigny 
would have top priority (348); he was still waiting for the new service to 
start in 1985.
The CATCC moved to appeal against the decision of the Conseil d’Etat 
but was refused leave to do so. The RATP and the Government had improved
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their judgement of local political opinion and once the environmental 
safeguards were announced support for the CATCC fell away. The project 
received a Declaration dUtilite Publique on December 9th 1975 and the RATP 
was able to start work again on the project after a delay of almost two 
years. The Maire was able to offer support from the Municipality’s technical 
services and work continued uninterrupted. In constructing the special hood 
and noise abatement measures the RATP went further than the Conseil d’Etat 
had recommended and improved access to shops by building a special bridge 
across the road and the Metro at Pont de Clichy. The area around the tunnel 
entrance was landscaped into a small park for local use. The engineers who 
carried out the work estimate that the environmental safeguards and 
improvements added about five per cent to the total cost of the Metro 
extension (349). The first train ran across the new viaduct and over the 
Seine in May 1980.
There were, therefore, two issues about quality; the quality of the 
transport service and the quality of the local environment. The RATP and the 
Government were prepared to compromise on environmental issues up to a 
certain level of cost, as were the local municipal politicians, and for them 
a new transport service was the highest priority. The local PCF’s interest 
in the environmental issue was an opportunist alternative to their real 
concern which was to demonstrate the systematic bias against working people 
in urban planning and transport investment. The RATP retained absolute 
control of questions pertaining to transport. As their director made clear 
above - they were prepared to re-order their priorities within the Metro 
extension programme in order to ensure that the service it provided was a 
high speed alternative to rail and car users and distinctly different from
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the tram service offered by the city centre Metro network.
5.6 : Transport users’ participation in implementation
Although the issues are of a different order, there are some strong 
signs of continuity in the organisation and impact of transport consumers in 
the implementation of detailed projects. During the strategic policy changes 
users were predominantly organised on the initiative of the Communist Party 
and their impact was to create the climate in which professional innovation 
was attractive to the Government. Looking at developments in Clichy there 
are some basic similarities. The PCF was the mobilising force behind the 
main local committee, CATCC, and its leading local politician was the main 
spokesman for the campaign against the RATP’s proposals. Other political 
groups, reluctant allies of the PCF, were drawn into the argument and had to 
negotiate publicly things they would have preferred to settle privately. It 
is in the role of these allies and of the professionals with whom they 
negotiated that the differences from the strategic campaign start to become 
apparent.
The Socialists, in this locality, occupied the controlling office of 
Maire, the most legitimate route by which to influence regional and 
national decisions. It was significant that it was M. Schmauss that went to 
lobby the RATP, not M. Levillain. The latter could have spoken for the whole 
commune rather than just for an aggrieved group of residents who had formed 
an ad hoc association. The fact that the Maires of competing communes gave 
their names to the Mitro projects in those districts reveals the value of a
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Maire with insider influence in Government circles when it comes to securing 
a modification in RATP strategy. The attacks on the RATP office and the 
trumpeting of complaints in the press were weaknesses not strengths. Despite 
their isolation from the inside circles of policy making the users’ campaign 
in Clichy, locally rooted and gathered around a local politician did more to 
change the shape of the Metro extension programme than the federations of 
professional specialists who had accepted seats on the Syndicat des 
Transports Parisiens or attended the academic conferences on the merits of 
automated signalling systems.
The users’ campaign successfully challenged the RATP’s legal right to 
proceed with the project and forced the RATP to clarify the issues which 
were the basis of its judgments about suitable extensions to suburbs and the 
price that it was reasonable to expect residents to pay for a Metro. The 
RATP also gave some ground to the most aggrieved residents who had their 
properties protected from the worst of the noise. No one can claim that the 
viaduct is not a blot on the Rue du Landy or that the new bridge improves 
the aspect of the Seine, but public action did get the plight of people 
neighbouring the route taken into account by the highest court in the land 
and some relief ordered from the highest level.
5.7 : Full circle for the Ponts et Chaussees
The role of the professionals in Clichy was more extensive than it had 
been in the strategic debate in the early seventies. They continued to 
advise the Minister; it was their rationalisations he offered in reply to M.
Vivien, but they were there on the ground taking the brickbats from
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protestors as well. There was a real building project at stake, not just a 
theoretical argument. This meant that a different kind of engineer was at 
the forefront of the business. In the early seventies the academic or 
researcher who could demonstrate through a defensible economic model that 
public transport investment was good value for money was the key actor. It 
was these intellectuals of the Ponts et Chaussees who secured the resource 
base which the versement transports guaranteed and who wrote the programmes 
which legitimised the new investment programmes.
The site engineers at Clichy were the people actually building the 
things. The theoretical foundations of the plan were of less interest than 
the commonsense of building two bridges at once and avoiding the trying 
hours of overtime and risk to staff involved in burrowing under the river.
It might not have been the site engineer’s place to go out and make peace 
with the local traders, but it was their equipment that was getting tampered 
with and their schedules which were falling behind with every occupation or 
sit down protest. Civil engineers seem unlikely practitioners of community 
politics, but their ability to tackle these local issues was the key to 
getting things done. It also had the effect of marginalising the 
theoretician so far as the concerned local resident or traveller was 
concerned. Local changes which preserved the value of a flat or the quality 
of a TV picture were more important than the relative claims of Clichy and 
Saint Cloud.
The Ponts et Chaussies had come full circle. By way of the Schema 
Directeur, ministerial re-organisation, a new professional structure, 
radical planning and marxist economics they had arrived at community
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politics in the inner city, just as they had practiced in deepest 
provincial France in the 1930s. They were working for a public company 
rather than a public service, and they were subject to a financial 
discipline the conservative engineer would not have recognised, but they 
were still the people who went out and got strategies converted into 
concrete and carried the local politicians, businessmen and other notables 
along with the process.
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CHAPTER 6 : Building the central section o f the Reseau Express Regional(RER)
The Metro extension programme brought new policy processes to the fore, 
drawing municipal politicians, citizens committees and middle management 
directly into major policy decisions. By contrast the RER remained a central 
Government preserve, dominated by the Travaux Neufs division of the RATP, 
its fate determined in the Elysee, away from the communities it might serve 
or damage. The RER was the flagship of the regional development proposals in 
the PADOG and the Schema Directeur. Yet, without the central tunnels, it 
would be difficult to distinguish the RER from conventional rail systems 
seen in most large cities the world over. An analysis of how the central
secton of the first line came to be approved and constructed, and its impact
on the communties which were directly affected will enable us to judge how 
the grander visions of urban renewal fared in the policy making systems 
emerging from the troubled years from 1968 to 1972.
6.1 : The case for a new regional transport infrastructure
The RER was not.a revolutionary departure in transport policy. Its
success had more to do with generating a myth than to do with any concrete
development of the transport infrastructure. The myth is exemplified by the
RATP’s own account of the history of the RER:
" Its gestation has been very long, one can almost say it has
lasted a century ... for, since the first consideration of
railways as a way of radically improving Paris transport, around
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1880, certain people have thought of a system bearing the 
characteristics of today’s RER." (350)
The first major step towards establishing the reality of anything 
called a regional network, linking the RATP and SNCF, was taken in 1961 
when the Government approved a proposal to construct a new wide gauge 
railway from Etoile to La Defense, and the improvement of an old SNCF line 
from Bastille to Vincennes. Both schemes were to be managed by the RATP. The 
projects were allocated special Government finance and made no call on the 
stretched revenue budgets of the RATP. Losing responsibility for an old and 
highly unreliable service was a bonus to the SNCF. This was a crucial 
decision and it is worth exploring the underlying causes for a move which 
created a new division of management responsibilities, a special financing 
arrangement, the first railway construction within the walls of Paris for 
over eighty years and most significant of all, launched a new concept of the 
future for Paris transport.
It was during the inter war years that leading planners like Jayot,
Ruhlmann and Langevin established the intellectual credibility of a rail 
service conceived, constructed and organised outside the framework of the 
existing Metro and main line systems. The growth of the population and the 
ever increasing sprawl of urban areas remained the basic rationale for a new 
style of public transport service.
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Figure 6.1 : Growth of population and urban area
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Indeed the population increased quickest relative to the rest of the 
country between 1921 and 1946 when large numbers of people migrated to the 
Paris area in search of work. The built up area expanded most rapidly in 
the same period; between 1919 and 1935 1800 hectares were built upon per 
year. The political will to grapple systematically with the demands of rapid 
urbanisation did not exist in the inter war years. However by the 1950s the 
inefficiency of uncontrolled development was recognised even though the rate 
of inward migration and urbanisation had eased off. Population densities and 
housing standards which had been acceptable hitherto were now regarded as 
intolerable and improvements to housing conditions and increases in 
population demanded relatively more space. The style and scale of industrial 
development also called for larger scale planning of urban and regional 
development. These factors persuaded the Government that it was essential to 
intervene directly in the development of the Paris region, especially in the 
field of housing.
The result was the designation by national ministries of a series of 
major schemes for which consortia of construction and finance companies were 
invited to tender. The schemes included 12,000 dwellings at Sarcelles, 3,600 
dwellings at Bobigny, 9,900 dwelling at Oeteil, 8,600 dwellings at Vitry 
and an incredible 25,400 dwellings at Aulnay-Sevran-Villepinte (351). The 
Government had accepted a leading role not simply in house construction but 
in creating new environments, new land uses and a new industry of huge scale 
urban development. Implicitly the Government had also accepted a leading 
role in planning and providing the infrastructure and support services which 
would turn these developments into practical and tolerable places to live.
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The new Government led by Debre after the establishment of the Fifth 
Republic added major redevelopment schemes to the programme of construction 
in the Paris region. The largest single project was at La Defense where a 
special Etablissement Public d’Amfnagement de la Defense (EPAD) was charged 
with constructing 1,650,000 square metres of offices, 16,200 dwellings and a 
new exhibition centre: the Centre International d’Industries et Techniques 
(CNIT) (352). This development placed both the RATP and the SNCF in a 
quandary, the solution to which brought the RER off the drawing board and 
into construction.
The nearest Metro line to the CNIT was the busiest, and the nearest 
suburban railway terminus at St. Lazare was the most crowded in the city and 
already over capacity. If population and traffic levels continued to grow at 
the pace they were growing in 1960 then neither the Mitro or the Railway 
would be able to cope by 1965 (353). In fact, such a projection was highly 
improbable, given the density of development in the areas through which the 
existing routes passed, there was little scope for population increase.
There were alternative solutions which would have been possible within the 
sphere of responsibility of one of the transport companies; the RATP could 
have doubled its Mhro line no. 1, thus more than doubling capacity; 
alternatively the SNCF could have constructed a new suburban line to serve 
the CNIT. However the RATP was reluctant to take on the cost of a major 
investment while the SNCF did not wish to increase the burden of a suburban 
system which was already a managerial millstone for the necks of ambitious 
railway engineers (354).
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The central Government had assumed a stronger position in regional 
planning bodies precisely to ensure that infrastructure kept pace with its 
schemes for new centres of international business and commerce, and to give 
Paris a new, modem image appropriate to a country emerging from the shadows 
of corruption, near civil war and colonial defeats. To promote these 
priorities the Government had created the Syndicat des Transports Parisiens 
in 1959 to oversee transport strategy. In 1961 arrangements were being 
completed for a new District de Paris headed up by a high powered civil 
servant (355) which would give the President and Prime Minister leading 
roles in determining future policies and plans in the capital and 
surrounding dtfpartements. In this context the new route ceased to be 
unattractive to leading engineers in the RATP who saw the opportunity to 
develop a new prestige project, without prejudicing the activities of the 
company on its traditional services. Furthermore, working on a project with 
direct links to the planning commissions established by Delouvrier, and 
reporting to the inner cabinet of the President, offered a channel of 
influence to further their personal and professional ambitions.
From the outset the national/local alliance which promoted the RER was 
different from that promoting improvements to the Metro. The local 
supporters were large companies, the professional engineers and property 
developers on the outskirts of the built up area. The national supporters 
were those parts of the Government keenest to promote modern redevelopment 
of the city’s business sector and to create an image of a revitalised 
country capable of leading the European Community. The Metro's promoters 
were more traditional local politicians keen to reap benefits from bringing 
improved public services to their area, and consumers themselves who wanted
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to escape the crowded, uncomfortable, unreliable service on which they now 
depended. For the national Government the Mfaro bought political peace, 
marginal gains in key suburban constituencies and polished the city’s image 
for tourists and visitors.
Local reluctance to countenance the RER in the early 1960s flowed 
mainly from concern about the effect of such an expensive project on the 
already perilous finances of the RATP. This concern abated immediately the 
Government announced, in 1961, that special funding would be made available 
for the RER (356), and that the new route from Etoile to La Defense would be 
financed wholly by a special grant from the central Government. The 
Government also undertook to meet half the costs of upgrading the Bastille 
to Vincennes and the Defence to St. Germaine en Laye route to RER standard. 
The other half of the cost was assumed by the District (357), and did not, 
therefore, impinge on the RATP’s revenues. Indeed the RER would have a 
beneficial effect on the RATP’s revenues because the system would operate a 
graduated fare structure (358). The flat rate fares in operation on the rest 
of the RATP’s network were a major disincentive to extending the scope of 
the system. As the average length of journey increased the proportion of 
marginal cost met by the flat rate fare fell. The RER was a new product, and 
could, therefore, be sold in a new way. It is this dimension of the RER, as 
a diversification of the RATP’s product range, which was, over the long term 
its most important impact.
To summarise the position reached by the mid 1960s: Essentially the 
central Government, through the autonomous Travawc Neufs (359) division of 
the RATP was engaged in a pilot scheme to assess the prospects of launching
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a new wide gauge rail network under the management of the RATP. The bulk of 
the pilot scheme consisted of upgrading two old SNCF lines, which the SNCF 
had readily conceded control of in order to avoid the burden of carrying out 
necessary repairs themselves. The only new construction was a tunnel 
linking the main Metro exchange at Etoile to the new CNIT at La Defense.
These initiatives had been embarked upon in a relatively unplanned fashion, 
to meet particular requirements for the CNIT and to improve access to labour 
markets for firms locating on the La Defense site. The name RER had been 
borrowed from previous plans and the allocation of management responsibility 
to the RATP was a pragmatic decision to smooth the path of a scheme mostly 
directed from the Elysee. The RER had evolved from being a traditional 
railway system, serving provincial travellers who needed to cross Paris, 
into a plan for how to serve suburban commuters into a pilot scheme to boost 
the prospects of a massive investment in offices to the west of Paris. The 
possibility that it might become a key element in the future shape of the 
region still hung in the balance.
6.2 : Spoke or spanner in the Schema Directeur!
The most important feature of the Schema Directeur was its attempt to 
restructure the Paris region around several new poles of development. These 
were the nine new towns planned in the outer suburbs. Their transport needs 
were to be met by autoroute class roads circling the city, and by RER rail 
routes linking them to one another across the city. This was the basic 
weakness of the Schema Directeur and the basic strength of the RER. By 
crossing the city the RER routes would make the new towns ideal residences 
for commuters, they would vastly expand the pool of labour available to
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firms locating in the central districts served by the RER, at the same time, 
this would undermine the independence of the new towns; rather than becoming 
alternative attractions to the city centre, they would simply facilitate 
more intense city centre commercial development. The RER also enabled 
increased specialisation of land uses, contrary to the policies of the 
Schema Directeur which sought to reduce segregation by planning integrated 
new towns (360).
The Schema Directeur envisaged three routes crossing the city, one from 
east to west from Etoile to Nation (where the Bastille line terminated), one 
from Luxembourg to Gare du Nord and one from Invalides to Champs Elysee. 
Only a very small part of this work was underway - the tunnels from Etoile 
to Auber and from Vincennes to Nation. The rest of the development of the 
RER was the relaunch of old services under a new banner. Most of the planned 
RER network could be mixed and matched out of the old SNCF suburban services 
in this way and this would create a new-look service for the airports and 
new towns. This would leave the Mitro to cope with the cross town 
travellers, and necessitate changes in mode to travel from a town like Torcy 
to La Defense. However, the central sections, as well as making the RER 
distinctive, would also make it fabulously expensive. This did not concern 
the planners who drafted the Schema Directeur which was replete with 
fabulously expensive schemes for which no funding had yet been identified.
It began to concern the Government and the engineers working on the pilot 
sections in the late 1960s. By then the new work was largely complete, and 
the new services were ready to open. Two questions had to be answered in the 
late 1960s: what kind of service was being launched - the first phase in a 
grand plan or a one off improvement to a lucky few; and secondly, what
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provision in its future funding and management arrangements should the RATP 
make for possible future work on the RER?
Simultaneously the overall Schema Directeur itself was under review.
The demographic rationale for a radical re-organisation of the city and its 
suburbs was undermined by the 1968 census which showed a slower than 
anticipated rate of population growth (361). Combined with the caution 
engendered by the political upheavals of 1968 the new data curbed the 
ambitions of the region’s planners. The nine new towns were cut to just five 
and one of the north - south RER routes was abandoned in the revised Schema 
Directeur of 1969. The RER was clearly vulnerable to these kinds of shifts 
in ambitions, for it was the centrepeice of a plan which was now threatened 
by political caution, a growing cultural conservatism and by resource 
constraints. In this context several strands of opposition to the RER began 
to gain influence in central Government circles.
The Minister of Transport, M. Raymond Mondon, favoured Metro 
extensions, particularly to facilities like airports which he argued should 
be linked to the widest possible number of destinations in the city so that 
they would serve all users rather than give special treatment to business 
customers wanting to travel swiftly to a few destinations (362). Metro 
extensions were cheaper, could be constructed more quickly, did not involve 
extensive building work in the centre of Paris and would offer political 
advantages in the suburbs in the municipal elections in 1973. Several 
provincial Maires including M. Defferre in Marseilles and M. Pradel in Lyon 
argued that to devote such a large proportion of infrastructure development 
funds and effort to central Paris ran counter to the regional development
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policies of the Government and that it was more important to develop 
provincial business by backing proposals for Metro systems in several major 
cities including Marseilles and Lyon, but also in Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing 
and Grenoble. Leading participants in the national debate were sensitive to 
these regional viewpoints. The Prime Minister, M. Chaban Delmas, was also 
Maire of Bordeaux and the Regional Prefect, M. Doublet, had been Prefect in 
Grenoble during the city’s redevelopment and preparation for the 1968 Winter 
Olympic Games (363).
The Minister of Finance and the management of the RATP were sceptical
as to the affordability of future RER development. No-one really knew what
it would cost to bore a tunnel deep under the centre of Paris, and engineers 
had nightmares about the potential pitfalls of the enterprise. The RATP 
certainly did not wish to embark on the venture without some guarantee of 
protection against the possible increase in costs. The central section of 
the RER was a prestige national project for which the local transport 
company and local population should not have to carry the can. The Ministry 
of Finance was unhappy with the suggestion that it should write a blank
cheque for the RATP’s engineers to go ahead with a risky idea. Their
experience with other high technology projects like the Concorde aeroplane 
was an unhappy one. The sections of the RER which had so far been completed 
had come in a three and a half times the original budget (364).
The road lobby was also concerned about the impact of the RER on road 
construction in Paris. First of all it was actually easier to construct an 
RER service to the new towns than to build new roads because the railways 
were already there waiting to be modernised in many instances. They
202
Part 3 : Policy Implementation
presented no problems of planning permission, design, parking and so.
Secondly railways were quieter, cleaner and safer than roads and would 
receive less opposition from the communes through which they would run. 
Thirdly if commuting could take place mainly on the RER then the case for 
arterial roads into the centre of Paris would be significantly reduced.
Fourthly, at a more general level, the road lobby did not wish to lose the 
ownership of the top prestige projects in the city. The greatest marvel of 
civil engineering in Paris in 1969 was the Boulevard Peripherique, 
especially the tunnel being constructed under the Bois de Boulogne. If the 
RER outstripped this in technical wizardry, then the rival system would have 
gained academic and public attention and the probability of new funds being 
approved for road building would be correspondingly reduced.
There were then two fundamental decisions to be made in 1969: whether 
to continue pursuing the RER at all and secondly if so what sections to 
construct first.
6.3 : Did Paris really need an RER system?
The issue of priorities was at the heart of implementing the Schema 
Directeur - the process of creating a new regional structure was quite 
different from painting a picture of the desired end product. Most of the 
forces and resources which would create a new regional market, new towns and 
new employment opportunities were outside the direct control of the planning 
and development agencies. It was particularly important for them to make 
appropriate interventions in the areas which were directly managed by public 
sector agencies. There was only a limited capital resource to allocate in
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the period of the sixth plan, and the state needed to be relatively 
confident that the preferred investments would not lead to crippling revenue 
costs in the long run.
In October 1969 the Prime Minister appointed a special ad hoc 
commission to advise him on priorities for transport infrastructure 
development in the Paris region. This was charged with looking at 
priorities on the basis of four possible financial scenarios: continuing 
expenditure at the fifth plan level of eleven billion francs; uprating the 
fifth plan expenditure to current prices making a total of fourteen billion 
francs; increasing expenditure to sixteen billion francs and finally 
increasing expenditure to nineteen billion francs. All of these options 
necessitated deferring at least one of the major transport schemes until the 
seventh plan. The four candidates for deferral were the central section of 
the RER, the extension of the Ligne de Sceaux to Chatelet to make a link 
with the RER system, the extension of Metro No. 5 to Orly Airport and the 
construction of the first phase of the A86/7 outer ring road.
The commission included representatives of all the major ministries 
concerned: Interior, Finance, Transport and Equipement and was convened by 
the Regional Prefect. It was the first group to look at the full 
consequences of transport investments which included the Ministry of 
Finance (365). The commission was not empowered to question existing 
allocations of resources committed in advance during the fifth plan. This 
meant that the completion of the Boulevard Peripherique was protected from 
scrutiny. The commission’s recommendation reflected the strength of the RER 
as a cornerstone of regional planning. The Commission recommended that
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within any given level of resources the central section of the RER should 
have highest priority and the A86/7 outer ring road the lowest priority.
They placed equal the Metro extension and the Ligne de Sceaux. The central 
section of the RER was assured favour because it was judged essential to the 
success of the new towns. This is a perverse outcome since of all the 
projects on offer the central section of the RER did most to re-inforce the 
tendencies to segregation and regional imbalance which the Schema Directeur 
sought to correct.
The likelihood of the new towns developing independent economies was 
further weakened by the decision to place the roads which would have 
insulated them from pressure to serve the city centre at the bottom of the 
list. This conclusion was not made public knowledge but became a basis for 
the planning commissions of the sixth plan and the Plan Global of 1972. The 
transport users’ campaign of 1970 worked on the assumption that the RER was 
not a fixed priority and that the Government might seek economies by not 
proceeding with the scheme, or by forcing the users to finance it through 
increased fares.
The RER was a central part of the Cartel's campaign. They regarded the 
project as crucial to relieving overcrowding on the main commuter routes and 
as indicative of the priority the Government attached to public transport in 
its future plans. Where the Cartel clashed with the Government over fares 
and revenue support to the RATP, its concern on capital projects, especially 
the central section of the RER tended to re-inforce adopted policy. The PCF 
regarded the RER as the central plank of its programme for improving the 
Paris region and it published ever more grandiose plans for regional rail
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systems. Significantly the Cartel’s largest demonstration in November 1970 
followed the projected route of the central section of the RER from Les 
Hailes to Opera, and one of the organisers, M. Jean Gajer, laid a foundation 
stone at Les Hailes for the new service. The Cartel’s most significant 
members, the alternative engineering profession and the commuters whose 
places of work were moving to new locations in the west of the city saw the 
RER as the long run answer to regional transport problems. The users’ 
campaigns were in no doubt that the region needed an RER, they did differ to 
a degree about relative priorities of sections of the RER.
6.4 : Where to start building the RER
If the new towns were the overwhelming justification for constructing 
the RER at all (366) then they could not be advanced as a justification for 
the central section. The majority of the settlements served by the east and 
west routes were very old towns, and the new towns to which the route would 
extend were in their infancy. The principal justification for starting with 
the central section was nothing to do with the outer suburbs; it was to do 
with the very heart of old Paris - Les Hailes. Right from the start of the 
Fifth Republic it had been the Government’s intention to do something about 
the area around the old Hailes wholesale markets on the right bank just west 
of the Marais. They were surrounded by dense, dirty streets, the centre of 
the Paris underworld, jammed with traffic by day and crime by night.
Retailing no longer demanded the city centre site which the existing 
markets occupied, and changes in the rest of Paris made Les Hailes an 
attractive area for redevelopment. In 1963 the District had put forward a 
plan for the reconstruction of the whole sector north of Place du Chatelet
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as far as Gare du Nord and Gare de l’Est (367). However, architectural and 
public opposition to the destruction of so many old and admired streets, the 
sole survivors of the Haussmann reconstruction of the 1860s, persuaded the 
District to withdraw the scheme. The issue remained on the agenda however, 
and became more pressing after new wholesale markets were opened at Rungis 
in the southern suburbs in 1969.
The vacant, cavernous archways of the old market halls, surrounded by
steadily depopulating quartiers falling into dereliction drew attention to
the waste of so valuable a city centre site. Some national ministries’ eyes
turned longingly to the site for their pet schemes. The Ministry of Finance
sought permission to plan a new HQ on the site enabling them to vacate the
wing of the Louvre they occupied. The Ville de Paris increased the pressure
to make a decision by permitting some of the market pavillions to be
demolished. The Regional Prefect mounted an exhibition of six outline ideas,
none of which met with much approval (368). Finally in 1970 the City Council
asked its own Urban Planning Workshop to propose a model for the future use
of Les Hailes. The workshop proposed a mixture of uses including a large
shopping centre, a national centre for art and culture, some new housing and
an office complex with space earmarked for the Ministry of Finance. This was
published in 1970 and approved by the Council of Ministers considering the
sixth plan in October of that year (369). The scheme was one of the largest
and certainly the most valuable redevelopment proposals in France but its
significance was wider still:
"Of all the renewal operations carried out in France it is among
the most important, not only because of its extent and cost, but
above all because of its location: to restructure the centre of
Paris is obviously going to change the way of life of its
inhabitants dramatically and, more profoundly, it will reorganise
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directly the conditions in which the whole urban area functions 
and develops. It affects the national and international role of 
the capital city" (370)
The most significant aspect of the plan in regional development terms 
was that the RER was an integral part of it. In the outline plans a new RER 
station and interchange was quite literally the foundation of the new 
buildings. The activities located on the Les Hailes site would be linked 
directly to major residential centres, to the Gare du Nord, Gare de Lyon and 
Gare Montparnasse, to the major airports and to La Defense by a high speed 
underground rail system. They would be at the hub of the city’s local, 
national and international transport systems.
The effect of this decision was felt at two levels. First the RER 
became part of a much bigger project for Parisians and for the 
international business community. A major new development in the very 
centre of one of the world’s top ten trading centres was of international 
economic significance. The central section of the RER wasn’t about making 
life more comfortable for marginal voters in the Val de Marne; it was about 
getting a stake in a part of Paris that promised future prosperity and 
prestige. Secondly it took control of the future of Les Hailes and of the 
RER away from the Ville de Paris and the engineers at the RATP. If the two 
schemes were bound together then their management would need co-ordinating 
as well. The RER was the deepest part of a major underground construction 
project, but the RATP could only build it if the rest of the plan was 
agreed. This meant that the initial phases of the Les Hailes project were 
carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport.
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It is not clear how it would improve the lives of residents of the new
towns or the old towns who had been promised new rail services to put Les
Hailes at the top of the priority list. Those with local in the suburbs
faced two major difficulties in making a case for a different order of
priorities. Firstly the main umbrella groups of transport users
wholeheartedly supported the RER and especially the central section, as did
all the opposition parties. The central section was what made the RER
different - distinguishing it from conventional railway systems and from the
Metro. Its identity rested on this project - so none of its supporters would
question the vast sums being expended tunnelling under the Seine and the
centre of Paris. The second problem was that many of the areas which would
benefit most from extensions to the suburban network of the RATP were new
communities which had no real political identity and in some cases did not
even have established political structures. In Clichy, the local council was
a crucial channel for local people’s concerns. In Noisel and Torcy, the
organisations managing the new towns were Etablissements Publiques whose
directors were accountable to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing.
Most of the day to day work was undertaken by the private consortia who
managed the ZACs. It was these consortia who provided the only route for
pressure on the Government to allocate funds, and their interests were
clearly less legitimate politically than the Maires and Councillors who
spoke for other causes. Only rarely did they make public statements, it is
testimony to the crucial role the RER played in their calculations that in
September 1970, as the priorities for the sixth plan were being set, the
Union des Constructeurs pour VAminagement du secteur de Noisel said:
"If the decision to commit funds to the eastern branch of the RER 
to Fontenay sous Bois and Noisy le Grand could not come within the 
ambit of the sixth plan. The consequences could be disastrous for
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the commencement of the new town of Marne la Vallee" (371)
The speakers for the central section had more weight. In the same month the
Cornell Administratif of the District sent a deputation led by Pierre Bas,
a Depute for Paris, to impress on the President of the Republic the
importance they collectively attached to the central section of the RER.
After the meeting M. Bas had this to say:
"Within Paris, we have told the President that we attach absolute 
priority to the central section of the RER between Auber and 
Nation with an intermediate station at Les Hailes. We have also 
pointed out how useful a link between St. Lazare and Invalides 
would be." (372)
6.5 : W ho paid for the RER?
The initial phases of RER construction were paid for entirely by the
national Government, and thus drew on loan sanctions which might have been 
used anywhere in France. The cost of the debt incurred was met by the 
central Government. These were special funding arrangements for a public 
transport service. Normally public transport investment was partly a local 
responsibility and local charges began to be built into subsequent sections 
of the system. At first these local charges only fell onto the District and 
they remained really just a way of laundering central Government funds, for
the District borrowed its capital on special terms from the central
Government. However, the long run revenue costs of the second phase, which 
were fifty per cent funded by the District, ultimately fell onto the budgets 
of the dipartements which contributed to the District’s budget.
The outer suburban lines which were the third phase of the RER after 
the central sections placed a direct financial burden on the passengers, for
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the RATP had to find forty per cent of the cost of building them, and repay 
that, if it borrowed, through income from fares or from the versements 
transports. Through the District's thirty per cent contribution to financing 
these developments the Government was also reducing the burden both to 
itself and to the SNCF. If the lines had remained the responsibility of the 
SNCF then the cost of modernising them would have been borne by the 
Government and SNCF passengers through the national capital programme of the 
railway system. So while the central prestige sections of the RER enjoyed 
special financial regimes which protected local people and passengers from 
the full consequences of such expensive investments, the outer suburbs ended 
up paying more for their new services than would have been the case had the 
RER, and its management structure, not been in place.
6.6 : The distribution of new travel opportunities
There is little unambiguous evidence of the changes which resulted from 
the construction of the RER. The Paris Urban Workshop (APUR) did carry out a 
survey of the effects of the Auber RER station on the major stores in the 
Quartier de l’Op^ra in 1971 which showed considerable passenger satisfaction 
with the service and a general belief among passengers and traders that the 
RER had improved prospects for the quartier and the big stores. Twenty four 
per cent of those who had travelled to the area to shop said that the RER 
had made it easier for them to do so, thirty one per cent of them said they 
would now travel to the quartier more frequently. The main advantages of the 
new line were cited, in order of importance, as: savings in time; 
improvements in reliability and improvements in comfort. Loyalty to the RER 
was highest for shopping and work, and fell for other purposes as customers
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said they found cars preferable. Most RER customers had previously used the 
M^tro. Of those surveyed sixty per cent had previously used the Metro for 
their journey, fifteen per cent an SNCF train, nine per cent the bus, seven 
per cent a car and one per cent a taxi. Of people who had come to shop 
fifty five per cent had previously used the Metro, twenty six per cent 
trains, nineteen per cent cars, seven per cent buses and two per cent taxis.
A parallel survey of shopkeepers and traders showed that fifty six per 
cent thought that the RER was an advantage to trade, eleven per cent thought 
it a disadvantage and thirty three per cent were indifferent. While the 
stores clearly felt the RER to be an advantage and had acted to secure good 
access to it when the station had been built, there is no direct evidence of 
them intervening to promote its construction. The main case for the Auber 
link seems to have been based on the need to provide good transport links 
from the city business district to the new sites at La Defense. The results 
of the APUR survey should be treated with some caution, one of the days 
they chose for their field interviews was the occasion of a national day of 
action by the two largest trade union confederations which would have 
affected workplaces in the district and the travel patterns of many 
transport users. Nevertheless the broad conclusions that many consumers and 
traders benefited, and that the RER was a popular alternative to the Metro 
and cars seem very reasonable.
A study commissioned by the IAURP in 1971 set out to assess the effects 
of the RER line from Nation to Boissy St. Leger (373). A sample of people in 
the communes around the new stations was polled, and a selected group 
interviewed to discover what impact the new service had had on their
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travelling behaviour, and what they thought about the RER. Overall the poll 
showed a very high level of satisfaction with the new service. Eighty five 
per cent of those asked thought the new line was an improvement and only 
three per cent said it was definitely worse than the old SNCF service. Over 
sixty per cent said that the main factor which had improved was either the 
time journeys took, or the comfort of the trains. People were less happy 
with the transport links to the new stations, the choice of Nation as the 
new terminus in Paris and the higher graduated fares. In addition many 
people said they did not care for the automated ticket machines. Only thirty 
per cent mentioned cost as a factor which had improved.
Most users perceived employees to be the main beneficiaries of the new 
line, only a very small number of people identified students, local 
residents or pensioners as getting greatest benefit from the RER. The 
distance people lived from the new stations made no significant difference 
to their perception of the service. The most satisfied new users were in 
fact the public transport captives, women and non-working men who had no 
access to cars. Crucially about ten per cent of customers had previously 
travelled by car. It would seem, therefore, that the new service could make 
substantial differences to car use on specified routes and promote greater 
transport opportunities and satisfaction for disadvantaged groups.
In land use planning terms, and in strategic development terms, the 
effect of the RER on property values was obviously fundamental. Changes in 
property values are the basic signals to developers and landowners and 
increases in house prices and rents confer major benefits on property 
owners. The 1971 IAURP study tried to examine these signals by looking at
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the volume of new construction in the communes along the new line, at land
prices and rents and by polling people to discover whether the RER had
affected their decision about where to live, when to move and how much to
pay. The report of the survey accepted that:
"Altogether, such a study will remain descriptive ... we have 
preferred to offer, as a first step, a wide picture of the 
phenomena rather than to analyse in more detail the behaviour of 
particular urban actors, notably developers" (374)
The study looked at three aspects of development activity: construction of
dwelling, location of firms and installation of public facilities. The
research suggested that the RER had had little impact on major
infrastructure decisions or indeed most very large investments, these had
been planned over a longer period and were part of broader schemes which
would not have taken the rail service into account. In addition the change
in basic infrastructure resulting from the RER was minimal (unless one
assumed that the still speculative central section would be built). In
contrast the new service had had a significant impact on the construction of
dwellings. In the area as a whole over eight thousand new dwellings were
under construction and research among property developers and estate agents
suggested that the RER made housing in the communes along the line more
attractive to purchasers. To assess this effect in more detail the survey
divided the twenty eight communes concerned into five sub sets: those with a
good RER service, those with a poor RER service, those with a good Metro or
SNCF service, those with a poor Metro or SNCF service and remote communes
with little public transport. In the communes with a good RER service
construction rates were substantially higher than elsewhere.
Prices rose steeply throughout the whole region in 1969-72. In the
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twenty eight communes surveyed in the IAURP survey prices rose by an 
average of fifteen to twenty five per cent, and rents by an average of 
sixty per cent. Prices rose quickest in areas of new development and 
greater availability of land. In the densely developed communes close to the 
city land doubled in price in the three years, whereas in the outer rural 
communes served by the new rail route prices increased up to fivefold.
On average fifteen per cent of residents had moved into the area since 
the opening of the line and the poll concluded that since 1965, when the new 
route was approved, the prospect of an RER service had influenced people’s 
decisions to move to the area. Fifteen per cent of people who moved in in 
1965 cited it as a significant reason and twenty five per cent of those who 
moved in in 1969. An intriguing point is whether it was the opening of the 
new line in 1969 which made the difference or the increasing confidence 
among developers that the central section would be constructed. Is it the 
actual service which influences people’s property purchase, or the hope of 
making a significant capital gain by buying in advance of a development 
which will significantly increase the desirability of their property? The 
IAURP study sheds no light on this question, though it suggests that those 
who bought in 1965 did indeed stand to make substantial gains as the new 
line neared completion and opened. Two years after opening price rises were 
back in line with the rest of the region. Overall there was, apparently, a 
powerful incentive for constructors and potential purchasers of housing to 
follow the RER routes under construction when making decisions about 
investment opportunities. The incentives to firms seem weaker, and the 
impact on public sector investment is minimal.
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These factors underline the argument against proceeding with the
eastern branch of the RER as the first phase of the project, for they
increase the incentive to the market to further skew the pattern of
development in the region along a single axis, the effect the Schema
Directeur expressly set out to counter. The IAURP study itself concludes:
"If the principle of constructing the RER is not in question, the 
preceding analysis shows that the choice of the eastern route to 
Boissy St. Leger as the first stage corresponded more to an 
historical inheritance than to a clearly determined planning 
option. ... It is regrettable that the idea of building an RER, 
the only real solution to the transport problems of the Paris 
region, has had to be mortgaged in this way by the choice of the 
first line to become a reality" (375)
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CHAPTER 7 : The Dynamics of Policy Change
At the beginning of this study two modes of explaining policy changes 
were distinguished: accounts based on external imperatives and explanations 
founded on an analysis of the internal working of the state. State centred 
explanations were favoured on the grounds that external accounts failed to 
offer an adequate analysis of the means by which structural pressures were 
transmitted into purposive policy changes. This is not to deny the 
significance of external pressures on policy making in Paris in the period 
1968 - 1976. As we have seen inexorable increases in population, economic 
activity and demand for land continued to tax the ingenuity of planners and 
politicians, and international events such as the commodity price boom in 
the early 1970s and the oil crisis of 1973/4 radically altered the 
parameters of regional development policy. The late 1960s and early 1970s 
also saw manifest social conflict around urban policy and living conditions 
involving the alienated residents of the new grands ensembles and, more 
significant, the new class of property owners who saw wholesale 
redevelopment of their neighbourhoods as a threat to the valuable 
environment of older quarters in the city centre. Transport infrastructure, 
and the costs of travelling, became one focal point of protest against the 
architectural and urban design fashions of the 1960s, and against a social 
order which increased the segregation of work, leisure and consumption, 
breaking up established communities and ways of life and creating new 
patterns of daily existence with high social and economic costs.
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An air of crisis, partly a reprise of the events of May 1968, partly a 
sense of the failure of previous thinking about city development permeated 
political and professional thinking in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Violence on the Metro, citizens’ campaigns and large demonstrations by 
hitherto restrained commuters underlined the dissatisfaction of ordinary 
people with the status quo. The professionals on the inside of policy 
development had their own dissatisfactions with past practice, with the way 
they were organised and managed, with the relationships between planners and 
the people who operated the transport systems; most of all with the 
resources at their disposal. Politicians found transport policy a worthy 
cause for concern and, according to their standpoint, saw possibilities for 
gaining or losing power in the solutions adopted.
There can be no doubt that the principal participants in policy 
development in the early 1970s perceived powerful external pressures of both 
an ecological and a social character. Figure 7.1 summarises the pressures 
perceived at a structural level, and suggests their progression into 
pressures operating in a political sphere or a professional/bureaucratic 
sphere. Nonetheless the evidence for such a progression remains contextual 
and nothing this account of the development of Paris Transport overcomes 
the objections to external explanations which ruled them out before. The 
essential functionality of such accounts whether they are based on an a 
priori structural logic or a consequentialist line of argument prevents them 
from offering demonstrable intentioned causes of the major policy changes 
for explanation is sought. The pluralist and policy network modes of 
explanation developed in the introduction are clearly more promising.
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7.1 : Pluralist Explanations
The ease with which the state accomplished a substantial volte face on 
transport priorities and funding lends credence to the pluralist argument 
that the state itself is a neutral agent of the social and political 
competition in wider society. The complexity of the decision making process, 
and the large number of actors involved also suggests a comparatively open 
and permeable system in which any single interest would find it difficult to 
maintain continuous dominance. The underlying optimism of the pluralist 
approach is also vindicated by the political system’s capacity to adapt to 
significant social and economic challenges and establish a fairer, more 
efficient distribution of transport opportunities, acceptable to most of the 
social interests involved.
In the ’weathervane’ variant of pluralism, the state’s neutrality is 
characterised as a faithful representation of the balance of social and 
political resources deployed by competing interests in society (376). During 
the late 1960s and early 1970s advocates of alternative policies promoting 
public transport and redistributing the burden of costs away from consumers 
mobilised direct public protests, a particularly potent intervention in 
policy making in the aftermath of 1968, and more so in this case because it 
was supported by traditionally conservative elements in the population. 
Rational argument also played a strong part in the campaign for change, and 
many politicians and public officials were persuaded of the impossibility of 
a road based transport plan. They doubted whether it was necessary in terms 
of demand for private travel; they feared it was not financially viable and
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they were also anxious about its environmental impact. Of course, votes 
were a primary political resource, and it is evident that transport issues 
were part of a gamut of questions about local autonomy and conditions of 
urban life around which all the major parties in the 1971 municipal 
elections framed their programmes(.3H). In the 1973 legislative elections 
the left re-emerged as a significant force in French politics and did so 
from its municipal bastions on a programme centred around the quality of 
life in citiesL^). Supporters of the proposed road based investments, and 
fare increases to raise revenue on a more commercial basis for public 
transport, also articulated doubts about the viability of continuing with 
the programme at the pace, and with the single-mindedness advocated in the 
earlier Schemas Directeurs and 5th Plan (3*). Local business interests, 
especially retailers, advocated some balance or trimming of the road 
programme, and had an interest in a less divisive means of funding public 
transport.
By the late 1960s the defenders of the road lobby and advocates of a 
more commercial approach to public transport had shifted from their 
earlier evangelism for the saviour of private motoring to a defensive 
posture emphasising the consequences of adopting alternative policies.
These focussed on the possible impact on the motor industry, and the 
dangers of establishing a precedent by building alternative public 
transport infrastructures buttressed by subsidised fares. The Society of 
Motor Manufacturers(3&)» was almost a lone voice advocating continued 
redevelopment of city centres to provide improved road networks, while 
engineers emphasised the probable expense of establishing comparable 
public transport systems to say, the RER, in provincial cities which had
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outstanding claims for government support, notably Marsailles, Lille and 
Lyon - two of which had municipal councils lead by opposition parties (381). 
Political support for the road lobby was concentrated among a few high 
offices, most importantly road construction had the sympathies of President 
Pompidou. It is probable that without his personal endorsement fewer road 
schemes would have been included in the sixth plan than ultimately were. 
With Pompidou’s demise, and the election of Valery Giscard d’Estaing, co­
inciding with the oil crisis of 1973/4, support for road building waned 
dramatically. Giscard cancelled several controversial projects soon after 
taking office, and by 1977 even erstwhile Pompidou loyalists like Jacques 
Chirac were seeking political advantage by cancelling road schemes in the 
City of Paris.
While the policies of the Schema Directeur reflected the underlying 
dominance of urban policy by business and property development interests, 
allied to arguments about the necessity of establishing a competitive 
position in the international economy, the effects of these policies in the 
transport sector had created a strong countervailing influence of public 
protest, environmental concern and demands for social equity which pushed 
the balance strongly in favour of public transport based solutions and 
created the climate in which the state could reasonably extract additional 
resources from business to fund them.
The ’equalizing’ variant of the pluralist argument places much more 
emphasis on the state responding to political resources claiming redress 
from economic injustices (382). As the studies carried out by the IAURP 
(383) demonstrate, the policies adopted in 1970-72, even the construction of
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the RER, had a directly redistributive effect, reducing the financial burden 
on poorer consumers and increasing travel opportunities most for those 
groups which had previously been most ’captive’ of inefficient public 
transport, or of expensive and inefficient car travel. The users’ campaigns 
argued explicitly that employers made substantial gains from the existence 
of a public transport infrastructure while the costs of its inadequacy were 
bourn by employees who were asked to pay more for losing their leisure time. 
The simple fact of redistribution, crucial though it was to the policy 
change, does not suggest that an ’equalizing’ state must inevitably adopt a 
public transport based solution. The Society of Motor Manufacturers, and the 
engineering and research consultancies promoting new roads, saw major 
opportunities to extend travel opportunities through cheaper cars, more 
roads and reduced taxation on fuel. As was evident when considering the 
interests of local businesspeople, it is not clear that adopting public 
transport based solutions was entirely an ’equalizing’ intervention. Indeed 
it can be argued that the primary gain in terms of social efficiency was to 
businesses, for the Versement Transports provided a simple and effective way 
of pooling resources for beneficial collective action, at no administrative 
cost to the firms.
It is common to both these variants of a pluralist account that 
’anticipated reactions’ are of great importance. At no point did voters 
reject candidates explicitly because of their views on transport policy.
Social order was never threatened during the demonstrations and direct 
action on the transport network. Most of the time the transport system 
worked tolerably safely and speedily, given the previous standards. The 
great fear was that these norms would cease to hold under the pressure of
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increasing economic and structural changes in society, or because citizens’ 
tolerance of the status quo could become exhausted. In the arguments put 
forward by consumers’ groups, trade unions, businesspeople the emphasis was 
on what would happen if policy problems were acted upon in good time. 
However, neither the ’weathervane’ nor the ’equalizing’ variant of the 
pluralist explanation incorporates the energetic participation of 
professionals and bureaucrats in decision making on transport issues.
The importance of events like the Colloque de Tours in shaping policy 
options and developing a consensus among managers, professionals and 
politicians, suggests strongly the ’broker’ variant of the pluralist model.
Many of the most outspoken criticisms of the previous policy, and of the 
organisation of transport in the city came from employees of the state. The 
Regional Prefect, M. Doublet, played a central role in articulating the 
issues facing the state, and as a broker in preparing the Plan Global, which 
laid the foundations for future policy. In addition the role, and 
organisation, of the main professional bodies changed significantly over the 
period as a direct result of competition for political influence, and in 
response to models of management which politicians sought, unsuccessfully, 
to import into public service. Doublet’s own description of the fierce 
battles within the bureaucracy over transport policy and management (384) 
suggests that brokerage was far from neutral and that the Corps des Ponts et 
Chaussees, the Prefects, and the Ministry of Finance, to name only three, 
had substantial direct interests in the outcomes of policy debates. As the 
focus shifted from strategic planning to operational management new groups 
of state employees, or contractors, came into the frame, and new rivalries 
within and between professions emerged. The greater part of policy
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development was internal to the state and its agents. Wider social conflicts 
chiefly established a context which provided advocates of differing options 
evidence with which to support their case. The issue in determining the 
applicability of a pluralist account based on ’broker’ model is the relative 
weight of external social and political pressures as against the influence 
of changes in professional thinking and the balance of power among competing 
professional and bureaucratic interests (see Figure 7.1 above). Such an 
account would have to show that social and political argument in society, 
through public campaigns, articulated business and employee interests and / 
or arguments advanced by political parties was the origin of demands for 
policy change, which then proceeded towards an outcome which had greater 
support in wider society and was acceptable to the major interests within 
the state.
The difficulty with this approach is twofold. First the issue is 
overdetermined. The causes identifiable are more than commensurate with the 
outcome of a radical shift in transport policy and funding, for a whole 
gamut of external pressures was acting on a unstable and divided 
constellation of policy makers: There was widespread social discontent, and 
fierce internal debate, plus tendencies to ’equalizing’ intervention by a 
politically cautious Government and a general ’cultural’ shift away from the 
ideology which underpinned policies up till 1968. Secondly how does one, 
empirically, distinguish between societal pressures and internal brokerage.
One possibility is to follow a model of democratic elitism in which 
competing elites struggle for influence in a wider social and political 
context and circulate according to their ability to sustain political 
confidence. However, while there was competition about influence, the policy
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making system in Paris in the late 1960s was closed and secretive, an intra­
elite process which excluded political representatives and normal political 
discourse. The dilemma of characterising interventions within a closed elite 
system is neatly characterised by the fate of the Chamant’s transport plans 
in 1970 (385). The character of an intervention in a policy argument is 
determined by more than the status of the group or individuals who advance 
it; the audience it is addressed to and the means by which it is 
communicated are of equal importance. When Chamant leaked his 6th Plan 
proposals to the Press in 1970 before they were rejected by the relevant 
Cabinet Committee was he seeking to influence their decision? Or was he 
dissenting from a decision with which he disagreed? Or was he simply 
mistaken about the probable outcome? Each possibility suggests a different 
audience and a different kind of intervention. The first would clearly be an 
internal intervention within the state’s decision making, the second part of 
a wider social debate to establish that alternative options were available 
and the third an attempt to gain political credit for an outcome which he 
saw as popular. Even if it were unambiguous that Chamant was engaged in a 
wider social debate, his intervention might still impact more on 
deliberations which were internal to the state. Empirically, the fine 
divisions between political and bureaucratic activity are not easily 
identifiable, and would be impossible to maintain rigorously in an account 
of a policy change. This is particularly true in the case of Paris transport 
where forums and processes which consciously blurred such distinctions were 
the crucial agents of policy development such as the Planning Commissions 
for the Plan, the Committees of the CCES and the ad hoc Colloques.
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7.2 : State Centred Explanations
A chronological account of policy development in the Paris Region 
between 1968 and 1976 can be established using the framework of the inter­
governmental relations model and policy networks approaches described in the 
introduction. Two phases, and an intervening period of uncertainty and 
system change are summarised in Figure 7.2. The evolution of policy making 
is best characterised as a shift from a professionalised policy network 
towards a mixed model displaying the main features of an intergovernmental 
relations network. However, it is necessary to distinguish betweeijsub- 
issues, within the overall field of transport policy, to build a full 
picture of the policy making system which emerged from the uncertainty of 
the early 1970s.
The Corps des Ponts et Chaussees built up a professional policy network 
in the 1960s which ensured their domination of transport policy making. This 
domination is clearly evident in positional terms; three quarters of the 
senior posts in transport and civil engineering were held by members of the 
Corps, so too were all the senior technical, and a high proportion of the 
non-technical posts in the Ministry of Equipement. In the Paris region, the 
main planning agencies advising the Regional Prefect and the central 
government were staffed by the more energetic, visionary modernists of the 
Corps. Thoenig (386) has charted the skill and tenacity with which the Corps 
leadership adapted their organisation and professional approach to ensure 
their survival in the new circumstances of large scale urban redevelopment.
He explains their success, and the pre-eminent influence on transport 
policy in terms of their ability to manage rivalries with other professional
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groups and to secure their own position within a turbulent political 
environment. None of these factors suggest strongly a professionalised 
policy network, they point rather to a policy community in which a broader 
constellation of interests including Prefects, other professions, Ministers, 
local politicians and transport managers interacted in such a way as to vest 
particular positional authority in members of the Corps des Ponts et 
Chaussees. Sfez (387) argues that this was indeed the case in the mid 1960s 
when crucial decisions about the RER were being made.
The basis for a professionalised policy community is the ideological 
dominance which the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees, and its associated 
institutions, especially the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussees exercised over 
transport policy in the late 1960s. The conspiracy which Thoenig condemns in 
his study is not a manipulation of offices but of ideas. As such, it was 
much more volatile and vulnerable. Rhodes (388) argues that the truly 
professionalised policy network is independent of other networks, and that 
resource allocators and politicians are dependent on their advice for 
rationales for activity or change. Supporting this view he cites particular 
examples from medicine and architecture (389). Policy in these fields is 
especially influenced by professional fashions, for example for high rise 
buildings or hi-tech medicine.
Transport policy is Paris was equally a victim of professional fashion 
for large scale road building and the unachievable monumentalism of the 
Schema Directeur. The debate about the relative priority of roads and public 
transport was enclosed within a small group of professionals who drew their 
reference points from other cities across the atlantic, from abstract
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mathematical models and from a vision of Paris shared by few of its 
inhabitants. The effective policy network included several key political 
offices, notably those of the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister, but was essentially politically unaccountable. Recommendations on 
regional development and transport policy went before the Conseil 
Administrative du District de la Region Parisienne which was an artificial 
gathering of local notables with only tenuous claims to political 
representativeness (390). More representative local politicians, for example 
Maires of suburban communes, took no systematic part in policy formulation 
and could only be involved through personal or political favours. Consumer 
interests and trade unions took no part in the institutions which were 
permitted to endorse regional development plans.
The professionalised network had very broad ambitions, it concerns 
spread, as the Corps’ always had, well beyond the confines of transport 
policy. Efforts to incorporate large areas of public policy from 
construction, to airports, to water supply, to architectural design, within 
a single framework also contributed to vulnerability and enhanced the 
professional rivalries with other groups who had similar ambitions. The 
Prefecture had some formal legitimate claim to a co-ordinating role in 
policy development and implementation and were naturally threatened by the 
networks built up by the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees. A commitment to a 
consistent and generalist approach to public administration was also at the 
centre of the world view of the growing group of graduates of the Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration who held high offices in public service.
While the Corps des Ponts et Chauss'ees had successfully defended its
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members positional authority within the network, it was unable to cope with 
the diminishing credibility among other groups, and its own ranks, of the 
fashion for road based massive redevelopment. This internal ideological 
doubt was compounded by the financial crisis afflicting public transport in 
the Paris Region. The fiscal regime under which the transport companies 
operated was strongly influenced by the ideological changes which were 
taking place within the public finance policy networks, and within key state 
offices charged with building a partnership between private industry and the 
state. This partnership called for a more businesslike approach from 
managers of public sector enterprises, and a reduction of the level of 
subsidy offered to public services. The efforts by the Ministry of Finance 
supported by leading members of the Prime Minister’s personal cabinet, as 
well as influential figures outside the Government, to place the RATP and 
SNCF on a firmer financial footing invaded the policy space of the 
transport policy network. By 1969 there was a significant risk of the 
professional policy community being bypassed in crucial investment and 
financial decisions. The risk that this posed to the professional dominance 
of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees was underlined by the decisions to 
increase fares and the creation of an ad hoc team to advise the Prime 
Minister on major investment priorities in the 6th Plan. Resolving the 
tension between public transport and road building solutions would require 
additional resources, and the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees saw that access 
to conventional forms of state funding would involve compromises over 
control of future policy making.
The instability of the policy community was increased by external 
protest from the users’ campaigns in 1970. They introduced a political
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dimension to policy formulation which had previously been conspicuously 
absent. In this context the closed professionalised policy community became 
unsustainable as a vehicle for devising alternative policies which could 
secure politically defensible transport plans. These circumstances lead both 
the Government and the Corps des Ponts et Chaussees to countenance 
exceptional arrangements in order to preserve political and professional 
credibility.
The structural pressures acting on the region were re-interpreted 
through a series of revisions to the Schema Directeur and the scale of 
transport developments within it. In particular the demographic forecasts 
were revised downward, and the projected levels of car ownership were 
reduced. Political aspects of the issues around transport priorities and 
funding services were opened up to wider debate involving users’ 
organisations and local politicians. The Regional Prefect assumed a broker 
role, producing a variety of statements of the issues facing the region, and 
pulling together recommended solutions drawn from several competing planning 
agencies. Suggested solutions were strongly influenced by swift and dramatic 
changes in professional thinking and public opinion. Events like the 
Colloque de Tours provided an open forum in which a much wider constellation 
of interests formed a transitory policy community expressly to develop a 
consensus about new directions in policy.
The versement transports was the foundation for the less 
professionalised policy network which assumed the mantle of implementing the 
solutions advocated at the Colloque or detailed in the Plan Global. The 
versement provided earmarked funding for public transport investment and
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therefore overcame the competition for resources between roads and public 
transport which had made the professional policy network so vulnerable to 
bypassing on financial issues. The revenue from the new tax insulated a new 
policy network from external threats and permitted a greater degree of 
political accountability than had been achievable in the 1960s. By 1973 a 
new policy network was fully established with a smaller specialist remit to 
manage the development and operation of public transport in the Paris 
region, leaving aside the broader questions of regional development and 
structural change. The network was still lead by the Corps des Ponts et 
Chaussees, but by the more local operational engineers whose focus was on 
policy implementation. At project level, as Metro extensions were built and 
railway improvements were planned local politicians provided a close link 
with users’ interests and local user committees. Absolved of carrying 
Pompidou’s grand strategy the professionals were able to be more responsive 
and sensitive to consumer interests. The key differences between the policy 
networks operating in each phase are summarised in figure 3.
Within the new policy network the precise constellation of interests, 
and the importance of the resources which they contributed clearly varied 
from project to project. There is a case to be made that each specific 
development generated its own special arrangements. It is not necessary to 
take the argument this far. The two cases examined in this thesis show a 
useful distinction between two areas of policy: strategic developments of 
national importance on the one hand and local transport systems on the 
other. As Chapter 6 described, national strategic developments like the RER 
system appear largely unaffected by the changes which took place in the 
between 1969 and 1972. In fact, the priority ascribed to the central section
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of the RER was one of the first examples of ad hoc political bypassing of 
the professionalised policy community which dominated phase 1 of policy 
making. After that however, implementation of the project was dominated by 
professional interests because of the highly specialist skills required to 
complete a feat of innovative engineering, and because many of the 
organisations most concerned with the new railway were either very new or 
not politically represented. While the RER served a very wide area, the 
number of professional groups with a major interest in its implementation 
was small and the scope for affecting the course of the development was very 
limited by the recognised expertise of the group undertaking its 
construction. The RER was a response to external economic imperatives 
forbetter national transport links, better access for labour to new sites 
and adequate infrastructure for major new developments in the suburbs and 
the city centre. It was fundamentally a central initiative which engendered 
its own closed, professionalised policy community - so secretive that it did 
not interact even with sympathetic users groups or politicians.
In contrast the Mjftro extensions, described in Chapter 5 above, 
progressed through a series of local political decisions of an almost 
pluralist character, in which leading professionals negotiated directly with 
a wide range of articulated local interests and sought to achieve an optimum 
result within the bounds of the centrally determined resources. Local 
political arguments allowed scope for influence over implementation, and the 
detail of operation in that immediate neighbourhood; broader strategic 
matters concerning resource allocations, fares, network priorities were not 
negotiable. The process was politically grounded; municipal politicians were 
the key players, and provided the channel through which consumer interests
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FIGURE 3 - POLICY DILEMMAS AND NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS
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and neighbourhood issues could be raised with the RATP and SNCF. In the
case of the extension of Mfiro 13bis, local political expectations and 
professional innovations in planning combined to produce taxing issues about 
relative priorities and good design which were resolved by a network of non­
central politicians and notables and non-central professionals to mutual 
advantage in their relationship with central rule makers. The outcome is 
evidence of a new professional expertise in brokerage around rationing 
issues and public participation in implementing new projects.
7.3 : Dynamics of Policy Networks
The policy networks models used in this thesis, like those analysed by 
Rhodes (391) are limited by being static through time. Each type of network 
is derived from analysis of a particular policy field in a particular 
period. An underlying theme is that policy networks, of various types, are 
self perpetuating; for example the constellation of interests involved in 
health policy planning remains restricted by the professional dominance of 
doctors. Changes in policy usually follow from some evolution within the 
network, or the balance of interests within them. In a predominantly 
professional network like health policy making in Britain, the change agent 
will typically be ideological since the existing professional and political 
relationships are very stable. The staticity of the individual networks 
focusses attention on categorising them, since useful predictions and policy 
analysis will require an accurate typology of policy fields and their 
associated policy networks.
The case of policy change in Paris transport suggests that networks can
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be shortlived, serving explicit short run purposes and it is, therefore, 
important to track the shifting character of a policy network through time.
In a comparatively short period (8 years), the style of policy making 
altered dramatically, and all of the elements of a policy network were 
transformed. The constellation of interests changed, becoming more focussed 
on specific projects, admitting local political and consumer interests and 
excluding planning strategists from outside the public transport field.
Within this group, local politicians and operational managers assumed a far 
higher profile. The network became more ’vertically dependent’, that is its 
members developed a closer reliance on one another for achieving their 
objectives, and simultaneously ’horizontal independence’ increased as the 
policy field became more insulated from financial pressures. Resources 
within the network were not merely redistributed but redefined, as new tax 
revenues provided a secure basis for investment and local political 
accountability altered the balance of power in project implementation. The 
example of Paris transport policy indicates that it is clearly possible for 
policy networks to undergo rapid changes and that in professionalised policy 
fields exceptional arrangements which broaden access and increase political 
accountability are likely to be the vehicles for swift changes in ideology 
and policy.
One intriguing possibility is that policy networks themselves interact 
with the origins of policy choices (see Figures 7.1 and 7.3 above) and there 
may be, over the longer run, a life cycle of policy networks by which 
professional competition and non-central politics renew themselves. The 
exploration of this hypothesis is beyond the scope of a focussed study such 
as this but could contribute much to a broader theory of policy change.
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The issue of Transport Policy change in Paris was selected after an 
initial trawl through the literature of urban planning and development in 
Paris, as it presented a startling political paradox and an ideal focus for 
illuminating issues of urban policy making, professional power, consumer 
protest and relations between local and national political systems. Within 
the overall remit the question of strategic shifts in policy priorities and 
the distribution of costs are the major indicators of the scale and 
significance of the outcomes of a period of serious political conflict. The 
durability and depth of the change in policy and management style were 
assessed by examining in detail the subsequent implementation of priority 
transport developments.
The majority of the research for the thesis was carried out in Paris 
using three principal types of evidence: primary material and press 
reporting of the events which form the focus of the policy changes analysed 
in the thesis; interviews with key participants and analysts of the 
transport planning process in the Paris Region and thirdly the existing 
literature on urban planning and professional politics.
The first major source was primary material produced by planning 
agencies, government ministries, political parties, campaigning groups and 




* The Prefecture of the Paris Region and I n s t i t u t  d'Amenagement e t  
d'Urbanisme de la  Region d ' l l e  de France in Paris
* The A te l ie r  P a ris ien  d'Urbanisme (APUR), Paris
* Centre de Recherches d'Urbanisme, Paris
* The Ecole N ationale des Ponts e t  Chaussdes, Paris
* The I n s t i t u t  de Recherches de Transports, Paris
* the M in is tre  de 1 ’Equipement e t  de 1 'Amenagement du T e rr ito ire ,
Paris
* The S erv ice  Regional d'Equipement d ' l l e  de France, Paris
* The Syndicat des Transports P arisiens, Paris
* The RSgie Autonome des Transports P a ris ien s (RATP), Paris
* the I n s t i t u t  In te rn a tio n a l d 'A dm inistra tion  Publique, Paris
* P rospective  e t  Amenagement, Montrouge, Paris
* The Serv ice  de Presse at the I n s t i t u t  d ‘Etudes P o litiq u e s , Paris
During the fieldwork stage of the research a series of interviews, 
sometimes followed up by further inquiries, were held with a selection of 
key sources from within the transport planning agencies and regional 
administration at the time in question. The work benefited greatly from the 
evidence and helpful advice of staff at the IAURP and RATP, and from the 
time given up by administrative and professional staff in many agencies. The 
following people were interviewed:
M. P. Bemey, Head of Planning and Development
(Transport) at the I n s t i t u t  d ‘Amenagement 
e t  d'Urbanisme de la  Region d ' l l e  de France
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* M. G. Billon,
* M. J.P. Blanc,
* M. T. Brehier,
* M. de Calbiac,
* M. P. Cally,
* M. H. Conte,





Transport Officer at Federation Genera le  
des Transports e t  de 1 ‘Equipement, CFDT, 
Paris
D irection  des Col l e d i v i t ^ s  Locales, 
M in isters  de 1 ‘In t^ r ie u r  
Transport and Urban Planning Correspondent 
of Le Monde
S ec re ta ire -  A djo in t, Syndicat des
Transports P arisiens
Chef des S erv ices A d m in istra tives  e t
F inanciers, Syndicat des Transports
P arisiens
A djo in t au Maiire, Vi l i e  de C lichy  
Former Regional Prefect, Former Prefect of 
the Seine, at the time of research he was 
Head of the organisation responsible for 
planning and constructing car parks in the 
Paris area. Author of P aris en Proces 
Depute de Paris, A djo in t au Maire de P aris, 
C on se iller  Regional d ' l l e  de France and 
former President of the Paris Municipal 
Counci 1.
A djo in t en Chef du S erv ice  du Plan de 
Transports e t  de lig n es  nouvelles, RATP had 
direct managerial responsibility for Metro 
extension projects in the relevant period, 









of the Paris Federation (deposed in 1977 for 
his views on internal party democracy), 
candidate for Maire of Paris and author in 
1971 of the PCF's policy on transport in the 
Paris Region.
Chef du Departement P o litiq u e  des  
Transports, D irection  Regionale de 
1 'Equipement de I ' l i e  de France 
Former Chairman of the GEDACT, Former 
C onseiller General, leading contributor to 
PCF policy on Transport Policy, leader of 
the November 1971 demonstrations by 
Transport Users, author of an MSC Thesis on 
the RER and at the time of research special 
advisor to the Minister of Urban 
Development.
Service  des R ela tions E x terieures, RATP 
D irection  des Etudes, RATP : worked on the 
development of the Multi-criteria planning 
systems, presented public evidence for 
inquiries on Metro extensions, author of 
RATP planning model in use in late 1970s. 
Service  des R ela tions E x terieures, RATP 
Charge de M ission, Syndicat des Transports  
P arisiens -  responsible for services to new 
towns, policy advice to the Regional Prefect 
and advisor on RER priorities in mid 1970s.
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* M. B. Roy, D irection  des Etudes, RATP - co-author with
J-C Hugonnard of RATP planning model and 
researcher on Metro extensions and project 
evaluation,
* Alain Vidalon, Chef de Cabinet de M. P ierre  Giraudet,
Former Director General of the RATP
The interviews were based around a core of questions concerning the 
origins, consequences and rationale for strategic policy changes in the 
field of transport in the Paris Region, but were conducted on an 
unstructured basis and offered interviewees maximum opportunity to develop 
themes on which they wished to expand, or considered themselves particularly 
able to contribute to the research project. Evidence was placed within case 
studies of policy change and no explicit comparative or hypothetical 
framework of policy development was posited consistently throughout the 
collection of data and views. Interviewees were invited to offer their own 
explanations of events and to judge their importance to policy change within 
their own terms. The model of distinguishing clearly between the strategy 
issues and implementation issues emerged early in the fieldwork, and the 
study of the Metro extension was pursued with implementation issues in mind, 
several of the interviewees were directly involved in the planning and 
construction of Line 13bis.
A comprehensive literature survey was completed covering issues of urban 
development, planning, professional policy making, political institutions 
and processes in France, transport methods and economics, decision making 
and public sector management. Extensive searches of the catalogues of the 
following institutions were undertaken:
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* The British Library of Political and Economic Science
* The University Library, Cambridge
* The B ibliothecque of the I n s t i tu t  d 'E tudes P o litiq u es , Paris
* The Bibl iothecque Cujas, Paris
* The Bibl iotti&cque A dm in istra tive at the Hotel de Vi l i e , Paris
* The Bibl iothecque o f  the I n s t i tu t  d'Urbanisme, U n iversite  de P a ris
X II at Creteil
* The Bibl iothecque at the U niversite  de P aris X at Nanterre
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